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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Brands as Relationship Partners  
 
Traditionally, a brand has been understood as “a name, term, sign, symbol or design, or a 
combination of them which is intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or a 
group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competitors” (Kotler, 1997, p. 443). 
With the advancement of brand research however, the ability of brands to serve as 
relationship partners for consumers has become a focal point of research. Relationship 
principles have virtually replaced short-term exchange notions in both marketing thought 
(Webster, 1992) and practice (Peppers & Rogers, 1993) precipitating what has been 
considered a paradigm shift in marketing research (Deighton, 1996): “A call for the 
advancement of understanding consumer-firm relationships comes as customer satisfaction 
and other traditional measures used for relationship evaluation such as trust, commitment, 
and long term orientation do not seem to capture the fullness of the relationship notion” 
(Walls, 2003, p. 7). 
  
A key reason for the advancement of the relationship paradigm in consumer research is the 
new, increasingly efficient ways that companies have of understanding and responding to 
customers' needs and preferences, allowing them to build more meaningful connections with 
consumers than ever before (Fournier, Dobscha, & Mick, 1998). In fact Deighton (1996) has 
argued for a shift from broadcast marketing to interactive marketing. The term interactive 
refers to two communication features: the ability to address an individual and the ability to 
remember his response. That way the company can address the individual again, taking into 
account his prior unique response, thus making an interactive communication between 
company and customer possible. According to Deighton, mass marketing concepts and 
practices are taking advantage of new ways to become more customized, more responsive to 
the individual.  
 
The idea that people form relationships with brands is not without controversy however. 
Researchers have critically acknowledged that non-social judgments differ from social 
judgments in several ways. For example Kardes (1986) found that the effect of an initial 
judgment on subsequent judgments of a product differs from the extent of this effect on social 
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judgments. In addition people often use the self as a frame of reference when judging other 
people, but do not do so when judging nonsocial objects (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Hence, is it 
at all valid to conceptualize brands as relationship partners?  
 
Relationships have traditionally been defined as sequences of interactions between parties 
where the probable course of future interactions between them is significantly different from 
that of strangers (Hinde, 1976). Based on that, Aggarwal (2004) argues that established 
consumer interactions with brands could also be characterized as relationships because they 
too can be seen as sequences of interactions that differ from mere singular transactions. 
Concerning the question, when we can speak of a relationship, Macneil (1978) argues that 
purely discrete transactions constitute a rare exception. He suggests a continuum ranging 
from discrete transactions to relationships. According to him most transactions (including 
purely commercial transactions) have a relational character. The idea of a relationship 
continuum can also be found in Fournier’s (1998) work: she describes consumers’ 
relationships with brands as ranging from best friendships to forced marriages or flings.  
 
Empirical support for the relationship metaphor can be found in studies showing that 
consumers anthropomorphize brands as well as research showing that consumers bond with 
brands in similar ways as they do with social relationship partners. On a very general level, 
the human tendency to anthropomorphize inanimate objects has been identified as universal 
to all societies (Brown, 1991). Theories of animism suggest a felt need of people to 
anthropomorphize objects in order to facilitate interactions with the nonmaterial world 
(Gilmore, 1919; McDougall, 1911; Nida & Smalley, 1959). In fact consumer research has 
provided first evidence that consumers are able and willing to view brands as animate 
objects: they consistently assign personality traits to brands (Aaker, 1997; Aaker, Fournier, & 
Brasel, 2004) and engage in trait inferences similar to those used in personal interactions 
(Johar, Sengupta, & Aaker, 2005) or think about brands as if they were human characters 
(Levy, 1985; Plummer, 1985).  
 
Recent research in marketing has adopted relationship specific concepts and successfully 
applied them to the consumer-brand domain: Paulssen and Fournier (under review) applied 
and extended attachment theory, which has produced a large body of evidence for explaining 
individual differences in personal relationship behavior (see e.g., Ainsworth & Bowlby, 
1991), to the marketing domain. They found that, similar to the interpersonal domain, 
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consumers develop different attachment styles in relationships with their brands. Based on 
their work they concluded that “although the existential reality of the commercial relationship 
may never be proven, empirical results such as ours, which demonstrate that consumer-
brand/dealer engagements behave in an ‘as if’ fashion to personal relationships, provide 
reasons to continue development of the relationship paradigm in consumer research” 
(Paulssen & Fournier, under review). Furthermore, Aggarwal and colleagues (Aggarwal, 
2004; Aggarwal & Law, 2005; Aggarwal & Zhang, 2006) have provided first indications that 
norms may govern consumer-brand relationships and influence consumers’ acceptance of 
certain marketing tactics, perceived as ‘brand behavior’. 
 
However, by and large, research on consumer-brand relationships remains scarce: “The study 
of relationships is increasingly important to marketing theory and practice, yet research on 
consumer product and brand relationships has been limited” (Fournier & Brasel, 2002, p. 
102). It is the aim of this dissertation to fill several important lacks in consumer-brand 
relationship research, thereby advancing the field as a whole and providing further evidence 
for the relationship metaphor in consumer research. This dissertation consists of five articles 
concerned with different aspects of consumer-brand relationships. In the remainder of this 
chapter the articles will be introduced and their relation to the broader topic of consumer-
brand relationships will be pointed out. Each of the following subsections will also go beyond 
the articles and provide a wider introduction of the focal topics at hand. Article 1 looks at 
what makes consumers consider a brand in the first place, the precondition for a brand to 
establish a relationship with a consumer. Article 2 deals with sustaining consumer-
relationships and the role of satisfaction in retaining customers. Article 3 looks at whether 
consumers stay with the brand in the case of a relationship problem, actively work to sustain 
the relationship or silently let it deteriorate. It shows that relationship norms constitute an 
important factor in how consumers react to such negative incidents in a relationship. Article 4 
investigates the effect of negative brand information on consumers’ attitudes and article 5 
develops communication strategies for companies to employ when negative brand incidents 
occur.  
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1.2. Entering Consumers’ Consideration Sets 
 
“One of the most important roles played by brands … is their effect on consumer brand 
choice and consideration” (Erdem & Swait, 2004, p. 191). Entering a consumer’s 
consideration set is the condition sine qua non for establishing a relationship. However, 
whether consumers consider a brand ultimately depends on their perceptions of the brand and 
whether they think that the brand is able to satisfy their relevant purchase goals:  
 
“What matters in the construction of brand relationships is not simply what 
managers intend for them, or what brand images ‘‘contain’’ in the culture … but 
what consumers do with brands to add meaning in their lives. The abstracted, goal-
derived, and experiential categories that consumers create for brands are not 
necessarily the same as the categories imposed by the marketers in charge of brand 
management” (Fournier, 1998, p. 367).  
 
As an example, when VW decided to launch its luxury car VW Phaeton its goal was to 
establish relationships with customers on whom the VW brand previously had missed out on: 
the segment of luxury car customers, willing to pay premium prices and promising high 
margins. From a resource based strategic management perspective the outlook was 
optimistic: VW had control of the essential resources and adequate firm characteristics for 
production, existing distribution channels and even experience with the production and sales 
of luxury brands like Bentley, Lamborghini, and Bugatti. However despite millions of Euros 
spent in marketing costs and a product equal or superior to competitors’ products VW failed 
to sell more than a fifth of VW Phaeton cars from what management had expected (Rust, 
Zeithaml, & Lemon, 2004). What VW managers may have overestimated is the ability of a 
VW brand car to satisfy the product category goal of consumers in the luxury car segment 
despite a strategic positioning to do so. As the results of article 1 show, most customers in the 
luxury car segment did not consider the VW brand, in fact many even clearly rejected it.  
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1.2.1. Consideration Sets  
 
Consumers do not equally consider all brands before making a purchase decision (see 
Roberts & Lattin, 1997). Some brands are rejected immediately because they are not relevant 
for purchase, too expensive or of clearly insufficient quality and so forth. Other brands 
receive intense scrutiny and are part of a set of brands a consumer actively considers before 
making a purchase decision. Wright and Barbour (1977, p. 91) were the first to introduce the 
term consideration set, defining it simply as “the brands a consumer will consider”. 
Generally consideration sets are seen as being dynamic in the sense that they evolve over 
time (Howard, 1977; Roberts & Lattin, 1991).  
 
Narayana and Markin (1975) conceptualized the categorization process comprising of an 
awareness and an unawareness set, the latter containing all the brands the consumer has never 
heard of. The awareness set in turn, they argued, consists of a consideration set, containing 
the brands a consumer has a positive evaluation of and that he actively considers, an inert set, 
containing brands he carries neither a positive nor negative evaluation, and an inept set, 
containing brands he clearly rejects. Brisoux and Laroche (1980) advanced the model by 
differentiating between processed set and foggy set, the latter containing all those brands that 
due to cognitive capacity limits are not completely processed. Similar to Narayana and 
Markin, Brisoux and Laroche differentiate between consideration set, hold set and reject set. 
In contrast to the inert set, the hold set however does not consist of brands with neutral 
evaluation but brands that are neither acceptable nor unacceptable. Early work on 
consideration sets has focused on consideration set size and correlates and provided 
conclusive evidence for the existence of consideration sets (see Ostlund, 1974; Jarvis & 
Wilcox, 1973; Maddox et al., 1978; Gronhaug, 1973; Belonax & Mittelstaedt, 1978; Prasad, 
1975; Gronhaug & Troye, 1983; May & Homans, 1977; Belonax & Javalgi, 1989).  
 
Different perspectives on consideration set formation have evolved in the literature. 
Normative approaches (see Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Roberts & Lattin, 1991) are based on 
Stigler’s (1961) notion that the economic theory of utility-maximizing behavior can be used 
to predict the amount of information a decision maker should acquire. While search costs 
remain constant with each additional brand considered, the marginal expected utility from the 
search decreases with the number of brands already examined. Hence, an optimal number of 
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brands to consider exists: a consumer outweighs the cost of including additional brands into 
his consideration set against the expected benefit of adding more brands (Roberts & 
Nedungadi, 1995).   
 
Information processing approaches argue that consideration set formation is a consequence of 
humans’ constraint capacity to consider and evaluate all existing brands. Howard and Sheth 
(1969) conceptualized consideration set formation as a learning process, in which a consumer 
tries and evaluates different brands and over repeated exposure and purchase eventually 
learns which brands to include. The consideration set is viewed as a heuristic to reduce 
purchase effort.  
 
Stimulus-based choice approaches focus on the limited capacity of short-term memory and its 
influence on information processing (Bettman, 1979). The formation process is 
conceptualized as a two-stage process, with an initial non-compensatory screening phase and 
a mostly compensatory evaluation phase (Bettman, 1979; Lussier & Olshavsky, 1979; 
Olshavsky, 1979). This two-step process could be observed in several studies (see Lussier & 
Olshavsky, 1979; Olshavsky, 1979; Wright & Barbour, 1977; Payne, 1976).  Memory-based 
choice approaches have focused on the influence of retrieval processes on consideration-set 
formation. The approach rests on the availability–accessibility paradigm (Tulving & 
Pearlstone, 1966) distinguishing between general awareness (i.e., known brands) or 
availability and (b) situation-specific awareness (i.e., retrieved brands) or accessibility.  
 
Memory-based choice approaches are problematic however, because brands may be recalled 
even though they will eventually be rejected (see Holden, 1993). Therefore, Paulssen and 
Bagozzi (2005) provided a direct investigation of the antecedents of brand categorization. 
Based on Carver and Scheier’s (1998) theory of self-regulation, they developed and 
empirically tested a self-regulatory model of consideration-set formation that incorporates 
consumers’ goal-oriented, purposive behavior (Bagozzi & Dholakia, 1999; Bagozzi & 
Nataraajan, 2000). Similarly, Chakrawati, & Janiszewski (2003) could point out the role of 
motives on the consideration set composition in novel purchase situations. Their work 
represents a shift from the prevalent information-processing perspective and the 
accessibility–availability paradigm to a motivational point of view on consideration set 
formation and consumer behavior.  
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1.2.2. Consideration Sets as Goal-Derived Categories 
 
Following Ratneshwar, Pechmann, and Shocker‘s (1996) initial hypothesis, Paulssen and 
Bagozzi (2005) could show that consideration sets can be conceptualized as goal-derived 
categories. The term ‘goal-derived categories’ was originally coined by Barsalou (1991) 
based on early research on categorization processes (see Mervis & Rosch, 1981), describing 
often highly specialized sets of objects people create in everyday life, like ‘things to eat on a 
diet’. Similar to classic taxonomic categories, goal-derived categories possess a continuum of 
degrees of membership that range from typical members to typical non-members. This has 
been referred to as ‘graded structure’ (Rosch, 1975; Barsalou, 1991).  
 
Similar to graded structure where typical members of a category, unclear members of a 
category and non-members can be distinguished, frameworks of brand-categorization with a 
similar tri-partition into consideration, hold, and reject set have been developed (Laroche & 
Toffoli, 1999; Brisoux & Laroche, 1980; Peter & Olson, 2005). For example, depending on 
the goals of consumers, members of the product category ‘chair’ should be assigned different 
degrees of membership in the resulting goal-derived categories. The degree of membership of 
a particular chair in the different goal-derived categories will then be a function of its ability 
to serve the associated goals. A consumer with the goal derived category ‘chairs that provide 
back support’ will assign an orthopedic chair a high degree of membership whereas a 
consumer with the goal derived category ‘chairs that look stylish’ will likely assign it a low 
degree of membership. In a purchase situation a consumer with the goal derived category 
‘chairs that provide back support’ would hence include the orthopedic chair in his 
consideration set, whereas a consumer with a goal-derived category ‘chairs that look stylish’ 
would likely include it in his reject set. A third customer with the goal derived category 
‘chairs that are durable’ may neither clearly consider nor clearly reject it and include the 
orthopedic chair in his hold set (see Paulssen & Bagozzi, 2005).  
 
1.2.3. The Relationship between Consideration Sets, Market Segments and Strategic 
Groups 
 
To understand which brands comprise consumers’ consideration sets is of crucial importance 
because these are the only ones that are seriously scrutinized in a purchase decision. A market 
can be divided into a certain number of segments in which consumers consider a distinctive 
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subset of brands (Cooper & Inoue, 1996). Each market segment can also be described by the 
probabilities that brands are in the consideration, hold or reject set of its respective customers. 
Competition between them exists to the extent that potential customers perceive them as 
substitutes at a particular purchase occasion (Cooper & Inoue, 1996; Siddarth, Bucklin, & 
Morrison, 1995)  
 
The supply-side analogue to market segments are strategic groups (Grover & Srinivasan, 
1987), commonly defined as firms that intensely compete in a particular segment and use 
similar strategies (Bauer, 1991). The topic of strategic groups has been one of the most active 
areas of strategic management research (see Peteraf & Shanley, 1997) and has generated 
large amounts of publications on the topic over the last three decades (McNamara, 
Deephouse, & Luce, 2003). It was Hunt (1972) who first introduced the concept of strategic 
groups in his dissertation in order to describe intra-industry structure. Porter (1979) later 
conceptualized strategic groups as persistent structural features of industries and Hatten and 
Hatten (1987, p. 329) contended that strategic groups segment firms into “sets of companies 
whose competitors, actions and results are relevant to each other”. 
 
Most research on strategic groups has been conducted by analyzing archival strategy 
variables (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Ketchen, Thomas, & Snow, 1993), mostly using cluster 
analysis methods (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990). However these 
approaches have been criticized for a lack of theory (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Peteraf & 
Shanley, 1997), an over-reliance on secondary data (Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988), an 
inability to explain how and why competitive structures in industries come to develop 
(Hodgkinson, 1997) and a failure to predict future strategic behavior and performance 
(Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). Starting with Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller (1989) 
research on strategic groups in the nineties has investigated groupings of firms based on 
managers’ cognitions (Reger & Huff, 1993). Porac et al. found that managers shared themes 
about the boundaries of the competitive domain and often showed wide agreement about the 
competitive process in that domain. Many studies have since been concerned with managers’ 
groupings of firms, investigating links to other grouping methods (Nath & Gruca, 1997), 
performance measures (McNamara, Luce, & Thompson, 2002; Osborne, Stubbart, & 
Ramaprasad, 2001; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2003) and reputation differences (Ferguson, 
Deephouse, & Luce, 2000). Summarizing the contribution of cognitive research in the 
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strategic group domain, Peteraf and Shanley (1997, p. 165) argued, “The most compelling 
evidence for the existence of meaningful groups of firms within industries comes from 
cognitive studies and from organizational ecology”. Surprisingly few studies however exist, 
investigating customer-side approaches to strategic groups (exceptions are Day et al., 1987 
and Pegels & Sekar, 1989).  
 
Corollary to the existence of strategic groups is the concept of mobility barriers (McGee & 
Thomas, 1986): “the concept of mobility barriers is inextricably bound to any discussion of 
strategic groups” (Olusoga, Mokwa, & Nobel, 1995). Mobility barriers are structural forces 
impeding firms from freely changing their competitive position (Hodgkinson, 1997). 
Mobility barriers can be caused by market related strategies, industry supply characteristics 
and firm characteristics (McGee & Thomas, 1986) as well as assets such as brand name, loyal 
customer base or distribution channels (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). From a customer side 
perspective, a strategic group is at least partly sheltered from competition because other firms 
cannot readily imitate the mix of product attributes preferred by customers of a particular 
segment. Hence, customer preferences restrict strategic movements of companies. Therefore 
customer preferences can be conceptualized as mobility barriers for firms. 
 
Because brands that make up an individual’s consideration set are those brands he perceives 
as substitutes (Roberts & Lattin, 1991), competition between goods or services exists to the 
extent that potential customers jointly consider them in a particular purchase. The more 
consumers jointly consider two brands, the higher the degree of substitutability and hence the 
greater the intensity of competition between those two brands should be (Cooper & Inoue, 
1996; Siddarth et al., 1995). Following this argument, several researchers have employed 
consideration sets in order to structure a market (e.g., DeSarbo & Jedidi, 1995; Finn & 
Louviere, 1990).  
 
1.2.4. Contributions of Article 1 
 
Following Cooper and Inoue (1996) article 1 proposes that market segments or strategic 
groups can be seen as types of consumers with homogeneous patterns of brand 
categorization. Using latent class analysis article 1 shows that consumer groups or brand 
categorization types with intense rivalry between certain brands but lesser rivalry with other 
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brands emerge. Further, results of article 1 show that the salience of the product category goal 
‘self-presentation of social status’ differs across these types and that in turn the salience of 
this product category goal determines the importance consumers attach to certain benefits like 
‘sporty driving’ or ‘comfort’. 
 
Structuring markets based on consumers’ brand categorization patterns allows the 
characterization of market segments by the probability of brand consideration, rejection, or 
neutrality. This approach results in a clear picture of preference barriers, which can be seen as 
mobility barriers for firms. By categorizing brands into ‘consideration’, ‘uncertain’ and 
‘reject’ set, these patterns also allow for an estimation of the strength of demand-side 
mobility barriers. Firms that want to overcome these barriers will need to address prevalent 
customer goals and corresponding benefits. Apparently VW’s Phaeton was not able to 
sufficiently satisfy the goal of ‘self presentation of social status’. Article 1 shows that the 
probability that consumers in the ‘luxury car segment’ would reject a VW-brand car was 
0.83, creating an especially high mobility barrier for VW.  
 
Article 1 contributes to research on consumer-brand relationships by providing support for 
Fournier’s (1998) notion that the goal-derived categories that consumers create for brands are 
not necessarily the same as the categories imposed by marketers in charge of brand 
management. When trying to enter consumer relations marketing managers hence are well 
advised to investigate customers’ perceptions of a brand’s ability to satisfy their relevant 
consumption goals. 
 
1.3. Establishing Lasting Brand Relationships 
 
Undoubtedly, entering the consideration set of a consumer is a pre-condition for establishing 
a relationship with a consumer, followed by the consumer’s actual choice of the brand over 
the other competing brands in his consideration set. Until the eighties marketing researchers 
have primarily focused on single transactions that consumers make (Homburg & Bruhn, 
2005). As outlined above, during the nineties, marketing has undergone a paradigm shift 
(Grönroos, 1994; McLoughlin & De Bourca, 1996; Brodie et al., 1997), redefining marketing 
in relationship terms and stressing the need for effective management of consumer-brand 
loyalties (Blattberg & Deighton, 1991; Reichheld & Sasser, 1990; Webster, 1992) making 
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brand loyalty a key topic of interest for marketing scholars until today (see e.g., Homburg, 
Hoyer, & Stock-Homburg, 2007).  
 
1.3.1. Consumer Loyalty 
 
In contrast to a consumer’s single choice of a brand over competing alternatives in his 
consideration set, loyalty has been defined as “the biased behavioral response expressed over 
time by some decision-making unit with respect to one or more alternative brands out of a set 
of such brands” (Jacoby & Chestnut, 1978, p. 80). More extensive definitions of consumer 
loyalty conceptualize it as a three-dimensional construct comprising, repurchase behavior, 
willingness to cross-buy other products from the same company and willingness to 
recommend (Anderson, 1998; Homburg & Bruhn, 2005; Szymanski & Henard, 2001).  
 
Part of the interest in brand loyalty stems from the recognition that attracting new customers 
is typically much more expensive than keeping existing customers: across a wide range of 
businesses, the pattern is the same: the longer a company keeps a customer, the more money 
it makes (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990, p. 106). The reason for this is usually, that attracting 
new customers comes with costs attached (e.g., advertisements, promotions). Hence, research 
on customer relationship management has essentially focused on activities that attempt to 
retain existing customers (Homburg, Hoyer, & Stock-Homburg, 2007). A central research 
issue in this context is the investigation of the relationship between loyalty and another key 
marketing concept - customer satisfaction (e.g., Anderson et al., 1994; Bolton, 1998; 
Kamakura et al., 2002; Mittal & Kamakura, 2001; Mittal, Ross, & Baldasare, 1998; Taylor & 
Baker, 1994).  
 
1.3.2. Consumer Satisfaction 
 
Satisfaction can be seen as an attitude-like judgment following a purchase act or based on a 
series of consumer product interactions (Czepiel & Rosenberg, 1977; Day & Landon, 1977; 
Yi, 1990). Oliver (1997, p. 13) defines satisfaction as a “consumer’s fulfillment response. It 
is a judgment that a product or service feature, or the product or service itself, provided (or is 
providing) a pleasurable level of consumption-related fulfillment, including levels of under- 
or overfulfillment.” The concept of under- or overfulfillment is mirrored in the most widely 
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accepted model of customer satisfaction, the Confirmation-Disconfirmation (CD) – 
Paradigm, that has prevailed as the key satisfaction paradigm (see Oliver, 1997; Bolton & 
Drew, 1991; Cadotte, Woodruff, & Jenkins, 1987; LaBarbera & Mazursky, 1983; Richins & 
Bloch, 1991; Spreng, MacKenzie, & Olshavsky, 1996). The CD-Paradigm can be seen as an 
integrative framework, in which numerous other theories explaining customer satisfaction 
like assimilation theory (see Clow, Kurtz, & Ozmet, 1998; Mittal, Kumar, & Tsiros, 1999), 
contrast theory (see Oliver, 1997), assimilation-contrast theory (see Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 
1997) attribution theory (see Folkes, 1984, 1988) or prospect theory (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, 1991) can be integrated (see Homburg & Stock-Homburg, 2006). 
 
According to the CD-Paradigm confirmation or disconfirmation of pre-consumption product 
standards is the essential determinant of customer satisfaction (Everelles & Levitt, 1992; 
Oliver, 1997). Confirmed standards should thereby lead to moderate satisfaction whereas 
positively disconfirmed standards (exceeding the expectations) should lead to high 
satisfaction. Dissatisfaction in turn should be the result of negatively disconfirmed standards 
(underachieving expectations). Three main comparison standards have evolved in the 
literature (Fournier & Mick, 1999): predictive expectations of attribute performance 
(Boulding et al. 1993; Oliver, 1997; Tse & Wilton, 1988), experience-based norms derived 
from personal experience or information received (Cadotte, Woodruff, & Jenkins, 1987), and 
desires based on features and benefits that are perceived as ideal (Westbrook & Reilly, 1983).  
 
1.3.3. The Satisfaction-Loyalty Link 
 
Even though a strong relation between satisfaction and loyalty is a widely held assumption in 
management, research on the proposed link between satisfaction and loyalty has repeatedly 
found that the “intuitive” underlying assumption that satisfied customers stay loyal to the 
brand does not always hold (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Ganesh, Arnold, & Reynolds, 2000; 
Jones & Sasser, 1995; Keaveney, 1995), which led to an increased interest of researchers on 
the link between satisfaction and loyalty in the nineties (e.g., Reichheld & Sasser, 1990; 
Fornell, 1992; Fornell et al., 1996; Heskett et al., 1994; Giering, 2000). Researchers have 
acknowledged that the link between satisfaction and loyalty may be more complex than 
previously assumed (Oliva, Oliver, & MacMillan, 1992) and have found that several 
demographic customer characteristics like education, sex, or age moderate the satisfaction-
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loyalty link (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001). For example, Mittal and Kamakura found that 
women needed a lower level of satisfaction to repurchase than men. However, Seiders et al. 
(2005) provided and extensive overview of different studies concerned with moderators of 
the satisfaction-loyalty link and found only little congruence between the results of the 
different studies. They concluded that, “although prior research points to several variables 
that may moderate the satisfaction repurchase relationship, empirical results are equivocal 
and difficult to reconcile” (Seiders et al., 2005, p. 26). 
 
A further problem of satisfaction-loyalty research has been a lack of studies using behavioral 
measures (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001) with the majority of them using intentional loyalty 
measures (for a review see Seiders et al., 2005). This is surprising, as the question whether 
satisfaction ultimately translates into consumers’ repurchasing behavior is of pivotal 
importance to management. The use of intentional measures further suffers from problems 
such as inflated common method variance (see Mazursky & Geva, 1989) as well as spurious 
correlations (Arnold, Feldman, & Purbhoo, 1985; Zedeck, Kafry, & Jacobs, 1976). 
Specifically Mittal and Kamakura (2001) as well as Seiders and colleagues (2005) found that 
results from studies using intentional measures differed significantly from those using actual 
behavior data. 
 
1.3.4. Contributions of Article 2 
 
Article 2 makes two central contributions to research on the satisfaction-loyalty link. First, it 
addresses the problem of previous equivocal findings on the role of demographics as 
moderators of the satisfaction-loyalty link: a key problem with existing studies investigating 
the satisfaction-loyalty link has been, that they each focused on one single brand. The 
possible moderating role of brand has so far been fully neglected, i.e., whether the 
moderating role of demographics varies for different brands. Article 2 addresses this by 
investigating moderating variables of the satisfaction-loyalty link for various brands. Second, 
instead of intentional measures it investigates consumers’ actual repurchase behavior and 
satisfaction with the replaced vehicle. One of the key results of article 2 is that the 
moderating role of demographic variables differs for different brands.  
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Findings from this article are of key theoretic and managerial importance. From a theoretic 
standpoint they can explain the equivocal results of previous studies: the moderating role of 
demographic characteristics cannot simply be extrapolated from one brand to another. In 
other words, whereas women may need to be less satisfied in order to repurchase a Mercedes-
Benz than men, no such differences may exist for VW customers. From a managerial 
perspective the advantages are two-fold: identifying those customers with a high intrinsic 
retainability (those customers who will stay in the relationship even at low satisfaction levels) 
is central for identifying those customers for whom relationship building does pay out 
(Reinartz & Kumar, 2003). Those customers that are intrinsically volatile (leaving the 
company even when highly satisfied) are short lived and investments in relationship building 
with these may be a waste of resources. On the other hand customers of key competitors with 
little intrinsic retainability should represent the customer group that should switch most easily 
and should specifically be targeted by management.  
 
1.4. Norms in Consumer-Brand Relationships 
 
Although customer satisfaction has become a key focus of marketing strategy (Homburg, 
Koschate, & Hoyer, 2005), marketing tactics or mistakes repeatedly lead to violations of 
consumers’ expectations towards their brands and subsequently to a decline in satisfaction: 
“Customer satisfaction rates in the United States are at an all-time low, while complaints, 
boycotts, and other expressions of consumer discontent rise” (Fournier, Dobscha, & Mick, 
1998, p. 43). Fournier and colleagues argue that this is due to brand behavior that many 
customers do not find acceptable: “When we talk to people about their lives as consumers, we 
do not hear praise for their so-called corporate partners. Instead, we hear about the confusing, 
stressful, insensitive, and manipulative marketplace in which they feel trapped and 
victimized” (Fournier, Dobscha, & Mick, 1998, p. 43).  
 
Similarly McGraw and Tetlock (2005, p. 14) reason: “Consumers who have been gulled into 
thinking of themselves as part of a corporate family or partnership may feel especially bitter 
when they discover that the other party was treating them along purely as objects of monetary 
calculation”. As Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel (2002) argue, relationship growth is a complex 
process in which the occurrence of a transgression or letdown is inevitable. A transgression is 
commonly defined as a behavior by a relationship partner that is perceived as inconsistent 
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with a relational rule or expectation (see e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; 
Boon & Holmes, 1999). However research on consumer-brand relationships has so far widely 
neglected to specify what relational rules or norms actually govern consumers’ relationships 
with brands (Aaker et al., 2004).  
Research in consumer behavior has just recently turned to the topic of norms that may evolve 
in consumer-brand relationships (see e.g., Aggarwal, 2004; Aggarwal & Law, 2005; 
Aggarwal & Zhang, 2006). However this research suffers from key deficits, such as the lack 
of a measurement of norms in real consumer-brand relationships (focusing on hypothetical 
brand relationships in the laboratory), hence leaving Johar’s (2005, p. 26) key question “is 
there a norm attached to brand behavior” unanswered. For the advancement of the consumer-
brand relationship metaphor, investigating whether relationship norms do govern consumer-
brand relationships hence is of pivotal importance.  
 
1.4.1. The Norm Concept 
 
On a general level Kahneman and Miller (1986) developed a model of norms, specifically 
explaining activation processes that lead to the generation of norms. According to their 
model, a stimulus recruits the ad hoc generation of alternatives, the so-called counterfactual 
reasoning and in parallel recruits its own alternatives, its own frame of reference to which the 
stimulus is compared to. The aggregated set of recruited representations constitutes the norm. 
A stimulus event not only elicits a norm that it is compared to, it also influences the norm that 
subsequent events are being compared to. The latter is done in two different ways: a) by 
eliciting expectations for future events and b) by laying down a memory trace that is 
activated when a subsequent event is an appropriate reminder (see Kahneman & Miller, 
1986). According to Kahneman and Miller (1986) an event is considered abnormal if it has 
highly available alternatives. These alternatives may be constructed as counterfactual 
alternatives retrieved from memory. Norms can be evoked by probes, and one and the same 
probe can elicit retrieval as well as construction: a probe can remind a person of similar 
experiences in the past and lead to the generation of counterfactual alternatives. Probes are 
either experiences of an object / event or references to a category. Accordingly Kahneman 
and Miller distinguish between two kinds of norms, stimulus norms and category norms. In 
category-centered comparisons, the object of judgment is compared to the norm for a 
specified category. Explicit reference to a category however, permits a high degree of control 
1 Introduction 
 16 
over the selection of norm elements. In stimulus-centered comparisons, the elements of the 
norm are recruited directly by the stimulus. Those elements are favored that resemble the 
evoking stimulus. 
 
The notion of category norms assumes that a single instance should be sufficient for setting 
up a norm. This becomes apparent in findings that people are willing to radically generalize 
from single observations of certain behavior to a norm for the behavior a) across other people 
in the same situation and b) across situations for the same person (see e.g, Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Read, 1983). Generalizations are apparently made with high confidence, depending 
largely on the consistency of the information as compared to quantity and quality of the 
information (see e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) and lead to predictions of future behavior 
as well as to inferences about traits.  
 
On a more relationship specific level, Fiske (1991) developed a model specifying norms that 
emerge in relationships. Fiske’s Relational Models Theory accounts for people’s implicit 
representations of their relationships. He proposed four elementary and universal cognitive 
models for the representation of social relationships. Those models are communal sharing, 
based on the norm of equivalence, authority ranking, based on the norm of asymmetry, 
equality matching based on the norm of reciprocity and market pricing based on the norm of 
proportionality. In the marketing domain, McGraw and Tetlock (2005) have drawn on 
Fiske’s (1991) Relational Models Theory to investigate the role different relational models in 
market transactions. They could show in several scenario-based studies that the prevalent 
relationship norm strongly influenced the perceived acceptability of a certain market 
transaction between seller and buyer. In a slightly simplified model Clark and Mills (1993) 
distinguish between communal and exchange relationships based on the norms of giving 
benefits to the partner. Exchange relationships are based on the reciprocity norm, the idea of 
giving something in return for getting something back. On the contrary in communal 
relationships – that are commonly found between family members – benefits are given to the 
relationship partner out of a concern for his well being, without expecting a comparable 
benefit back in return. In fact receiving monetary benefits for providing help is seen as a 
transgression in communal relationships. Aggarwal and colleagues (Aggarwal, 2004; 
Aggarwal & Law, 2005; Aggarwal & Zhang, 2006) adopted Clark and Mill’s framework to 
the consumer-brand domain. From a conceptual point of view it is questionable whether the 
concept of communal relationships is at all adequate for consumer-brand relationships that at 
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their core are based on exchange and in which monetary compensation is the ultimate reason 
for companies to bond with consumers. 
 
Hence, it is surprising that consumer research has so far widely neglected the extensive body 
of research on norms in business-to-business relationships, which since more than 20 years 
has successfully drawn on Relational Exchange Theory (RET) in explaining normative 
regulations of business relationships. This is especially striking as RET a) focuses on 
exchange relationships and b) has been conceptualized to apply to all forms of exchange 
between individuals or organizations (Macneil, 1985). As such, RET seems to provide a more 
adequate framework for research on norms in consumer-brand relationships than theories 
from the interpersonal domain. 
 
1.4.2. Relational Exchange Theory 
 
Relational Exchange Theory was developed by Macneil (1974, 1978) in response to the 
observations that written agreements are often intentionally left incomplete by parties in order 
to leave room for adaptation to changes (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). In contrast to the (neo-) 
classic view, which assumes that all current and future transactions are regulated by written 
agreements, RET underscores the role of norms in relationships (Ivens & Blois, 2004). 
According to RET, agreements between parties usually contain explicit as well as implicit 
agreements or norms (Hadfield, 1990). Norms according to that view can be seen as 
expectations towards the other party’s behavior (Heide & John, 1990; Lipset, 1975), as 
guidelines towards own behavior (Scanzoni, 1979), or as “general frame of reference, order, 
and standards against which to guide and assess appropriate behavior in uncertain and 
ambiguous situations” (Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000, p. 184). 
 
Norms have been shown to develop early in the relationship process (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 
1987) and limit the danger of opportunistic behavior on one side (Ouchi, 1980; Nohria & 
Ghoschal, 1990): “Because they involve expectations rather than rigid requirements of 
behavior, they create a cooperative as opposed to a confrontational environment for 
negotiating adaptations, thus promoting continuity in exchange” (Cannon, Achrol, & 
Gundlach, 2000, p. 184). The fact that norms are in general not discussed explicitly, and even 
less specified in detail but rather developed on a relatively general level however, leaves 
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room for an individual interpretation of a norm’s content by the parties involved in exchange 
transactions. 
 
According to Macneil (1985) RET as a theory applies to all forms of exchange between 
individuals or organizations. He assumes that exchange is not purely an economic 
phenomenon but characterizes all forms of social interaction. Transactions according to RET 
can be classified on a continuum ranging from discrete to relational exchange. Purely discrete 
transactions according to Macneil (1983) however constitute an exception, with most 
transactions having relational character.  
 
Macneil (1980, 1983) developed ten relational norms: role integrity, reciprocity, 
implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, flexibility, solidarity, the linking norms, 
creation and restraint of power, propriety of means and harmonization with the social matrix. 
As these norms originally were not created for empirical purposes, they are partly 
overlapping. Investigating the dimensional structure of Macneil’s norms using explanatory 
factor analysis, Ivens (2006) found two emerging factors that he termed value-claiming and 
value-creating norms. Due to these problems, most empirical work on Macneil’s norms 
focuses on a subset of three to four norms (see e.g., Dant & Schul, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 
2000; Heide & Miner, 1992; Heide & John, 1992; Kaufman & Stern, 1988). Acknowledging 
the high interdependence of these norms, researchers have also argued for one meta-norm and 
have found empirical support for it (Heide & John, 1992).  
 
The central role of norms in relationships according to Macneil (1978) exists because all 
economic exchange is conflict laden, the reason being that interests of parties involved 
usually diverge on several issues. RET posits that in addition to differences regarding the 
sources of conflict, discrete and relational exchange also vary concerning conflict resolution 
behavior. Parties in relations with a high degree of norm orientation should seek conflict 
resolution mechanisms that do not threaten the continuity of the relationship (Achrol, 1997). 
Such a behavior implies considering one’s own and the partner’s interests jointly. Under 
relational exchange, conflict resolution should be achieved through communication with the 
partner. 
 
Concerning the effect of relational norms, Kaufman and Stern (1988) found that perceptions 
of unfairness of the other party’s behavior were influenced by relational norms. Doney and 
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Cannon (1997) found a positive relationship between relational norms and trust and Jap and 
Ganesan (2000) report a positive relationship between norms and perceived commitment. 
Concerning the impact on relationship relevant behavior, Dant and Schul (1992) studied the 
impact of role integrity (one of Macneil’s norms) on four potential conflict resolution 
strategies (problem solving, persuasion, bargaining, and politics) and Gundlach, Achrol, and 
Mentzer (1995) could show that relational norms positively influence behaviors expressing 
commitment. Also, the links between relational norms and relationship variables such as 
relationship duration (Haugland, 1996), relationship performance (Noordewier, John, & 
Nevin, 1990; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Bello & Gilliland 1997; Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 
2000), relationship quality (Gassenheimer, Calantone, & Scully, 1995; Johnson, 1999), or 
acquisition and operating costs (Cannon & Homburg, 2001) have been examined.  
 
A large body of research has further investigated antecedents to the emergence of relational 
norms. Heide and John (1990) found that technological unpredictability decreased 
expectations of continuity whereas Bello and Gilliland (1997) argue for a negative influence 
of market volatility on flexibility. Actual commitments (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 
1995), the use of non-coercive influence strategies (Kim, 2000), specific human investments 
(Bello & Gilliland, 1997), and manifest opportunism have proven to positively or negatively 
influence the development and intensity of a number of relational norms. Key relationship 
marketing variables, such as trust and satisfaction with past outcomes, equally have a positive 
impact on the norm of long-term orientation (Ganesan, 1994). 
 
1.4.3. Contributions of Article 3 
 
Although recent research has turned to the investigation of norms in consumer-brand 
relationships, several open questions have remained. Norm research in the consumer domain 
has applied constructs from the interpersonal domain without discussing whether these are at 
all applicable to brand relationships that in essence are based on exchange. This problem is 
amplified by the fact that these norms have not been measured in actual consumer-brand 
relationships (see Aggarwal 2004; Aggarwal & Law 2005; Aggarwal & Zhang 2006). Hence, 
whether norms do at all evolve between consumers and their brands remains an open 
question. In the light of the conceptual problems it is especially surprising that consumer 
research has so far fully neglect the impressive body of research on norms in the business-to-
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business area. This research has mainly drawn on Relational Exchange Theory (RET), and 
has shown in numerous empirical investigations that RET norms like solidarity, reciprocity 
or flexibility do evolve in and govern business-to-business relationships. 
In order to address these issues, article 3 adapted RET to consumer-brand relationships. A 
scale was developed to measure RET norms in consumer-brand relationships and consumer 
relationships with their banks were surveyed. Results showed that, RET norms did evolve in 
consumer-brand relationships and that these norms differed from key relationship marketing 
variables such as satisfaction and trust. Further, article 3 could show that, norms guided the 
perception of severity of critical incidents in the relationships: the higher relationships scored 
on RET norms, as the more severe relationship transgressions were perceived. Furthermore, 
RET norms influenced consumers’ resolution strategies: consumers in relationships high in 
RET norms were more likely to choose constructive resolution strategies like voicing the 
problem. These results remained largely stable when taking into account key relationship 
marketing variables like satisfaction and trust.  
 
Summarizing, article 3 provides evidence for the notion that consumers do form relationships 
with their brands that are governed by norms. These norms guide consumers’ perceptions of 
transgressions and choice of resolution strategies and are different from key existing 
relationship marketing variables.  
 
1.5. The Effect of Negative Information on Consumers’ Attitude Strength 
 
When consumers receive bad news about brands in the media, how does it affect their 
attitudes and the strength of their attitudes? In the modern marketing sphere, with consumers’ 
access to all kinds of different media channels and media’s broad coverage of brand mishaps, 
product failures and service deficiencies, consumers usually learn about negative brand 
incidents via the media. The credibility of different media sources however varies widely 
and, especially with sources like the Internet, source credibility is often hard to judge. Several 
questions for researchers and practitioners hence emerge: does bad brand news influence 
consumers’ attitudes even when they know that it is from a non-credible source? And what 
happens when people learn about that source after they have already read the news? Will the 
news still affect their attitudes or are consumers able to ‘correct’ for the lack of credibility? 
 
1 Introduction 
 21
1.5.1. Attitudes and Attitude Strength 
 
The attitudes that consumers carry towards their brands are of pivotal relevance for 
marketers. A key reason for this interest in attitudes is the underlying assumption that 
attitudes predict consumers’ behavior. However, as chapter 1.3. has already pointed out (and 
article 2 will in more detail) with the example of satisfaction - an attitude-like judgment - 
attitudes do not always translate nicely into behavior: article 2 shows only a moderate 
relationship between satisfaction and repurchase behavior. In fact, the finding that the 
predictive ability of attitudes may be limited is almost as old as attitude research itself (see 
LaPiere, 1934) and some scholars have subsequently questioned whether a link between 
attitudes and behavior exists at all (Corey, 1937; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Similarly many 
attitude change studies in laboratory settings have shown that attitudes could often be 
changed quite easily (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). On the other 
hand researchers have found that some attitudes can be very stable and very difficult to 
change. In fact Hovland (1959) as well as Hyman and Sheatsley (1947) found that most 
attitudes appear to change only little over the course of a lifespan. In addition, some attitudes, 
especially political attitudes, have been shown to be very powerful determinants of behavior 
(Schuman & Johnson, 1976).  
 
As a result, social scientists started to acknowledge that attitudes could vary considerably in 
their strength (see e.g., Raden, 1985; Schuman & Presser, 1981). However attitude strength 
has long remained a vaguely defined ‘metaphor’ (Raden, 1985). According to most current 
definitions strong attitudes possess two main features: they are durable and they have impact. 
Accordingly Krosnick and Petty (1995, p. 3) define attitude strength as “the extent to which 
attitudes manifest the qualities of durability and impactfulness”. Instead of conceptualizing 
attitude strength as a latent psychological construct with durability and strength as effect 
indicators, durability and strength are commonly conceptualized as causal indicators of 
attitude strength which is seen as a phantom variable (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Hence, 
strength is not presumed to be a latent construct but a heuristic label attached to attitudes “as 
a way of efficiently noting that they possess certain characteristics” (Krosnick & Petty, 1995, 
p. 3).  
 
A key determinant of attitude strength is the amount of elaboration spent on attitude relevant 
information. Attitudes that are based on more careful elaboration are stronger than those that 
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are created by more peripheral processes (e.g., accepting information without careful scrutiny 
because it comes from an expert; see e.g., Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Two main 
theories have been developed to account for these two different processes: the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty, 1977; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) and the Heuristic 
Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Because both propose two 
routes by which attitudes can be created or changed they are often summarized as Dual 
Process Theories.  
 
1.5.2. Dual Process Theories  
 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) has been developed by Petty and Cacioppo in the 
late seventies and early eighties based on Petty’s doctoral dissertation (Petty, 1977; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) and has since then generated a large number of publications in various 
disciplines (see Petty & Wegener, 1999 for a review). The ELM postulates two routes by 
which attitudes can change, the central and the peripheral route. These two routes differ in the 
degree of effortful processing. The central route involves extensive and effortful information 
processing activity aimed at scrutinizing and uncovering the central merits of the information, 
whereas attitude change by the peripheral route is based on low resource demanding change 
processes, such as heuristics (Chaiken, 1987), classical conditioning (Staats & Staats, 1958) 
or self-perception (Bem, 1972). When an attitude changes as a result of careful thinking (i.e., 
via the central route) the resulting attitude will be stronger than when it is changed by cursory 
thought based on a simple cue (e.g., accepting an argument because the person formulating it 
is perceived as an expert). Thoughtful (i.e., central) attitude changes have been shown to be 
more persistent over time, resistant to counter-persuasive attempts and predictive of behavior 
than attitudes changed by only little attitude relevant thought (for a review see Petty, 1994).  
 
Similarly the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) 
assumes two different processing routes, systematic and heuristic processing. Systematic 
processing refers to scrutinizing all informational input for its relevance to the judgment. 
Heuristic processing on the other hand is based on the retrieval of certain learned rules from 
memory (like “statements from experts can be trusted”) that allow the evaluation of a 
message without careful processing (Chaiken et al., 1989). Like the ELM the HSM assumes 
that people will only exert as much cognitive effort as necessary in order to reach a certain 
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processing goal (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). If achieving high accuracy is the goal, then careful 
scrutiny on the message is most likely when accuracy cannot be achieved by the reliance on 
certain cues (e.g., source credibility). Hence according to both theories, source credibility 
(i.e., expertise and trustworthiness of the source) plays a significant role in determining how 
much cognitive effort is spent on the message. It has been found repeatedly that the 
knowledge of high source credibility reduces the scrutiny of the arguments and leads to more 
shallow processing because the information is more readily accepted without elaborating on 
the quality of the arguments (Priester & Petty, 1995, 2003).  
 
More evidence for the role of source credibility in preventing careful elaboration comes from 
research on the sleeper effect. The sleeper effect describes a delayed increase in persuasion, 
an effect first reported by Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield (1949) that since then has 
generated a large body of research. The central finding is, that a message from a non-credible 
source has little immediate effect on attitudes however regains an effect over time (see 
Kumkale & Albaraccin, 2004 for a review). This effect however only appears when the 
message is elaborated carefully. Knowledge of the non-credible source before the message 
has been found to prevent the sleeper effect because the knowledge of the source prevents 
careful elaboration of the message (Kumkale & Albaraccin, 2004; Priester et al., 1999; 
Pratkanis et al., 1988). 
 
1.5.3. The Effect of Elaboration on Attitude Inconsistent Information on Attitude 
Strength 
 
Consumers usually hold positive attitudes towards their brands. Hence, when they encounter 
negative information, this is usually inconsistent with their prior attitude. A central question 
for marketing and an issue of considerable controversy thus has been, whether elaboration on 
negative inconsistent information leads to stronger or weaker overall attitudes. Traditionally 
research has argued that exposure to inconsistent information leads to higher elaboration on 
the complete information set and hence should lead to stronger attitudes (Maheswaran & 
Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Alternatively researchers have shown that 
inconsistencies in the structure of attitudes can result in conflict of opposing attitude elements 
(Bargh et al., 1992; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995).  Conflict in turn has been shown to 
weaken the strength of attitudes (Conner et al., 1996). Hence a weakening effect of 
elaboration should theoretically be possible. Sengupta and Johar (2002) were first to show 
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such a weakening effect of elaboration on attitudes and show that the presence of a 
reconciliation goal determines whether inconsistent information leads to stronger or weaker 
attitudes. Usually consumers are motivated to reconciliate conflicting attitudes in order to 
arrive at a consistent attitude (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).  In the presence of such a 
reconciliation goal, greater elaboration has been shown to lead to overall stronger attitudes 
(Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997). If however reconciliation is prevented, structural 
inconsistencies prevail and no consistent attitude can evolve (Sengupta & Johar, 2002).  
 
1.5.4. Contributions of Article 4 
 
How does negative brand information impact on the strength of consumers brand attitudes? 
Article 4 shows that the effect of negative information on attitude strength depends on two 
factors: source credibility and the time consumers become aware of the source credibility. 
Extending research in the line of Dual Process Theories, article 4 shows that knowledge of 
source credibility cannot only prevent but also increase careful elaboration on the message, 
when the source information is given after the message as opposed to before. This is because 
source credibility conveys information about how relevant (i.e., diagnostic) the processed 
message is for attitude formation. When consumers learn after reading the message that it 
was either highly relevant for attitude formation (e.g., because it came from a very credible 
source) or possibly biased them (e.g., because it came from a clearly non-credible source), 
article 4 shows that further elaboration on the message is prompted.  
 
Article 4 further shows that the effect of this elaboration on attitude strength differs 
depending on whether it was prompted by a credible or non-credible source. Elaboration on 
attitude-inconsistent information in the light of a credible source apparently leads to the 
maintenance of structural inconsistencies and hence results in weaker attitudes. The reason, 
article 4 argues, is that receiving the source information after the message alerts consumers of 
the fact that the negative message they have read is valid and relevant for attitude formation. 
Hence, further elaboration should be aimed at maintaining the structurally inconsistent 
negative arguments. On the other hand, when consumers learn that the message came from a 
non-credible source, this should alert them to the fact that they just processed invalid 
information. The prompted elaboration hence should be aimed at refuting the inconsistent 
negative information and subsequently lead to stronger attitudes. Summarizing, article 4 
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shows that elaboration on negative brand information can do both, weaken as well as 
strengthen consumers’ attitudes.  
 
1.6. How Companies Should React to Negative Brand Information 
 
1.6.1. Brand Crises and their Effect on Brands 
 
Whereas article 4 deals with the question of how consumers react to negative brand 
information consumers receive over the media, article 5 deals with the company side: how 
should companies react when negative messages about their brands are spread in the media. 
Article 4 points out that such negative information can potentially harm consumers’ attitudes. 
Article 3 shows that some consumers may decide to let their relationship deteriorate when 
confronted with incidents they find severe. How should companies hence react to counter 
such detrimental effects? Apart from an effect on consumers’ attitude strength, researches 
have also shown that such brand crises have negative effects on market share, sales of 
recalled products, stock prices, purchase intentions, and sales of other company products 
(Pruitt & Peterson, 1986; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994) as well as threatening a company’s 
reputation (Berman, 1999; Davies et al., 2003; Mowen, 1980). The devastating effect of 
negative brand news on their companies is partly due to the fact that negative information is 
perceived to be more diagnostic and informative, and weighed more heavily in consumer 
judgments than positive information, an effect referred to as negativity bias (Herr, Kardes, & 
Kim, 1991). In addition, because negative news deviates from the norm – consumers are used 
to positive (advertising) messages about brands - negative news is reported more frequently 
and more vividly by consumers (Weinberger & Lepkowska-White, 2000) as well as 
considered more credible than positive news spread by the company itself (Ahluwalia, 
Burnkrant, & Unnava, 2000). As a result, customer preferences may shift towards competing 
products during the recall period, and competitors often increase their advertising spending in 
the wake of a competing brand’s crisis (Cleeren, DeKimpe, & Helsen, 2006).  
 
Despite the increasing occurrence of brand crises and the risks for the companies involved, 
research on brand crises still remains scarce (Klein & Dawar, 2004). In fact, previous 
research has mostly relied on general strategies providing check-lists or ‘six-step plans’ with 
general recommendations like ‘act quickly’ and ‘take responsibility’ (see Turpin, 2008) on 
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how to deal with brand crises. In general, case studies have been used to derive conclusions 
about which strategies work and which do not (e.g., Chisholm, 1998; Marconi, 1997; Pearson 
& Mitroff, 1993; Weinberger, Romeo, & Piracha, 1991; Kurzbard, & Siomkos, 1992; Smith, 
Thomas, & Quelch, 1996). “This literature, however, provides little direction for 
understanding the problem from a theoretical perspective” (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, & Unnava, 
2000, p. 203) and few research exists developing strategies to combat marketing crises taking 
into account the variables that influence consumers’ perceptions and their processing of brand 
crisis information (Cleeren, Dekimpe, & Helsen, 2006; Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, & Unnava, 
2000).  
 
From a managerial vantage point an adequate communication response is of utmost 
importance. In a study by DDB Needham involving 2,645 consumers it was found that a 
company’s handling of a crisis ranked as the third most important influence on consumer 
purchasing, after product quality and handling of complaints (Marketing News, 1995). The 
importance of adequate crisis communication is further underlined by findings showing that 
company communication after an emergency has strong implications for the image of a 
company (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000). In addition, most crisis-management experts agree that it 
is not a matter of if a company will be faced with a crisis, but when and how well prepared 
executives are to weather the storm (Albrecht, 1996). The importance of an effective 
communicating strategy is further reinforced by the growth of so called “instant information” 
networks. Due to the Internet, dissatisfied employees, angry customers and other 
disappointed stakeholders can spread information and false facts almost instantaneously 
(Turpin, 2008). Hence, developing a proper communication strategy is a key challenge for 
companies faced with a crisis situation (e.g., Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005; Coombs, 2000; 
Cleeren, DeKimpe, & Helsen, 2006).  
 
It was the aim of article 5 to develop an actionable framework for communication strategies 
based on psychological and consumer research on persuasion processes, information 
processing, attribution processes and attitude formation as well as marketing research on 
consumer reactions to product harm crises and rumors. Three key variables were identified in 
the literature, which should determine the choice of a successful communication strategy: 
truth of the allegation, severity of the crisis and consumers’ commitment. The three will be 
outlined in the following.  
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1.6.2. Truth of the Allegation  
 
Most research on brand crises has focused on one of two types of crises, product harm crises 
or rumors. Whereas product-harm crises constitute real threats to the consumer, rumors 
concern negative brand information based on false facts. Product harm crises are usually 
defined as discrete, well-publicized occurrences wherein products are found to be defective 
or dangerous (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000). These can result from product tampering incidents or 
problems inherent in the product, the latter being far more common than the former (Laufer 
& Coombs, 2006). Apart from the damage to a brand’s reputation by a product harm crisis, 
these are usually followed by product recalls. During these out-of-stock situations customers 
may switch to competing brands which may lead to lost customers in the long run, who once 
changed to another brand do not return (e.g., because of a lock-in to a rival brand; Goldfarb, 
2006). Getting lost customers back, may be a difficult task, especially in the case of a 
product-harm crisis, because consumers perceive buying a brand that has just been affected as 
highly risky (Pennings, Wansink, & Meulenberg, 2002). In addition, a product-harm crisis 
may corrode trust in the product category as a whole, leading customers to decide to stop 
buying from the affected product category overall because the crisis is perceived as an 
industry-wide problem (De Alessi & Staaf, 1994; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985). 
 
Rumors have been defined as “unverified information of uncertain origin which is usually 
spread by word of mouth”  (Akande & Odewale, 1994, p. 27). Rumors become increasingly 
common with the advances in communication technology and many well-known companies 
(e.g., Procter & Gamble, McDonald’s) have been the target of negative rumors, sometimes 
with serious consequences. As implied by the above definition, rumor is negative word of 
mouth (WOM) based on false facts (Kamins, Folkes, & Perner, 1997). Negative WOM has 
been shown to be an important determinant of consumers’ choice of products (Herr, Kardes, 
& Kim, 1991; Reingen & Kernan, 1986). A central problem in defeating rumors is that 
negative information is more likely to be attributed to the qualities of the product rather than 
to the credibility of the transmitter, which gives the rumor more credibility (Mizerski, 1982). 
In addition, rumors have been shown to affect consumers independent of whether they 
believed them or not. Tybout, Calder, & Sternthal (1981) found that despite consumers’ 
assertions that they disbelieved a rumor saying that McDonald’s hamburgers contained 
worms, purchase intention and evaluations of McDonald’s were adversely affected.  
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One might reason, that when an allegation is not justified – as is the case with a rumor - the 
company does not really have to do anything at all. However, not reacting to an unfounded 
allegation may hurt the company in some cases: “Even if management perceives the crisis as 
‘unfounded’ or ‘unfair’ because of below-the-belt attacks or because they underestimate the 
problem at hand, years of efforts aimed at building a strong brand and reputation can be 
ruined in the time it takes to say ‘no comment’” (Turpin, 2008, p. 1). In some cases however 
refuting a negative rumor about a firm may be counterproductive, because it may serve to 
reintroduce the rumor in the process of discounting it (Tybout, Calder, & Sternthal, 1981). 
Ahluwalia, Burnkrandt, and Unnava (2000) however found that a focused approach to 
refutation, depending on consumers’ commitment could be effective. Hence, whether and 
how to best react to a rumor is further dependent on customer commitment. The central role 
of customer commitment is outlined in chapter 1.6.4. 
 
1.6.3. Severity of the Crisis 
 
Several authors have stressed the central role of severity of brand crises. Crises can differ 
widely in their severity. For example, certain types of product failure may only involve mild 
inconveniences for the consumer. These may involve incidents, in which the product is not 
working as well as suggested in advertisements. In contrast, product harm crises usually 
involve more serious problems that can result in injuries, sickness and even deaths (Laufer & 
Coombs, 2006). Examples are unknown side-effects of pharmaceutical products as in Bayer’s 
anti-cholesterol drug Lipobay that in the late nineties in combination with other drugs had 
caused 59 deadly cases of a rare muscle tissue disease or the case of Ford’s Pinto car that due 
to engineering flaws led the cars’ engines to catch fire easily in accidents, resulting in 27 
deaths in the seventies. Whereas these cases obviously are severe crises, ultimately severity 
lies in the eyes of the beholders – namely the consumers.  
 
The role of crisis severity has been shown to be of special relevance for defensive attributions 
(Laufer & Coombs, 2006). The defensive attribution hypothesis predicts that when an 
incident is high in severity, more blame will be attributed to a potentially responsible party 
than when the severity of the incident is low (see Robbennolt, 2000 for a review). The reason 
for this is that as the consequences of an incident become more severe, the notion that they 
might be accidental and outside control becomes less bearable. Perceiving the incident as 
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more predictable by blaming it on a person or institution makes the incident seem more 
avoidable (e.g., by simply reducing one’s interaction with the person or institution who 
caused the incident) than when acknowledging that it was an uncontrollable accident (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991). Laufer and colleagues (2005) found in a corporate setting that, as 
perceptions of crisis severity increased, more blame was in fact assessed to the firm. 
 
1.6.4. Consumers’ Commitment 
 
The concept of commitment is deeply intertwined with the concept of loyalty (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). In fact Bloemer and Kasper (1995, p. 314) argue that “true brand loyalty is 
brand commitment, since, brand commitment is a necessary condition for true brand loyalty 
to occur.” By true brand loyalty, Bloemer and Kasper refer to the fact that a customer may 
repurchase without being committed to the brand (e.g., because it simply is the cheapest 
product on the shelf). Commitment has traditionally been defined as the pledging or binding 
of an individual to his brand choice (Kiesler, 1968) as an emotional or psychological 
attachment to a brand within a product class (Lastovicka & Gardner, 1978).  
 
For consumers’ reactions to negative information commitment is of special relevance. 
Although committed consumers have been shown to be more aware of a crisis (Dawar & 
Pillutla, 2000), they are also more likely to engage in biased processing (Ahluwalia, 
Burnkrant, & Unnava, 2000).  Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava (2000) found that 
commitment not only moderates the negativity effect, whereas lowly committed consumers 
give more weight to negative than positive information, because they perceive it to be more 
diagnostic, highly committed consumers do not only exhibit an absence of the negativity 
effect but consider positive information about the brand as more diagnostic. Consumers who 
are committed to a brand also counter-argue negative information about the brand, mitigating 
the negative effects of the information by reducing the likelihood of attitude degradation. 
Lowly commitment consumers however counter-argue to a lesser degree and even though 
they may like the brand as much as the highly committed consumers, they exhibit greater 
attitude change and increased attitude ambivalence upon exposure to negative information 
about the brand. In addition, committed consumers have been found to show more sympathy 
for the brand and to believe that the company deserves their help (Stockmeyer, 1996) and to 
be less likely to switch brands during out-of-stock situations, which is partly due to their 
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increased search costs because of their limited experience with other brands (Campo, 
Gijsbrechts, & Nisol, 2000). Hence, instead of the commonly used "mass approaches" in 
responding to negative publicity (see, e.g., Pearson & Mitroff 1993; Weinberger, Romeo, & 
Piracha, 1991) companies should consider using a targeted approach, because different 
response strategies are likely to be more effective for highly and lowly committed consumers. 
However Ahluwalia, Burnkrant and Unnava (2000) acknowledge, that the effect of consumer 
commitment may be moderated by severity of the crisis: when the crisis is high in severity 
then consumer commitment should not play a role. This is because it may be difficult even 
for the committed consumers to discount very severe negative information.  
 
1.6.5. Contributions of Article 5 
 
How should marketing managers react when negative brand information is spread in the 
media? In order to answer this question, a literature review was conducted. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge no comprehensive framework has been developed yet that incorporates 
findings from different research streams on how people process negative information in order 
to arrive at recommendations for how to counter the adverse effect of a brand crisis. Based on 
persuasion literature, research on information processing, attribution processes and attitude 
formation as well as marketing research on consumers’ reactions to negative brand 
information article 5 provides a framework, suggesting what communication strategies 
should be most effective. As a result of this extensive literature review the variables, truth of 
the allegation, severity of the crisis and consumers’ commitment emerged as factors that 
strongly affect consumers’ perceptions of the incident. They influence how much attention 
consumers devote to the incident, whether they counter-argue the allegations, what they 
attribute the crisis to and how strongly the incident affects their attitudes and attitude 
strength. Hence companies are well advised to adapt their response strategies to these three 
variables. Based on the identified three central variables, six fundamentally different crisis 
situations are derived and the applicability of eight different strategies discussed.  
1 Introduction 
 31
1.7. References 
 
Aaker, J., Fournier, S., & Brasel, S. A. (2004). When Good Brands Do Bad. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 31(1), 1-16. 
 
Aaker, J. (1997). Dimensions of Brand Personality. Journal of Marketing Research, 
34(August), 347-356. 
 
Achrol, R. S. (1997). Changes in the Theory of Interorganizational Relations in Marketing: 
Toward a Network Paradigm. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
25(Winter), 56-71. 
 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1977). Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and 
Review of Empirical Research. Psychological Bulletin, 84(5), 888-918. 
 
Akande, A., & Odewale, F. (1994). One more Time: How to Stop Company Rumours. 
Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 15(4), 27-30.  
 
Aggarwal, P., (2004). The Effects of Brand Relationship Norms on Consumer Attitudes and 
Behavior. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(June), 87-101. 
 
Aggarwal, P., & Law, S. (2005). Role of Relationship Norms in Processing Brand 
Information. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(December), 453-464 
 
Aggarwal, P., & Zhang, M. (2006). The Moderating Effect of Relationship Norms.  Journal 
of Consumer Research, 33(December), 413-419. 
 
Ahluwalia, R., Burnkrant, R. E., & Unnava, H. R. (2000). Consumer Response to Negative 
Publicity: The Moderating Role of Commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 
37(May), 203-214.  
 
Ainsworth, M. D., & Bowlby, J. (1991). An Ethological Approach to Personality 
Development. American Psychologist, 46(April), 331-341.  
1 Introduction 
 32 
Albrecht, S. (1996). Crisis Management for Corporate Self-Defense. New York: Amacom. 
 
Anderson, E. (1998). Customer Satisfaction and Word-of-Mouth. Journal of Service 
Research, 1(1), 5-17.  
 
Anderson, E. W., Fornell, C., & Lehmann, D. R. (1994). Customer Satisfaction, Market 
Share, and Profitability: Findings From Sweden. Journal of Marketing, 58, 53–66.  
 
Arnold, H. J., Feldman, D. C., & Purbhoo, M. (1985). The Role of Social Desirability 
Response Bias in Turnover Research. Academy of Management Journal, 28(4), 
955−966. 
 
Bagozzi, R. P., & Dholakia, U. (1999). Goal-Setting and Goal-Striving in Consumer 
Behavior. Journal of Marketing, 63, 19–32. 
 
Bagozzi, R. P., & Nataraajan, R. (2000). The Year 2000: Looking Forward. Psychology & 
Marketing, 17, 1–11. 
 
Barney, J. B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990). Strategic Groups, Untested Assertions and 
Research Proposals. Managerial and Decision Economics, 11(3), 187–198. 
 
Barsalou, L. W. (1991). Deriving categories to achieve goals. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory (Vol.27, 
pp. 1–64). New York: Academic Press. 
 
Bauer, H. H. (1991). Unternehmensstrategie und Strategische Gruppen. In K.P. Kistner &R. 
Schmidt (Eds.), Unternehmensdynamik. Wiesbaden.  
 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. (1995). Personal Narratives About 
Guilt: Role in Action Control and Interpersonal Relationships. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 17, 173-198. 
 
1 Introduction 
 33
Bello, D. C., & Gilliland, D. I. (1997). The Effect of Output Controls, Process Controls, and 
Flexibility on Export Channel Performance. Journal of Marketing, 61(January), 22-
38. 
 
Belonax, J. A. & Javalgi, R. G. (1989). The Influence of Involvement and Product Class 
Quality on Consumer Choice Sets. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 
17(3), 209-216. 
 
Belonax, J. A., & Mittelstaedt, R. A. (1978). Evoked Set Size as a Function of Number of 
Choice Criterion and Information Variability. Advances in Consumer Research, 5, 48-
51. 
 
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-Perception Theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in  Experimental 
Social Psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 1-62). New York: Academic Press. 
 
Bendapudi, N., & Berry, L. L. (1997). Customers’ Motivations for Maintaining Relationships 
with Service Providers. Journal of Retailing, 71(3), 223-247. 
 
Berman, B. (1999). Planning for the Inevitable Product Recall. Business Horizons, 42(2), 69 
– 78.  
 
Bettman, J. R. (1979). An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice. Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Blattberg, R. C., & Deighton, J. (1991). Interactive Marketing: Exploiting the Age of 
Addressability. Sloan Management Review (Fall), 5-14.  
 
Bloemer, J. M. M., & Kasper, H. D. P. (1995). The Complex Relationship Between 
Consumer Satisfaction and Brand Loyalty. Journal of Economic Psychology, 16, 311-
329.  
 
Bolton, R. (1998). A Dynamic Model of the Duration of the Customer’s Relationship with a 
Continuous Service Provider: The role of satisfaction. Marketing Science, 17, 45–65.  
 
1 Introduction 
 34 
Bolton, R., & Drew, J. (1991). A Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Service Changes on 
Customer Attitudes. Journal of Marketing, 55(1), 1-9.   
 
Boon, S. D., & Holmes, J. G. (1999) Interpersonal Risk and the Evaluation of Transgressions 
in Close Relationships. Personal Relationships, 6, 151-168. 
 
Boulding, W., Kalra, A., Staelin, R., & Zeithaml, V. (1993). A Dynamic Process Model of 
Service Quality: From Expectations to Behavioral Intentions. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 30(February), 7-27.  
 
Brisoux, J. E., & Laroche, M. (1980). A Proposed Consumer Strategy of Simplification for 
Categorizing Brands. In J. D. Sumney & R. D. Taylor (Eds.), Evolving Marketing 
Thought for 1980. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Southern Marketing 
Association. Carbondale. IL: Southern Marketing Association.  
 
Brodie, R., Coviello, N., Brookers, R.W., & Little, V. (1997). Towards a Paradigm Shift in 
Marketing? An Examination of Current Marketing Practices. Journal of Marketing 
Management, 13(5), 383-406. 
 
Brown, D.E. (1991). Human Universals. New York: McGraw Hill.  
 
Cadotte, E., Woodruff, R., & Jenkins, R. (1987). Expectation and Norms in Models of 
Consumer Satisfaction. Journal of Marketing Research, 24(3), 305-314. 
 
Campo, K., Gijsbrechts, E., & Nisol, P. (2000). Towards Understanding Consumer Response 
to Stock-Outs. Journal of Retailing, 76(Summer), 219-242.  
 
Cannon, J. P., Achrol, R. S., & Gundlach, G. T. (2000). Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form 
Governance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28(Spring), 180-194. 
 
Cannon, J. P., & Homburg, C. (2001). Buyer-Supplier Relationships and Customer Firm 
Costs. Journal of Marketing, 65 (January), 29-43. 
 
1 Introduction 
 35
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the Self-Regulation of Behavior. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Chaiken, S. (1987).  The Heuristic Model of Persuasion. In M. P. Zanna, & J. M. Olson, & C. 
P. Herman (Eds.), Social influence: The Ontario Symposium (Vol. 5, pp. 3-39). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and Systematic Information 
Processing Within and Beyond the Persuasion Context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh 
(Eds.), Unintended Thought (pp. 212–252). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Chakravarti, A., & Janiszewski, C. (2003). The Influence of Macro-Level Motives on 
Consideration Set Composition in Novel Purchase Situations. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 30, 244–258. 
 
Chisholm, S. J. (1998). Coping With Minority Crises. Advertising Age, 69(April 6), 24.  
 
Clark, M. S. & Mills, J. (1993). The Difference between Communal and Exchange 
Relationships: What It Is and Is Not. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
19(December), 684–91. 
 
Cleeren, K., Dekimpe, M. G., & Helsen, K. (2006). Weathering Product Harm Crises. 
FETEW Research Report MO_0611 K.U.Leuven. 
 
Clow, K. E., Kurtz, D. L., & Ozmet, J. (1998). A Longitudinal Study of the Stability of 
Consumer Expectations of Services. Journal of Business Research, 42(1), 63-73.  
 
Conner, M., Sparks, P. Povey, R., James, R., & Shepherd, R. (1996). Attitude-Intention-
Behavior Links: Moderating Role of Attitudinal Ambivalence. Paper presented at the 
11th General Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social 
Psychology, Gmünden, Austria.  
 
Cool, K., & Schendel, D. (1988). Performance Differences Among Strategic Group 
Members. Strategic Management Journal 9(3), 207-223. 
1 Introduction 
 36 
Coombs, W. T. (2000). Designing Post-Crisis Messages: Lessons for Crisis Response 
Strategies. Review of Business, 21(Fall), 37-41. 
 
Cooper, L. G., & Inoue, A. (1996). Building Market Structures from Consumer Preferences. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 33(3), 293–306.  
 
Corey, S. M. (1937). Professional Attitudes and Actual Behavior. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 28(1), 271-280. 
 
Czepiel, J. A., & Rosenberg, L. J. (1977). Consumer satisfaction: concept and measurement. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 5(4), 403-411 11. 
  
Dant, R. P., & Schul, P. L. (1992). Conflict Resolution Processes in Contractual Channels of 
Distribution. Journal of Marketing, 56(January), 38-54. 
 
Dawar, N., & Pillutla, M. M. (2000). Impact of Product Harm Crises on Brand Equity: The 
Moderating Role of Consumer Expectations. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 
215 – 226.  
 
Day, R., & Landon, E. L. (1977). Toward a Theory of Consumer Complaining Behavior. In: 
A. G. Woodside, J. N. Sheth, & P. Bennett (Eds.), Consumer and Industrial Buying 
(pp. 425 -437). North-Holland: Elsevier. 
 
Day, D. L., DeSarbo, W. S., & Oliva, T. A. (1987). Strategy Maps: A Spatial Representation 
of Intra-Industry Competitive Strategy. Management Science, 33(12): 1534-1551. 
 
Davies, G., Chun, R., da Silva, R. V., & Roper, S. (2003). Corporate Reputation and 
Competitiveness. Human Relations, 30(1), 95 – 107.  
 
De Alessi, L., & Staaf, R. J. (1994). What Does Reputation Really Assure? The Relationship 
of Trademarks to Expectations and Legal Remedies. Economic Inquiry, 32(July), 477-
485.  
 
1 Introduction 
 37
Deighton, J. (1996). The Future of Interactive Marketing. Harvard Business Review, 
(November-December), 151-152.  
 
DeSarbo, W. S., & Jedidi, K. (1995). The Spatial Representation of Heterogeneous 
Consideration Sets. Marketing Science, 14(3): 326-342. 
 
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 61(April), 35-51. 
 
Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P.H., & Oh, S. (1987). Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal 
of Marketing, 51(April), 11-27. 
 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The Psychology of Attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: Hartcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich.  
 
Erdem, T., & Swait, J. (2004). Brand Credibility, Brand Consideration, and Choice. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 31(June), 191-198. 
 
Everelles, S., & Levitt, C. (1992). A Comparison of Current Models of Consumer 
Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction. Journal of Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, and 
Complaining Behavior, 5, 104-114. 
 
Ferguson, T. D., Deephouse, D. L., & Ferguson, W. L. (2000). Do Strategic Groups Differ in 
Reputation? Strategic Management Journal 21(12), 1195-1214. 
 
Finn A., & Louviere J. (1990). Shopping-Center Patronage Models: Fashioning a 
Consideration Set Segmentation Solution. Journal of Business Research 21(3), 259-
275. 
 
Fiegenbaum, A., & Thomas, H. (1990). Strategic Groups and Performance - the United-
States Insurance Industry, 1970-84. Strategic Management Journal 11(3): 197-215 
 
Fiske, A. P. (1991). Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human 
Relations. New York: Free Press 
1 Introduction 
 38 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social Cognition. New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
Folkes, V. (1984). Consumer Reactions to Product Failure: An Attributional Approach. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 10(4), 398-409. 
 
Folkes, V. (1988). Recent Attribution Research in Consumer Behavior: A Review and New 
Directions. Journal of Consumer Research, 14(4), 548-565.  
 
Fong, G. T., & Markus, H. (1982). Self-Schemas and Judgments About Others. Social 
Cognition, 1(3), 191– 204.  
 
Fornell, C. (1992). A National Customer Satisfaction Barometer: The Swedish Experience. 
Journal of Marketing, 56(1), 6-21. 
 
Fornell, C., Johnson, M., Anderson, E., Cha, J., & Bryant, B. (1996). The American 
Customer Satisfaction Index: Nature, Purpose and Findings. Journal of Marketing, 
60(4), 7-18. 
 
Fournier, S. & Brasel, S. A. (2002). Making Good of Doing Bad : Negotiating Transgressions 
in Consumer Brand-Relationships. Advances in Consumer Research, 102-104.  
 
Fournier, S., Dobscha, S., & Mick, D. (1998).  Preventing the Premature Death of 
Relationship Marketing.  Harvard Business Review, 76(1), 42-51. 
 
Fournier, S., & Mick, D. G. (1999). Rediscovering Satisfaction. Journal of Marketing, 63(4), 
5-23.  
 
Gassenheimer, J. B., Calantone, R. J., & Scully, J. I. (1995). Supplier Involvement and 
Dealer Satisfaction: Implications for Enhancing Channel Relationships. Journal of 
Business & Industrial Marketing, 10(Spring), 7-19.  
 
Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships. 
Journal of Marketing, 58(April), 1-19. 
 
1 Introduction 
 39
Ganesh, J., Arnold, M. J., & Reynolds, K. E. (2000). Understanding the Customer Base of 
Service Providers: An Examination of the Differences Between Switchers And 
Stayers. Journal of Marketing, 64(July), 65−87. 
 
Giering, A. (2000). Der Zusammenhang zwischen Kundenzufriedenheit und Kundenloyalität. 
Eine Untersuchung moderierender Effekte. Wiesbaden: Gabler-Verlag. 
 
Gilmore, G. W. (1919). Animism. Boston: Marshall Jones. 
 
Goldfarb, A. (2006). The Medium-Term Effects of Unavailability. Quantitative Marketing 
and Economics, 4(June), 143-171.  
 
Gronhaug, K. (1973). Some Factors Influencing the Size of a Buyer’s Evoked Set. European 
Journal of Marketing, 7, 232-241.  
 
Gronhaug, K., & Troye, S. V. (1983). Exploring the Content of the Evoked Set in Car 
Buying. European Research, 11, 98-104.  
 
Grönroos, C. (1994). From Marketing Mix to Relationship Marketing: Towards a Paradigm 
Shift in Marketing. Management Decision, 32(2), 4-20. 
 
Grover, R., & Srinivasan, V. (1987). A Simultaneous Approach to Market Segmentation and 
Market Structuring. Journal of Marketing Research, 24(2), 139–153.  
 
Gundlach, G., Achrol, R. S. & Mentzer, J. T. (1995). The Structure of Commitment in 
Exchange. Journal of Marketing, 59(January), 78-92. 
 
Hadfield, G. K. (1990). Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts. Stanford Law Review, 42, 927-992. 
 
Hale, J. E., Dulek, R. E., & Hale, D. P. (2005). Crisis Response Communication Challenges. 
Journal of Business Communication, 42(April), 112-134. 
 
1 Introduction 
 40 
Hatten K. J., & Hatten M. L. (1987). Strategic Groups, Asymmetrical Mobility Barriers and 
Contestability. Strategic Management Journal 8(4), 329–342. 
 
Haugland, S. A. (1996). Factors Influencing the Duration of International Buyer-Seller 
Relationships. Proceedings of the 1996 International Research Conference on 
Relationship Marketing, Berlin, 221-224. 
 
Hauser, J. R., & Wernerfelt, B. (1990). An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration 
 Sets. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(4), 393- 407. 
 
Heide J., & John, G. (1990). Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint 
Action in Buyer-Supplier Relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 
27(February), 24-36. 
 
Heide J., & John, G. (1992). Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?. Journal of 
Marketing, 56(April), 32-44. 
 
Herr, P. M., Kardes, F. R., & Kim, J. (1991). Effects of Word-of-Mouth and Product 
Attribute Information on Persuasion. An Accessibility-Diagnosticity Perspective. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (4), 454-462 
 
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. (1992). The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated 
Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer–Seller Cooperation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 35(2): 265–91 
 
Heskett, J. L., Jones, T. O., Loveman, G. W., Sasser, W.E., & Schlesinger, L.A. (1994). 
Putting the Service-Profit Chain to Work. Harvard Business Review, 72(2), 164-174. 
 
Hinde, R. A. (1976). On Describing Relationships. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 17(January), 1–19. 
 
Hodgkinson G. P. (1997). The Cognitive Analysis of Competitive Structures: a Review and 
Critique. Human Relations, 50(6), 625-654. 
 
1 Introduction 
 41
Holden, S. J. (1993). Understanding Brand Awareness: Let Me Give You a C(l)ue. Advances 
in Consumer Research, 20, 383-388. 
 
Homburg, C., & Bruhn, M. (2005). Kundenbindungsmanagement – Eine Einführung in die 
theoretischen und praktischen Problemstellungen. In M. Bruhn & C. Homburg (Eds.), 
Handbuch Kundenbindungsmanagement, 6. Aufl. (pp. 3-37). Wiesbaden: Gabler-
Verlag.      
 
Homburg, C., Hoyer, W., & Stock-Homburg, R. (2007). How to Get Customers Back? 
Insights Into Customer Relationship Revival Activities. Journal of the Academy of  
Marketing Science, 35(4), 461-474. 
 
Homburg, C., Koschate, N., & Hoyer, W. D. (2005). Do Satisfied Customers Really Pay 
More? A Study of the Relationship Between Customer Satisfaction and Willingness to 
Pay. Journal of Marketing, 69(2), 84-96. 
 
Homburg, C., & Stock-Homburg, R. (2006). Theoretische Perspektiven zur 
Kundenzufriedenheit. In C. Homburg (Ed.), Kundenzufriedenheit, 6. Aufl. (17- 51). 
Wiesbaden: Gabler-Verlag. 
 
Howard, J. A. (1977). Consumer Behavior: Application of Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
  
Howard, J. A., & Sheth, J. N. (1969). The Theory of Buyer Behavior. New York:  
 John Wiley. 
 
Hovland, C. I. (1959). Reconciliating Conflicting Results Derived from Experimental and 
Survey Studies of Attitude Change. American Psychologist, 14, 8-17.  
 
Hovland, C. I., Lumsdaine, A. A., & Sheffield, F. D. (1949). Experiments on Mass 
Communication. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Hunt, M. S. (1972). Competition in the Major Home Appliance Industry, 1960-1970. 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University.  
 
1 Introduction 
 42 
Hyman, H. H., & Sheatsley, P. B. (1947). Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail. 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 11, 412-423.  
 
Ivens, B. S., & Blois, K. J. (2004). Relational Exchange norms in marketing: a critical review 
of Macneil’s contribution. Marketing Theory, 4(3), 239-263.  
 
Ivens, B.S. (2006). Norm-Based Relational Behaviours: Is There an Underlying Dimensional 
Structure? Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 21(2), 94 – 105  
 
Jap, S. D. & Ganesan, S. (2000). Control Mechanisms and the Relationship Life Cycle: 
Implications for Safeguarding Specific Investments and Developing Commitment. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 37(May), 227-245. 
 
Jarvis, L. P., & Wilcox, J. B. (1973). Evoked Set Size - Some Theoretical Foundations and 
Empirical Evidence. In T. V. Greer (Ed.), Combined Proceedings, American 
Marketing Association, 236-240.  
 
Jacoby, J., & Chestnut, R. W. (1978). Brand Loyalty: Measurement and management. New 
York : Wiley.  
 
Jarrell, G. & Peltzman, S. (1985). The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers. 
Journal of Political Economy, 93(June), 512-536.  
 
Johar, G. V. (2005). The Price of Friendship: When, Why, and How Relational Norms Guide 
Social Exchange Behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(1), 22-27. 
 
Johar, G. V., Sengupta, J., & Aaker, J. (2005). Two Roads to Updating Brand Personality 
Impressions: Trait versus Evaluative Inferencing. Journal of Marketing Research, 
42(4), 458-469. 
 
Johnson, J. L. (1999). Strategic Integration in Industrial Distribution Channels: Managing the 
Interfirm Relationship as a Strategic Asset. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 27(Winter), 4-18. 
 
1 Introduction 
 43
Jonas, K., Diehl, M. &, Brömer, P. (1997). Effects of Attitude Ambivalence on Information 
Processing and Attitude-Intention Consistency. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 33(March), 190–210. 
 
Jones, T. O., & Sasser, W. E. (1995). Why Satisfied Customers Defect. Harvard Business 
Review, 73(6), 88−99.  
 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives. 
Psychological Review, 93(2), 136-153. 
 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the Psychology of Prediction. Psychological 
Review, 80(4), 237-251.  
 
Kamakura, W. A., Mittal, V., de Rosa, F., & Mazzon, J. A. (2002). Assessing the Service 
Profit Chain. Marketing Science, 21, 294– 317. 
 
Kamins, M. A., Folkes, V. S. & Perner, L. (1997). Consumer Responses to Rumors: Good 
News, Bad News. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 6(2), 165-187.  
 
Kardes, F. R. (1986). Effects of Initial Product Judgments on Subsequent Memory-Based 
Judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 13, 1–11.  
 
Kaufman, P. J., & Stern, L.W. (1988). Relational Exchange Norms, Perceptions of 
Unfairness, and Retained Hostility in Commercial Litigation. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 32(September), 534-552. 
 
Keaveney, S. M. (1995). Customer Switching Behavior in Service Industries — An 
Exploratory-Study. Journal of Marketing, 59(2), 71−82.  
 
Ketchen D. J., Thomas, J. B., & Snow, C. C. (1993). Organizational Configurations and 
Performance:  A Comparison of Theoretical Approaches. Academy of Management 
Review 36(6), 1278-1313. 
 
1 Introduction 
 44 
Kiesler, C. A. (1968). Commitment. In P.A. Abelson et al. (Eds.), Theories of Cognitive 
Consistency: A Source Book (pp. 448-455). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.  
 
Kim, K. (2000). On Interfirm Power, Channel Climate, and Solidarity in Industrial 
Distributor-Supplier Dyads. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
28(Summer), 388-405. 
 
Klein, J., & Dawar, N. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility and Consumers’ Attributions 
and Brand Evaluations in a Product-Harm Crisis. International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 21(September), 203-217.  
 
Kotler, P. (1997). Marketing Management, 7th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Krosnick, J. A. & Petty, R. E. (1995). Attitude strength: An overview. In R. E. Petty & J. A. 
Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 1–24). 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Kumkale, G. T., & Albaraccin, D. (2004). The Sleeper Effect in Persuasion: A Meta-Analytic 
review. Psychological Bulletin, 130(1), 143-172. 
 
Kurzbard, G., & Siomkos, G. J.  (1992). Crafting a Damage Control Plan: Lessons from 
Perrier. Journal of Business Strategy, 13(March/April), 39-43.   
 
Lastovicka, J. L., & Gardner, D. M. (1978). Components of Involvement. In J. C. Maloney & 
B. Silverman (Eds.), Attitude Research Plays for High Stokes (pp. 53-73). Chicago: 
American Marketing Association. 
 
Laufer, D., & Coombs, W. T. (2006). How Should a Company respond to a Product Harm 
Crisis? The Role of Corporate Reputation and Consumer-Based Cues. Business 
Horizons, 49, 379-385.  
 
Laufer, D., Gillespie, K., McBride, B., & Gonzalez, S. (2005). The Role of Severity in 
Consumer Attributions of Blame: Defensive Attributions in Product Harm Crises in 
Mexico. Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 17(2/3), 33 – 50. 
1 Introduction 
 45
LaBarbera, P., & Mazursky, D. (1983). A Longitudinal Assessment of Consumer 
Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction: The Dynamic Aspect of the Cognitive Process. Journal 
of Marketing Research, 20(4), 394-404. 
 
LaPiere, R. (1934). Attitudes Versus Actions. Social Forces, 13, 230-237. 
 
Laroche, M., & Toffoli, R. (1999). Strategic Brand Evaluations Among Fast-Food 
Franchises. A Test of Two Frameworks. Journal of Business Research, 45(2), 221–
233. 
 
Levy, S. J. (1985). Dreams, Fairy Tales, Animals, and Cars. Psychology & Marketing, 
2(Summer), 67-81.  
 
Lipset, S. M. (1975). Social Structure and Social Change. In P. M. Blau (Ed.), Approaches to 
the Study of Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Lusch, R. F., & Brown, J. R. (1996). Interdependency, Contracting, and Relational Behavior 
in Marketing Channels. Journal of Marketing, 60(October), 19-38. 
 
Lussier, D.A., & Olshavsky, R.W. (1979). Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in 
Brand Choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 6(2), 154–165.  
 
Macneil, I. R. (1974). The Many Futures of Contracts. Southern California Law Review, 
47(September), 691-816. 
 
Macneil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law. Northwestern University Law 
Review, 72, 854-905. 
 
Macneil, I. R. (1983). Values in Contract: Internal and External. Northwestern University 
Law Review, 78, 340-418 
 
Macneil, I. R. (1985). Relational Contract: What We Do Know and What We Do Not Know. 
Wisconsin Law Review, 3, 483-525. 
1 Introduction 
 46 
Maddox, R. N., Gronhaug, K., Homans, R. E., & May, F. E. (1978). Correlates of 
Information Gathering and Evoked Set Size for new Automobile Purchases in Norway 
and the U.S. Advances in Consumer Research, 5, 167-170.  
 
Maheswaran, D. & Chaiken, S. (1991). Promoting Systematic Processing in Low-
Involvement Settings: Effect of Incongruent Information on Processing and Judgment. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(July), 13–25.  
 
Marconi, J. (1997). Crisis Marketing: When Bad Things Happen to Good Companies. 
Chicago: American Marketing Association. 
 
Marketing News (1995). Consumers Eager to Know Values that Guide Business Decisions 
(11/06/05).  
 
Mascarenhas B., & Aaker D. A. (1989). Mobility Barriers and Strategic Groups. Strategic 
Management Journal ,10(5), 475–485. 
 
May, F. E., & Homans, R. E. (1977). Evoked Set Size and the Level of Information 
Processing in Product Comprehension and Choice Criteria. Advances in Consumer 
Research, 4, 172-177. 
 
McDougall, W. (1911). Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism. New York: 
Macmillan.  
 
McGee, J., & Thomas, H. (1986). Strategic Groups: Theory, Research and Taxonomy. 
Strategic Management Journal, 7(2): 141-160. 
 
McGraw, A. P., & Tetlock, P.E. (2005). Taboo Trade-Offs, Relational Framing, and the 
Acceptability of Exchanges. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(1), 2-15. 
 
McLoughlin, D., & De Bourca, S. (1996). When is a Relationship Really a Relationship? 
(When Do Organizations and Consumers Engage in Long Term Interactive 
Relationships?). In H. G. Gemünden, T. Ritter, & A. Walter (Eds.), Interaction, 
1 Introduction 
 47
Relationships and Networks, Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on 
Industrial Marketing and Purchasing, Vol. 2 (pp. 1013-1026). Karlsruhe. 
 
McNamara, G. M., Deephouse, D. L., & Luce, R. A. (2003). Competitive Positioning Within 
and Across a Strategic Groups Structure: the Performance of Core, Secondary, and 
Solitary Firms. Strategic Management Journal 24(2), 161-181.  
 
McNamara, G. M., Luce, R. A., & Tompson, G. H. (2002). Examining the Effect of 
Complexity in Strategic Group Knowledge Structures on Firm Performance. Strategic 
Management Journal 23(2), 153-170. 
 
Mervis, C. B., & Rosch, E. (1981). Categorization of Natural Objects. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 32, 89–115.  
 
Meyers-Levy, J., & Tybout, A. (1997). Context Effects at Encoding and Judgment in 
Consumption Settings: The Role of Cognitive Resources. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 24(1), 1-15.  
 
Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. 
Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall. 
 
Mittal, V., & Kamakura, W. A. (2001). Satisfaction, Repurchase Intent, and Repurchase 
Behavior: Investigating the Moderating Effect of Customer Characteristics. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 38(February), 131–142. 
 
Mittal, V., Kumar, P. & Tsiros, M. (1999). Attribute-Level Performance, Satisfaction and 
Behavioral Intentions over Time: A Consumption-System Approach. Journal of 
Marketing, 63(2), 88-101.  
 
Mittal, V., Ross, W. T. Jr., & Baldasare, P. M. (1998). The Asymmetric Impact of Negative 
and Positive Attribute-Level Performance on Overall Satisfaction and Repurchase 
Intentions. Journal of Marketing, 62(January), 33–47.  
 
1 Introduction 
 48 
Mizerski, R. W. (1982). An Attribution Explanation of the Disproportionate Influence of 
Unfavorable Information. Journal of Consumer Research, 9(3), 301–310.  
 
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994). A Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(July), 20-38. 
 
Mowen, J. C. (1980). Further Information on Consumer Perceptions of Product Recalls. 
Advances in Consumer Research, 7(1), 519 – 523. 
 
Narayana, C. L., & Markin, R. J. (1975). Consumer Behavior and Product Performance: An 
Alternative Conceptualization. Journal of Marketing, 39(4), 1-6. 
 
Nath D., & Gruca, T. S. (1997). Convergence Across Alternative Methods for Forming 
Strategic Groups. Strategic Management Journal 18(9), 745-760. 
 
Nida, E. A., & Smalley, W. (1959). Introducing Animism. New York: Friendship Press.  
 
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social 
Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Nohria, N., & Ghoshal, S. (1990). Differentiated Fit and Shared Values: Alternatives for 
Managing Headquarters-Subsidiary Relations. Strategic Management Journal, 15(6), 
491-502.  
 
Noordewier, T. G., John, G., & Nevin, J. R. (1990). Performance Outcomes of Purchasing 
Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 
54(October), 80-93. 
 
Oliva, T. A., Oliver, R. L., & MacMillan, I. C. (1992). A Catastrophe Model for Developing 
Service Satisfaction Strategies. Journal of Marketing, 56(3), 83−95. 
 
Oliver, R. (1997). Satisfaction: A Behavioral Perspective on the Consumer. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
 
1 Introduction 
 49
Olshavsky, R. W. (1979). Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision-Making: 
A Replication and Extension. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 24, 
300–316. 
 
Olusoga, S. A., Mokwa, M. P., & Nobel, C. H. (1995). Strategic Groups, Mobility Barriers, 
and Competitive Advantage: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Business 
Research 33(2): 153-164. 
 
Osborne, J. D., Stubbart, C. I., & Ramaprasad ,A. (2001). Strategic Groups and Competitive 
Enactment: A Study of Dynamic Relationships Between Mental Models and 
Performance. Strategic Management Journal 22(5). 435-454 
 
Ostlund, L. E. (1974). Evoked Set Size: Some Empirical Results. In T. V. Greer (Ed.), 
Combined Proceedings, American Marketing Association, 226-230. 
 
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, Bureaucracies, and Hierarchies. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 25(1), 129-141. 
 
Paulssen, M., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2005). A Self-Regulatory Model of Consideration Set 
Formation. Psychology & Marketing, 22(10), 785–812. 
 
Paulssen, M. & Fournier, S. (under review). Attachment Security and the Strength of 
Commercial Relationships: A Longitudinal Study. Manuscript submitted for 
publication.  
 
Payne, J. W. (1976). Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision Making: An 
Information Search and Protocol Analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 16, 366-387.  
 
Pearson, C. M., & Mitroff, I. I. (1993). From Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared: A Framework 
for Crisis Management. Academy of Management Executive, 7(1), 48-59.  
 
Pegels, C. C., & Sekar, C. (1989). Determining Strategic Groups Using Multidimensional 
Scaling. Interfaces 19(3): 47-57. 
1 Introduction 
 50 
Pennings, J. M. E., Wansink, B., & Meulenberg, M. T. G. (2002). A Note on Modeling the 
Consumer Reactions to a Crisis: The Case of the Mad Cow Disease. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 19(March), 91-100.  
 
Peppers, D., & Rogers, M. (1993). The One-to-One Future: Building Relationships One 
Customer at a Time. New York: Currency/Doubleday.  
 
Peter, J. P., & Olson, J. C. (2005). Consumer Behavior & Marketing Strategy. McGraw Hill: 
Irwin. 
 
Peteraf, M., & Shanley, M. (1997). Getting to Know You: a Theory of Strategic Group 
Identity. Strategic Management Journal, 18(Summer Special Issue), 165–186. 
 
Petty, R. E. (1977). A Cognitive Response Analysis of the Temporal Persistence of Attitude 
Changes Induced by Persuasive Communications. Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State 
University.  
 
Petty, R. E. (1994). Two Routes to Persuasion: State of the Art. In G. d'Ydewalle, P. Eelen, & 
P. Bertelson (Eds.), International Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 2 (pp. 
229-247). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Central and peripheral 
routes to attitude change. New York: Springer.  
 
Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and Persuasion: Central and 
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change. New York: Springer. 
 
Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a Determinant of 
Attitude Strength: Creating Attitudes that are Persistent, Resistant, and Predictive of 
Behavior. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and 
Consequences (pp. 93–130). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
 
1 Introduction 
 51
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1999). The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current Status 
and Controversies. In S. Chaiken, & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual Process Theories in Social 
Psychology (pp. 41-72). New York: Guilford Press 
 
Plummer, J. (1985). How Personality Makes a Difference. Journal of Advertising Research, 
24(December/January), 27-31.  
 
Porac, J. F., Thomas, H., & Baden-Fuller, C. (1989). Competitive Groups as Cognitive 
Communities - The Case of Scottish Knitwear. Journal of Management Studies 26(4): 
397-416.  
 
Porter, M. E. (1979). The Structure Within Industries and Companies’ Performance. Review 
of Economics & Statistics, 61, 214-227. 
 
Prasad, K. V. (1975). Evoked Set size - Personality Correlates and Mediating Variables. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 3, 272-279.  
 
Pratkanis, A. R., Greenwald, A. G., Leippe, M. R., & Baumgardner, M. H. (1998). In Search 
of Reliable Persuasion Effects: III. The sleeper Effect is Dead. Long Live the Sleeper 
Effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(2), 203-218. 
 
Priester, J. M., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Source Attributions and Persuasion: Perceived Honesty 
as a Determinant of Message Scrutiny. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
21(6), 637-654. 
 
Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (2003). The Influence of Spokesperson Trustworthiness on 
Message Elaboration, Attitude Strength, and Advertising Effectiveness. Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 13, 408-421. 
 
Priester, J. R., Wegener, D., Petty, R, & Fabrigar, L. (1999). Examining the Psychological 
Process Underlying the Sleeper Effect: The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
Explanation. Media Psychology, 1, 27-48.  
 
1 Introduction 
 52 
Pruitt, S. W., & Peterson, R. D. (1986). Security Price Reactions Around Product Recall 
Announcements. Journal of Financial Research, 9(2), 113 – 122. 
 
Raden, D. (1985). Strength-Related Attitude Dimensions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, 
312-330.  
 
Ratneshwar, S., Pechmann, C., & Shocker, A. D. (1996). Goal-Derived Categories and the 
Antecedents of Across-Category Consideration. Journal of Consumer Research, 
23(3), 240–250. 
 
Read, S. (1983). Once Is Enough: Causal Reasoning From a Single Instance. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45(2) , 323 – 334. 
 
Reger, R. K., & Huff, A. S. (1993). Strategic Groups a Cognitive Perspective. Strategic 
Management Journal 14(2): 103-123. 
 
Reichheld, F., & Sasser, E. (1990). Zero Defections: Quality Comes to Services. Harvard 
Business Review 68, 105-111. 
 
Reinartz, W. J., & Kumar, V. (2003). The Impact of Customer Relationship Characteristics 
on Profitable Lifetime Duration. Journal of Marketing, 67(1), 77−99 
 
Reingen, P. H., & Kernan, J. B. (1986). Analysis of Referral Networks in Marketing. 
Methods and Illustration. Journal of Marketing Research, 23(4), 370-378.  
 
Richins, M. & Bloch, P. (1991). Post-Purchase Product Satisfaction: Incorporating the 
Effects of Involvement and Time. Journal of Business Research, 23(2), 145-158.  
 
Robbennolt, J. K. (2000). Outcome Severity and Judgments of Responsibility: A Meta-
Analytic Review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 30(12), 2575 – 2609. 
 
Roberts, J. H., & Lattin, J. M. (1997). Consideration: Review of Research and Prospects for 
Future Insights. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(3), 406-410. 
 
1 Introduction 
 53
Roberts, J., & Nedungadi, P. (1995). Studying Consideration in the Consumer Decision 
Process: Progress and Challenges. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 
12, 3-7. 
 
Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 104, 192–233. 
 
Rust, R. T., Zeithaml, V. A., & Lemon, K. N. (2004). Customer-Centered Brand 
Management. Harvard Business Review, 82(9), 110–118.  
 
Scanzoni, J. (1979). Social Exchange and Behavioral Interdependence. In R. L. Burgess & T. 
L. Huston (Eds.), Social Exchange in Developing Relationships (pp. 61-75). New 
York : Academic Press. 
 
Schuman, H., & Johnson, M. P. (1976). Attitudes and Behavior. Annual Review of Sociology, 
2, 161-207. 
 
Seiders, K., Voss, G. B., Grewal, D., & Godfrey, A. L. (2005). Do satisfied customers buy 
more? Examining moderating influences in a retailing context. Journal of Marketing, 
69(4), 26−43. 
 
Sengupta, J., & Johar, G.V. (2002). Effects of Inconsistent Attribute Information on the 
Predictive Value of Product Attributes: Toward a Resolution of Opposing 
Perspectives. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(June), 39-56. 
 
Siddarth, S., Bucklin, R. E., & Morrison, D. G. (1995). Making the Cut: Modeling and 
Analyzing Choice Set Restrictions in Scannerpanel Data. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 32(3), 255–266. 
 
Siomkos, G. J., & Kurzbard, G. (1994). The Hidden Crisis in Product Harm Crisis 
Management. European Journal of Marketing, 28(2), 30 – 41. 
 
1 Introduction 
 54 
Smith, N. C., Thomas, R. J., & Quelch, J. A. (1996). A Strategic Approach to Managing 
Product Recalls. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
74(September/October), 102-112. 
 
Spreng, R., MacKenzie, S., & Olshavsky, R. (1996). A Reexamination of the Determinants of 
Consumer Satisfaction. Journal of Marketing , 60(3), 15-32. 
 
Srull, T. K., & Wyer Jr., R. S. (1989). Person Memory and Judgment. Psychological Review, 
96(January), 58–83. 
 
Staats, A. W., & Staats, C. K. (1958). Attitudes Established by Classical Conditioning. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 57, 37-40. 
 
Stigler, G. J. (1961). The Economics of Information. The Journal of Political Economy, 69, 
213-225. 
 
Stockmeyer, J. (1996). Brand in Crisis: Consumer Help for Deserving Victims. Advances in 
Consumer Research, 23(1), 429-435.  
 
Szymanski, D., & Henard, D. (2001). Customer Satisfaction: A Meta-Analysis of the 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 29(1), 16-35. 
 
Taylor, S. A., & Baker, T. L. (1994). An Assessment of the Relationship Between Service 
Quality and Customer Satisfaction in the Formation of Consumers’ Purchase 
intentions. Journal of Retailing, 70, 163–178. 
 
Thomas, H., & Venkatraman, N. (1988). Research on Strategic Groups – Progress and 
Prognosis. Journal of Management Studies 25(6), 537-55. 
 
Thompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., & Griffin, D. W. (1995). Let's Not Be Indifferent About 
(Attitudinal) Ambivalence. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude Strength: 
Antecedents and Consequences (pp. 361–386). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
1 Introduction 
 55
Tse, D. K., & Wilton, P. C. (1988). Models of Consumer Satisfaction Formulation: An 
Extension. Journal of Marketing Research, 24(August), 204-212. 
 
Tulving, E., & Pearlstone, Z. (1966). Availability Versus Accessibility of Information in 
Memory for Words. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5, 381-391 
 
Turpin, D. (2008). Communicating in a Crisis. European Business Forum. 
http://www.ebfonline.eu/Article.aspx?ArticleID=74 
 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice. Science, 211(30), 358-453.  
 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.  
 
Tybout, A. M., Calder, B. J., & Sternthal, B. (1981). Using Information Processing Theories 
to Design Marketing Strategies. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(February), 73-79. 
 
Walls, S. (2003). Relationship Marketing: The Dyadic Bonding Experience between a 
Consumer and a Company. Dissertation at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.  
 
Webster, F. E. (1992). The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation. Journal of 
Marketing, 56, 1-17.  
 
Weinberger, M. G., & Lepkowska-White, E. (2000). The Influence of Negative Information 
on Purchase Behavior. Journal of Marketing Management, 16(June), 465-482.  
 
Weinberger, M. G., Romeo, J. B., & Piracha, A. (1991). Negative Product Safety News: 
Coverage, Responses, and Effects. Business Horizons (May/June), 23-31.  
 
Westbrook, R. A., & Reilly, M. D. (1983). Value-Percept-Disparity: An Alternative to the 
Disconfirmation of Expectations Theory of Consumer Satisfaction. Advances in 
Consumer Research, 10, 256-261.  
 
1 Introduction 
 56 
Wright, P. L., & Barbour, F. (1977). Phased Decision Strategies: Sequels to Initial Screening. 
In M. K. Starr, & M. Zeleny (Eds.), North Holland TIMS Studies in the Management 
Science: Multiple Criteria Decision Making, 6 (pp. 91-109). Amsterdam: North 
Holland Publishing Company. 
 
Yi, Y. (1990). A Critical Review of Consumer Satisfaction. In V. A. Zeithaml (Ed.), Review 
of Marketing. Chicago: American Marketing Association.  
 
Zedeck, S., Kafry, D., & Jacobs, R. (1976). Format and Scoring Variations in Behavioural 
Expectation Evaluations. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 
17(October), 171−184.  
 
Zúñiga-Vicente J. A, de la Fuente-Sabate, J. M., & Suarez-Gonzalez, I. (2003). Dynamic of 
the Strategic Group Membership-Performance Linkage in Rapidly Changing 
Environments. Journal of Business Research 57(12), 1378-1390. 
2   When Customers Think Differently 
 57
2. Article 1: When Customers Think Differently: A Customer-
Side Categorization Approach to Strategic Groups 
 
 
Together with Marcel Paulssen and Richard P. Bagozzi 
 
 
Published in Marketing Journal for Research and Management, 2(3), 91–104, (2007). 
 
 
2.1. Abstract 
 
This paper draws upon categorization theory and applies it to segmentation and strategic 
group research. In contrast to existing approaches that have investigated the categorizations 
of managers and industry experts, we investigate customers’ patterns of brand categorization. 
Customer groups defined by their pattern of brand categorization can be conceptualized as 
the demand-side counterpart of strategic groups. Characterizing customer segments or 
strategic groups by their respective probabilities of brand categorization (brand consideration, 
brand neutrality, brand rejection) helps to understand the competitive structure of a market 
and preference barriers that exist for brands (i.e., it is very difficult for a firm to enter a 
segment/strategic group where its brand is rejected). These preference barriers in effect 
represent mobility barriers for firms and are crucial for understanding the dynamics of 
competition in a given market. Conceiving brand categorization as a goal-derived 
categorization process, we propose and show that product category goals and category-
specific benefits differ across brand categorization segments. Applying our approach in the 
automotive industry helps to explain market phenomena that are difficult to account for with 
solely a traditional resource based perspective on strategic groups.  
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2.2. Introduction 
 
When Volkswagen launched its luxury-model Phaeton in 2003, it expected annual sales of 
15,000 cars in Europe alone. Although most experts rated its technical features (e.g., fit and 
finish, comfort, and power) at least equal to rival brands BMW and Mercedes-Benz, VW 
failed to sell more than a fifth of what they had expected (Rust/Zeithaml/Lemon 2004). Thus 
the question arises why VW was not able to successfully enter the market segment of luxury-
car customers, despite the company’s resources and the demonstrated technical quality of its 
product.  
 
There is ample evidence that consumers do not consider all brands in a given market before 
making a purchase decision (for a review Roberts/Lattin 1997). Previous empirical work on 
how consumers may narrow down attention to a subset of brands out of a larger set of brands 
has developed the concept of the consideration set, the set of brands a consumer will consider 
in a purchase situation (e.g Nedungadi 1990; Erdem/Swait 2004). The notion of a 
consideration set implies a two-stage decision process, with a consideration stage followed by 
an evaluation stage. Consumer choices have therefore been conceptualized and modeled as 
the outcome of a two-stage process of consideration set formation and conditional brand 
choice (e.g., Andrews/Srinivasan 1995; Roberts/Lattin 1991). Since brand consideration is a 
precondition for brand evaluation and choice, understanding the consideration stage in the 
choice process can be crucial from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
Consideration set formation has among other things been shown to impact on brand 
switching behavior (Sambandam/Lord 1995) as well as to change market share independent 
of brand evaluation (Nedungadi 1990). Specifically in today’s highly competitive and 
crowded markets, it is likely that many brands may not even get access to consumer 
consideration sets (Desai/Hoyer 2000). In the car market of the introductory example aided 
brand awareness of new car buyers for most relevant competitors is on a very high level. 
Thus getting into the consideration sets of consumers is crucial for marketing success. It is 
likely that the Volkswagen Phaeton did not even manage to enter the consideration sets of its 
target customer segments. Therefore, the understanding of what determines consideration set 
composition is an important research question and can as we will show in this paper be 
employed to understand the structure of a market. Building on recent work (e.g., 
Paulssen/Bagozzi 2005; Chakravarti/Janiszewski 2003), who demonstrated that customers’ 
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brand consideration can be conceptualized as a goal-derived categorization process, we now 
turn to the concept of goal-derived categorization. 
 
2.3. Goal-Derived Categorization 
 
Based on early research on categorization processes (see Mervis/Rosch 1981), Barsalou 
(1991) could show that in everyday life people often create and use highly specialized sets of 
objects, such as ‘things to eat on a diet’ which he called ‘goal-derived categories’. Like 
classic taxonomic categories, goal-derived categories possess a continuum of degrees of 
membership ranging from typical members to typical non-members, which has been referred 
to as ‘graded structure’ (Rosch 1975; Barsalou 1991). A category can therefore be 
conceptualized as a fuzzy set with different degrees of membership and unclear category 
boundaries (McCloskey/Glucksberg 1978). Early approaches for modeling consideration set 
composition have used the crisp set model and investigated whether an alternative is 
considered or not within the choice process (e.g., Roberts/Lattin 1991; Andrews/Srinivasan 
1995). Newer approaches have built on the notion that the consideration stage of the choice 
process can be conceptualized as a categorization process and investigated varying degrees of 
membership (e.g., Viswanathan/Childers 1999, Wu/Rangaswamy 2003). Similar to graded 
structure where typical members of a category, unclear members of a category (e.g., is a 
duckbill a mammal?) and non-members can be distinguished, frameworks of brand-
categorization with a similar tri-partition into consideration, hold and reject set have been 
developed (Laroche/Toffoli 1999; Brisoux/Laroche 1980; Peter/Olson 2005). In addition to 
the brands a consumer considers in a choice situation (consideration set), brands that the 
consumer clearly rejects (reject set) and brands that for various reasons are neither acceptable 
nor unacceptable for choice (hold set) are distinguished. Already Roberts/Lattin (1991) had 
proposed that approaches that allow for different degrees of membership would possess 
higher process validity and more flexibility. A recent validation study of the Brisoux-Laroche 
categorization framework provided support for meaningful differentiation of brands within 
the different brand sets on the basis of their market share position. Specifically 
Laroche/Toffoli (1999) concluded that simply classifying a brand as being in the 
consideration set or not may hide considerable differences that still exist between brands. 
Thus the Brisoux-Laroche categorization framework provides a more refined measure of the 
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resulting graded structure of the brand categorization stage of the choice process than a mere 
consideration/non-consideration measure. 
 
Concerning the determinants of graded structure for goal-derived categories, Barsalou (1991) 
hypothesized that background goals determine ideals, which in turn determine graded 
structure. Ideals can be defined as characteristics an exemplar should have in order to satisfy 
a goal connected with a category (Barsalou 1985). For the goal-derived category ‘things to 
eat on a diet’ an ideal value of the attribute, calories, would be zero. In a consumption 
context, these ideals are basically the benefits desired given particular background goals of a 
consumer or given a specific usage situation (Desai/Hoyer 2000; Chakravati/Janiszewski 
2003). Consequently desired benefits determine graded structure in goal-derived 
categorization in a consumption context, that is consideration set formation. Benefits are 
defined as the personal value a consumer attaches to product or service attributes 
(O’Connor/Sullivan 1995; Srinivasan/Park 1997; Ratneshwar et al. 1999). Thus for the goal 
derived category ‘things to eat on a diet’ the benefit, low calories, would be particularly 
important and determine the degree of membership for different food products in that 
category. A consumer who only attaches a high importance to the benefit ‘low calories’ will 
construct a different goal-derived category ‘things to eat on a diet’ than a consumer who 
attaches high importance to both the benefits low calories and good taste. The relevance of 
benefits themselves is determined by salient background goals associated with the goal-
derived category (e.g., the goal to lose body weight might influence the evaluation of 
benefits). We will apply the concept of goal-derived categorization to the consumer context 
in order to derive and understand competitive market structure and preference-based mobility 
barriers for companies.   
 
2.3.1. Brand Categorization and Market Structure 
 
The brands that comprise an individual’s consideration set are the only one’s that are 
seriously scrutinized in a purchase decision. Thus the market for each consumer is restricted 
to his consideration set. In a given market consumers categorize brands differently 
(Cooper/Inoue 1996). For example a consumer seeking prestige and status in a car might 
consider a Porsche or a BMW whereas a Kia would be clearly rejected. In contrast a 
consumer, considering cars just as a method of transportation, might consider brands such as 
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Kia or Logan but would reject Porsche or BMW. A market can thus be divided into a certain 
number of segments in which consumers consider a distinctive subset of brands 
(Cooper/Inoue 1996). Within segments brand categorization is homogenous and across 
segments brand categorization is heterogeneous. Thus a market can be divided into K 
segments Sk (k = 0, …, K) of size wk, where 
1=∑Kk kw  that can be conceptualized as latent 
types of consumers with homogeneous patterns of brand categorization (De Sarbo/Jedidi 
1995). A method to derive these latent consumer types or segments would be a latent class 
analysis (see section 6.1). Latent class analysis assumes that customers belong to one or 
several a posteriori defined segments. Based on his or her individual pattern of brand 
categorization every customer can be assigned with a certain probability to each of the latent 
types or market segments. 
 
On an aggregate level each market segment can also be described by the probabilities that 
brands are in the consideration, hold or reject set of its respective customers. Competition 
between goods and services exist to the extent that potential customers perceive them as 
substitutes at a particular purchase occasion (Cooper/Inoue 1996; Siddarth/Bucklin/Morrison 
1995). Several researchers have employed consideration sets as measures of perceived 
substitutability to understand the competitive structure of a market (e.g., DeSarbo/Jedidi 
1995; Finn/Louviere 1990). As Ratneshwar et al. (1999, p. 193) emphasized, consideration 
sets ‘… provide competitor information relevant to a comparative assessment of a firm’s 
resources and competencies’. This means that brands/firms that are simultaneously 
categorized into the consideration set by a particular customer segment possess a high degree 
of competition in that group or segment. Market segments based on brand categorization 
patterns can therefore yield insight into the competitive relations between companies and 
their brands in a given market. Two brands that are considered by a high proportion of 
customers in a segment would be intense competitors in that segment. Brands or companies 
can be represented in strategic groups – with intense rivalry within groups and lessened 
rivalry between groups (Porter 1979). Firms that intensely compete in a particular segment 
can potentially be conceived as a strategic group (Bauer 1991). A strategic group is therefore 
the supply-side analogue to the demand-side market segment. Grover/Srinivasan (1987) 
demonstrated this interrelation by simultaneously inferring strategic groups and market 
segments through a latent class analysis of a matrix of brand switching data. From this 
perspective, a strategic group is therefore (at least temporarily) sheltered from competition 
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because other competitors cannot readily imitate the mix of product attributes preferred by 
customers of a particular segment. That is, customer preferences restrict movements of 
companies between strategic groups and can therefore be conceptualized as mobility barriers 
for companies. Mobility barriers are structural forces impeding firms from freely changing 
their competitive position (Hodgkinson 1997). Mobility barriers are a corollary to the 
existence of strategic groups (McGee/Thomas 1986). They can also be conceptualized as a 
generalization of the concept of entry barriers, consisting of various factors that prevent 
members of one group from transferring or extending their membership to other groups 
(Hodgkinson 1997). In order to enter and compete within a new strategic group or segment, 
as in the Phaeton example, a company or brand has to move from a position of brand 
neutrality (hold set) or even brand rejection (reject set) into the consideration sets of these 
new target customers. This represents a mobility barrier that has to be overcome (see also 
Mascarenhas/Aaker 1989). Mobility barriers that restrict movements of companies between 
strategic groups are the counterpart to preference barriers that restrict the movement of the 
individual consumer between segments (Bauer 1991, Hatten/Hatten 1987; Harrigan 1985) 
 
Although the topic of strategic groups has been one of the most active areas of strategic 
management research (Peteraf/Shanley 1997; McNamara/Deephouse/Luce 2003) there have 
been surprisingly few customer-side approaches to strategic groups (two exceptions are the 
studies by Day/DeSarbo/Oliva 1987, and Pegels/Sekar 1989, which are limited in scope). 
This is even more surprising when one notes that a customer-side approach to strategic 
groups seems a promising path for explaining market outcomes like the mentioned example 
of the VW Phaeton. VW apparently was unable to pass the mobility barrier that separated it 
from the luxury-car producer group/segment, despite its resources and the product’s 
acknowledged technical features. We argue that customers’ brand categorizations determine 
the competitive structure of a market and represent mobility barriers for companies 
(Mascarenhas/Aaker 1989). In the case of the VW Phaeton, customers’ brand categorization, 
in this case ‘rejection’, may have constituted a significant mobility barrier for entering the 
luxury car segment. Thus an understanding of customers’ brand categorization processes can 
provide further insights into the determinants of a market’s competitive structure and its 
underlying mobility barriers. In the next section we develop hypotheses concerning the 
determinants of brand categorization for the product category cars. 
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2.4. Hypothesis Development 
 
Individuals use products and brands to cultivate and preserve their identities. Consumer 
goods are capable of serving consumers in this way because of the symbolic meaning that is 
embedded in them (Belk 1988; Leigh/Gabel 1992; Solomon 1983). Therefore, consumers do 
not make consumption choices solely from a product’s utilities, per se, but also based on their 
symbolic meanings (Belk 1988). The consumption of symbolic meaning, particularly through 
the use of advertising as a cultural commodity, provides individuals with opportunities to 
construct, maintain, and communicate identity and social meaning (Elliott 1997). 
Communication by symbolic consumption has been thought to be an important part early on 
in marketing research (Levy 1959). Consider the example of a Rolex watch: it undoubtedly 
communicates the time of day, but apart from that, and supposedly more importantly for 
typical Rolex customers, it communicates symbolic issues, such as status and self image. A 
number of researchers have suggested that various aspects of products and possessions 
contain symbolic meanings and can therefore be used to express a particular self-image 
(Bearden/Etzel 1982; Belk 1981; Solomon 1983). In other words, individuals consume 
products and brands for their symbolic properties as much as for their functional benefits 
(Elliott 1997; Levy 1959). In social psychology self presentation has been defined as the 
process through which people try to control the impressions other people form of them. Self-
presentation is a goal-directed conscious or unconscious attempt to influence the perceptions 
of other people about a person (Leary 1995). That is if a consumers purchase a brand in a 
given product category primarily for its symbolic meaning than they want to consciously 
influence the perceptions other people have of them and self-presentation is a salient goal 
associated with that particular product category.   
 
In a consumption context desired benefits given particular background goals of a consumer 
determine graded structure in brand categorization (Desai/Hoyer 2000; 
Chakravati/Janiszewski 2003). Background goals can be as abstract as a terminal value or a 
self-ideal. Building on Barsalou’s (1991) research we chose to investigate a middle level of 
goal abstractedness that we label product category goal. The scope of a product category goal 
typically does not extend much beyond a product category. In light of the above said we want 
to investigate how the salience of the goal to use the products of a category for self-
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presentational purposes determines the relevance of benefits and subsequently brand 
categorization. In our empirical study in the product category cars we specifically want to 
study the impact of the goal ‘status presentation’. Thus we propose that the salience of the 
product category goal ‘status presentation’ determines the relevance of benefits for the 
product category, cars. Four important benefits recently found for consumers considering the 
purchase of cars are ‘economy’, ‘sporty driving’, ‘comfort’, and ‘safety’ (e.g., 
Paulssen/Bagozzi, 2005). If ‘status presentation’ is a salient goal for a customer when 
considering the purchase of a car, then it would be prudent for the product and advertising to 
communicate symbolic issues such as status or personality style. Two examples of classic 
status symbols in many societies are sporty cars with powerful engines, as well as large, 
comfortable roomy cars. Hence, we propose that to the extent that ‘status presentation’ is a 
prevalent consumption goal, then the benefits ‘sporty driving’ and ‘comfort’ will be highly 
relevant for consumers. Thus, 
 
H1: The salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ has a positive 
impact on the importance attached to the benefit ‘sporty driving’. 
 
H2: The salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ has a positive 
impact on the importance attached to the benefit ‘comfort’. 
 
The salience of the goal ‘status presentation’ is however also likely to have a negative impact 
on the relevance of certain benefits. Unlike an especially sporty car with a powerful engine or 
a large roomy car, a particular car scoring high on economic benefits may not be as well 
suited for status differentiation. Specifically, because such attributes as low fuel consumption 
or low maintenance cost are not readily visible as a symbol for communicating to others, they 
are not well suited to expressing a particular self-image. Furthermore an economic car, for 
technical reasons, is usually small, and has an efficient, but low power consumption, and 
rather weak engine. Hence, we would expect that for customers with a strong salience of the 
goal ‘status presentation’ the benefit ‘economy’ will be perceived to be counter productive.  
Therefore,  
 
H3: The salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ has a negative 
impact on the importance attached to the benefit ‘economy’. 
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What about the benefit ‘safety’? Until quite recently, more expensive and exclusive cars 
provided higher levels of safety. But nowadays most cars, even very small ones, provide high 
levels of safety, as confirmed in published safety test findings. Therefore, having a safe car 
will not necessarily communicate symbolic meaning, such as status. We would thus assume 
that the product category goal ‘status presentation’ will have no impact on the relevance a 
consumer attaches to safety. Hence, 
 
H4: The salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ will have no 
impact on the importance attached to the benefit ‘safety’. 
 
Several researchers have employed consideration sets to structure a market (e.g., 
DeSarbo/Jedidi 1995; Finn/Louviere 1990). Cooper/Inoue (1996) proposed that 
consideration sets are homogenous within segments and heterogeneous across segments and 
that these segments can be conceptualized as strategic groups. Their study employed latent 
structure models with the assumption of conditional independence to determine the number 
and composition of segments (see also DeSarbo/Jedidi 1995). Other researchers have found 
that probabilistic independence of brand consideration exists for the whole market 
(Hauser/Wernerfeldt 1989). The present paper follows the proposition of Cooper/Inoue 
(1996) that market segments/strategic groups can be conceptualized as latent types of 
consumers with homogeneous patterns of brand categorization. Note here that we use brand 
categorization, where three brand sets are distinguished, rather than two (the considered and 
not considered sets), for brand consideration. The probabilistic independence hypothesis 
confirmed by Hauser/Wernerfeldt (1989) essentially states that a market is unstructured or 
unpartitioned. All brands in the market compete with each other proportionally to their 
market share, and the whole market is one class or segment. That is, the number of segments 
equals 1 (c=1). The probabilistic independence hypothesis will be used as a null market 
structure hypothesis against which the market structure hypothesis proposed below will be 
tested. As a consequence,  
 
 H5:  Brand consideration is conditionally independent given c classes/segments 
  with c  ≥ 2. 
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To the extent that H5 is confirmed, a number of segments/strategic groups greater than one 
will be derived. Based on research on goal-derived categorization, we propose that the 
salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ determines the relevance of 
benefits for the product category cars, which in turn determines the categorization of 
particular car brands into ‘consideration’, ‘hold’, or ‘reject sets’. Given that different brand 
categorization types exist, these latent types should differ with respect to the salience of the 
product category goal and the importance of benefits. Different salience of the product 
category goal and different relevance of benefits results in unique patterns of brand 
categorization and are consequently the reason for the existence of distinct segments/strategic 
groups, where these are defined as latent consumer types with homogenous patterns of brand 
categorization. Thus,  
 
H6: The relevance of benefits differs across latent brand categorization types. 
 
H7: The salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ differs across 
latent brand categorization types. 
 
2.5. Method  
 
2.5.1. Setting 
 
The automotive industry was chosen as an appropriate study context in light of the high 
product involvement with strong non-functional attributes and implications (Johnson et. al. 
1997) as well as the high decision complexity that characterize automotive purchases relative 
to many other goods (Kardes et. al. 1993). Due to these characteristics consideration set 
formation constitutes a distinct stage of the decision process and is more deliberative than in 
many other product categories (Sambandam/Lord  1995). Given the initial example of the 
VW Phaeton and also the fact that the product category, car, is particularly well suited for 
symbolic consumption purposes, we consider the automotive market as an appropriate setting 
for testing our hypotheses. As explained above, focus on a particular setting is also relevant 
for hypothesis specification. Given that we want to investigate brand categorization, we need 
to select respondents with purchase experience in that category. Therefore, only respondents 
were interviewed who possessed a new (i.e., not previously owned) car purchased within the 
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last four years. This selection was necessary to assure that respondents were familiar with the 
product category and could meaningfully answer the brand categorization questions described 
below.  
 
2.5.2. Data and Descriptives 
 
A total of 1247 respondents were personally interviewed. The survey was conducted by a 
major German market research company. A quota sampling based on car ownership was 
employed to select respondents who fulfilled the above mentioned recruitment criteria. 
Quotas to recruit respondents (car owners who purchased a new car within the last four years) 
were based on the percentage of brand registrations within the last four years prior to the 
survey. The characteristics of the sample can be described as follows: people interviewed 
were on average 41.8 years old (SD=12.6), living on average in a 2.6 person household 
(SD=1.1) and having on average 0.7 children (SD=0.87) and 1.5 cars (SD=0.62).  
 
2.5.3. Construct Operationalization 
 
Brand Categorization: We applied the framework for brand categorization validated by 
Laroche/Toffoli (1999). Respondents had to check brands from a list of 25 brands that they 
knew (awareness set). They were asked: ‘Which of the brands you know would you consider 
in a future purchase?’ (consideration set), and ‘Which model do you think of in particular?’ 
Respondents were then asked to indicate which of the known brands they would not consider 
at all in a future purchase (reject set). To measure uncertainty, the so-called ‘foggy’ set, they 
were asked: ‘Which brands are you not sure whether you should consider in a purchase, 
because you do not know these brands well enough?’. In the last question of this section, 
respondents were asked to check those brands that they knew well enough, but would neither 
consider nor reject in a future purchase (hold set).  
 
Benefits: Respondents were asked to rate the importance of 18 different benefits for the 
purchase of a new car that were taken from a study in the automotive context by 
Paulssen/Bagozzi (2005). The lead-in question was phrased as follows: ‘Suppose you would 
buy a brand new car in the next couple of days. What importance would the following aspects 
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have for your personal decision for a new automobile? You can distribute between 1 and 5 
points per aspect. The more important an aspect is for you personally, the more points you 
should distribute’. The response format was a 5 point scale that ranged from totally 
unimportant (1 point) to absolutely important (5 points).  We tested the model with the four 
benefit dimensions ‘safety’, ‘sporty driving’, ‘comfort’ and ‘economy’, proposed by 
Paulssen/Bagozzi (2005) with a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for our sample. The fit of 
the model was excellent with χ2(15) = 24.54 (p = 0.06), RMSEA = 0.024, and CFI = 1.00. 
Thus the four-dimensional benefit model generalizes to our sample and will be employed in 
our analyses. Furthermore the four benefit dimensions display discriminant and convergent 
validity (see Table 2-8 in Appendix). 
 
Product category goal: Respondents were asked two questions to measure the salience of the 
goal ‘status presentation’ in the product category, cars. The questions were phrased in a four-
point Likert format with a scale ranging from ‘I totally agree” to “I totally disagree’. The two 
statements to measure the salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ were 
phrased as follows, ‘For me a car is a means to express my personality and my individuality’ 
(M = 2.61, SD = 0.97) and ‘The car I drive should express my position in society’ (M = 2.07, 
SD = 0.97). All lambda (factor loading) values are significant and substantial in our models. 
 
2.6. Results 
 
In analyzing the data we conducted two major steps. First we tested hypothesis 5 and 
conducted a latent class analysis with brand categorization data. Since we had sparse data 
additional parametric bootstrap simulations were conducted to decide on the number of 
classes. In a second step we performed multi-group analysis. As a precondition for 
meaningful group comparisons we assessed tau-equivalence of constructs across strategic 
groups. Then we tested the relations between product category goal and benefits as proposed 
in hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 4 and whether these relations are invariant across strategic 
groups. In a last step of multi-group analysis we tested whether the latent means of product 
category goal and benefits differ across strategic groups as proposed in hypothesis 6 and 
hypothesis 7.  
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2.6.1. Latent Class Analysis with Brand Categorization 
 
First we test the proposition that segments/strategic groups can be conceptualized as groups 
of customers with homogenous patterns of brand categorization by use of a latent class 
analysis. Forman (1984) recommends as a minimum requirement for latent class analysis that 
the number of cases should be greater than the number of cells. If we distinguish the five 
categories or sets from the Brisoux/Laroche (1980) framework of brand categorization, then 
the minimum requirement of a ratio of one between cells and cases would allow for only four 
brands as indicators of the latent market structure variable. From a practical point of view, the 
differences of brands in the unawareness set, foggy set, and hold set are not large. Brands in 
these three sets are neither considered nor rejected in a purchase decision. The position 
against those brands is neutral, although for different reasons, because they are unknown 
(unawareness set), not known well enough (foggy set), or because they are neither acceptable 
nor unacceptable for a purchase (hold set). In principle it would be desirable to use brand 
categorization indicators with five levels. But in order to include a reasonable number of 
brands as indicators of the latent market structure variable in the model, the required sample 
size would be prohibitively large. Therefore in the present study, the number of levels is 
reduced to three, and the unawareness set, hold set, and foggy set are treated as one single 
level of brand categorization. A contingency table with 6 indicators each measured at three 
levels would contain 729 cells. Thus the six brands with the highest share of brand 
consideration were retained for the analysis. These brands were Audi, BMW, Ford, 
Mercedes-Benz, Opel, and Volkswagen. The restriction to six brands as observed indicators 
of the latent class variable will not deliver a complete picture of the market, per se. However, 
the purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate the applicability of our approach to the analysis 
of strategic groups. Cases with missing values were deleted. The remaining 836 cases satisfy 
the above mentioned minimum requirement. Since 411, or 56% of the cells in the table were 
empty we have sparse data. Table 2-1 shows the non-bootstrapped fit measures for an 
exploratory latent class analysis with different class sizes. 
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Table 2-1: Non-Bootstrapped Measures of Fit for the Latent Class Model 
Model Df G2 P RC P χ2 p AIC BIC 
1 Class 716 1852 0.00 2338 0.00 3112 0.00 10880 10993 
2 Class 703 1308 0.00 1457 0.00 1756 0.00 10338 10456 
3 Class 690 929 0.00 960 0.00 1098 0.00 9985 10165 
4 Class 679 813 0.00 857 0.00 1000 0.00 9894 10135 
5 Class 670 713 0.09 729 0.039 841 0.00 9821 10124 
6 Class 659 641 0.60 657 0.43 757 0.00 9774 10139 
 
Test of Hypothesis 5: One hundred samples of random starting values were evaluated prior to 
each model estimation to avoid local optima. Again the one-class model is essentially a test 
of the hypothesis that brand categorization of the 6 regarded brands is probabilistically 
independent. Considering the degree of sparseness in our data a test of this hypothesis with 
chi-square based statistics is problematic (Langeheine/Pannekoek/van de Pol 1996). 
However, the values of the chi-square based goodness of fit measures show that the 
independence model does not fit the data at all. The five-class model is the first model where 
the log-likelihood ratio (G2) is non-significant, and the Read-Cressie (RC) statistic is only 
marginally significant. For the six-class-model, both statistics are highly non-significant. The 
Pearson’s chi-square test is, for both the five- and the six-class models, also non-significant. 
The BIC favors a five-class model, whereas the AIC favors a six-class model.  
 
 
Parametric bootstrap simulations were conducted to get a bootstrapped α (see Table 2-2). 
Following the recommendation of Langeheine/van de Pol/Pannekoek (1997), 1000 bootstrap 
samples were evaluated. Bootstrap α’s for the three statistics already show an adequate fit for 
the five-class model. Thus, considering parsimony and fit, the five-class model is favored, 
and H5 can be accepted and the null market structure hypothesis can be rejected. The 
percentage of subjects correctly allocated in the five-class model (85%), and the lambda 
measure of association (0.79) confirms the five class solution, compared to the two, three and 
four class solution where those values are lower. Predictability is more certain for the five 
class solution. 
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Table 2-2: Bootstrapped Measures of Fit for the Latent Class Model 
Model Number of bootstrap samples p(G2) p(RC) p(χ2) 
2 Class 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Class 1000 0.00 0.37 0.57 
4 Class 1000 0.02 0.35 0.42 
5 Class 1000 0.32 0.64 0.61 
6 Class 1000 0.74 0.85 0.80 
 
Thus five consumer types with homogeneous patterns of brand categorization of the six 
brands included in the latent class analysis were identified. Table 2-3 shows the class-specific 
probabilities for the observed variable brand categorization of the six brands. We have looked 
at three levels of categorization. The minus sign stands for the reject set, zero indicates 
neutrality towards the brand (i.e., the foggy set, hold set, and unawareness set), while the plus 
sign signifies that the brand is considered in a purchase decision (e.g., in segment/group 1, 
the probability of rejecting an Audi is 0.64 and the probability of considering Audi is 0.19).  
 
Table 2-3: Class Size and Class-Specific Probabilities for the Five-Class Model 
Segment/ 
strategic 
groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
Size 0.24 0.15 0.06 0.28 0.28 
Set − o + − o + − o + − o + − o +
Audi .64 .17 .19 .57 .18 .25 0 0 1 .04 .39 .57 .04 .67 .29 
BMW .91 .08 .01 .34 .07 .59 .04 .05 .91 .02 .22 .76 .14 .60 .26 
Ford .34 .34 .32 .94 .01 .04 .23 .21 .55 .45 .50 .05 .06 .54 .40 
MB .83 .12 .06 .25 .08 .67 .11 0 .89 .07 .28 .65 .33 .54 .13 
Opel .27 .31 .43 .91 0 .09 .10 .06 .84 .32 .59 .09 .02 .49 .49 
Br
an
d 
VW .18 .28 .55 .83 .07 .10 0 0 1 .14 .56 .3 .02 .44 .53 
“0” = neutrality toward the brand (i.e., the foggy set, hold set, and unawareness set), “-” = the reject set, and “+” = 
consideration set. 
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Interpretation of Segments/Groups:  In segment/group 1 the brands BMW, Mercedes-Benz 
and to a lesser extent Audi are clearly rejected with probabilities ranging from .64 to .91, 
whereas the brands Ford, Opel and VW are considered with probabilities of .32, .41 and .55, 
respectively. This segment is labeled ‘volume brands only segment’ since only volume 
brands are considered and premium brands are clearly rejected in this segment. Segment 1 
has a size of 24% of the sample. Segment 2 shows an approximately reversed pattern of 
brand categorization as segment 1 and is consequently labeled as the ‘luxury brand segment’. 
Interestingly, the probability of rejecting Audi is more than twice as high as the probability of 
considering Audi in the luxury brand segment. Analogously, segment 4 is labeled the 
‘upscale segment’ since also brands like Audi and VW are considered next to the luxury 
brands BMW and Mercedes-Benz. Segment 4 is labeled ‘volume brand segment’ since 
predominantly but not only volume brands are considered. Consumers in segment 3 consider 
all brands except Ford with probabilities approaching .9. Customers in this segment possess 
large consideration sets and thus not as pronounced preferences as the other segments. Thus 
this segment is labeled ‘indifferent segment’. Overall the two premium brands BMW and 
Mercedes-Benz as well as the three volume brands VW, Opel and Ford display a very similar 
pattern of competition in the five segments. Audi’s pattern of competition mirrors its position 
between the premium and the volume brands but possesses stronger similarities with the two 
premium brands.  
 
Our hypothesis, H5, and the underlying proposition that market segments/strategic groups can 
be defined as groups of consumers with homogeneous brand categorization patterns was 
confirmed, against the alternative hypothesis of probabilistic independence of brand 
categorization. On the one hand, our results provide a picture of the competitive structure of a 
market. On the other hand, we can assign each respondent to a segment and therefore could in 
principle characterize our segments with supplemental demographic variables. Analogous to 
Grover/Srinivasan (1987), we simultaneously infer the competitive structure of a market with 
market segments and strategic groups through a latent class analysis of brand categorization 
data. However, we go beyond mere description and test hypotheses to explain the origins and 
emergence of competitive market structure in the following section.  
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2.6.2. Product Category Goals and Market Structure 
 
Five market segments were identified through latent class analysis. Segment 3, which was 
labeled the ‘indifferent segment’, has a size of only 6% of the sample, or after accounting for 
missing values of only 45 respondents. Results from simulation studies indicate that with 
samples smaller than 50, the probability of an improper solution steeply increases in 
structural equation models (Boomsma 1982). Thus segment 3 is not included in the multiple 
group analysis that follows when testing the remaining hypotheses.  
 
Before further comparisons can be meaningfully tested we have to verify that our measures 
are tau-equivalent across groups. First a model with a similar factor pattern is tested. The 
model shows a very good fit with 2χ  (104) = 140.99 (p = 0.01), RMSEA = 0.044, and CFI = 
0.98 and the hypothesis of congeneric equivalence cannot be rejected. The next step in 
multiple group analysis is the test of tau-equivalency. The chi-square difference test, 2dχ  (3) 
= 3.64; p > .05, shows that this hypothesis can be accepted both for the product category goal 
status presentation and for the benefit dimensions ( 2dχ  (12) = 14.15; p > .05.).  
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Table 2-4: Results of Multiple Group Analysis 
 
Model 
 
 
Goodness of Fit 
 
Test of 
Hypothesis 
M1: Equal factor     
        Pattern 
χ(104,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
140.99 
p = 0.0092 
--- 
M2: Λx  invariant 
   Λy  pattern  
       similar 
χ(107,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
144.63 
p = 0.0090 
M2 - M1 
2
dχ (3) = 3.64 
p > .05 
M3: Λx  invariant  
        Λy  invariant 
χ(119,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
158.78 
p = 0.0087 
M3 – M2 
2
dχ (12) = 14.15 
p > .05 
M4: Λx  invariant  
        Λy  invariant 
        Γ  invariant 
χ(131,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
176.63 
p = 0.0049 
M4 – M3 
2
dχ (12) = 17.85 
p > .05 
 
Test of Hypotheses H1-H4: In order to test the influence of category goals on benefits, the 
equivalence of the gamma-matrix across groups is tested. The hypothesis underlying this test 
is that the causal influence of the product category goal on the importance of benefits is 
invariant across segments. The hypothesis can be accepted with 2dχ  (12) = 17.85; p > .05. 
Moreover, three hypotheses concerning relations between the product category goal and the 
benefit dimensions (H1, H2, H3) can be confirmed (see Table 2-5). The gamma-coefficients 
are all significant at p < .05. The explained variance of the benefit constructs is 3% for 
‘comfort’, 35% for ‘economy’, and 28% for ‘sporty driving’. As hypothesized, the salience of 
the product category goal, status presentation, increases the importance of the benefits, sporty 
driving and comfort, but decreases the importance of the benefit economy. Contrary to H4, a 
significant negative relationship between the product category goal and the benefit ‘safety’ 
exists. The more a consumer pursues the goal ‘status presentation’ for the product category 
cars, the lower will be the importance of the benefit ‘safety’ in a purchase decision. It is 
possible that consumers with a high salience of the goal ‘status presentation’ take ‘safety’ for 
granted or perceive it as a hygiene factor (Herzberg 1966) and consequently put relatively 
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less emphasis on this benefit in a purchase decision. The explained variance for ‘safety’ is 
27%.  
 
Table 2-5: Estimated Coefficients and T-Values for the Product Category Goal Model 
 ξ1 
Status presentation 
η1 
Safety 
γ11 = -0.52* 
t = -10.30 
η2 
Economy 
γ21 = -0.48* 
t = -9.02 
η3 
Comfort 
γ31 = 0.09** 
t = 2.16 
η4 
Sporty Driving 
γ41 = 0.44* 
t = 8.53 
* p < .05 
Test of Hypotheses H6-H7: In order to test Hypotheses 6 and 7 a confirmatory factor analysis 
with mean structures was run. Since we have already established true score equivalence of 
the five constructs across groups, the next step is to test for intercept invariance. The 
hypothesis can be accepted with 2dχ  (15) = 17.81; p > .05. Thus we can conclude that the 
intercepts are invariant across groups (see Table 2-6). Next we formally test whether the 
latent means of the benefit constructs and the product category goal differ significantly across 
strategic groups by constraining the latent means to be equal across segments. Hypothesis 6 
can be accepted for the three benefit dimensions economy (κ2), comfort (κ3), and sporty 
driving (κ4). Only the latent mean for the benefit safety (κ1) does not significantly differ 
across segments. Thus 3 of 4 predictions are confirmed for Hypothesis 6. Safety is of equal 
relevance across customer segments defined by their patterns of brand categorization. The 
product category goal (κ5) is also not invariant across segments ( 2dχ  (3) = 49.40; p < .05). As 
proposed in Hypothesis 7, the salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ 
differs significantly across segments with homogenous patterns of brand categorization. Our 
results support the notion that the salience of the product category goal ‘status presentation’ 
determines the relevance of benefits. Moreover market segments, defined as consumer types 
with homogeneous brand categorization patterns, differ with respect to the salience of the 
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product category goal as well as the relevance of category-specific benefits. The causal 
interrelations between product category goal and benefits are invariant (i.e., generalizes) 
across segments. The different salience of product category goals determine the salience of 
benefits, and thereby brand categorization, in a consumption context. Different patterns of 
brand categorization, in turn, determine the structure of the market.  
 
Table 2-6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Mean Structures 
 
Model 
 
 
Goodness of Fit 
 
Test of Hypothesis 
M1: Λx  invariant χ(119,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
158.78 
p = 0.0087 
--- 
M2: Λx  invariant 
        νx invariant 
χ(134,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
176.59 
p = 0.0080 
M2 - M1 
2
dχ (15) = 17.81 
p > .05 
M3: Λx  invariant  
        νx invariant 
…..  κ1 invariant 
χ(137,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
180.82 
p = 0.0087 
M3 – M2 
2
dχ (3) = 4.23 
p > .05 
M4: Λx  invariant  
        νx invariant 
…..  κ2 invariant 
χ(137,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
197.06 
p = 0.0006 
M4 – M2 
2
dχ (3) = 20.47 
p < .05 
M5: Λx  invariant  
        νx invariant 
…..  κ3 invariant 
χ(137,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
305.67 
p = 0.00 
M5– M2 
2
dχ (3) = 129.08 
p < .05 
M6: Λx  invariant  
        νx invariant 
…..  κ4 invariant 
χ(137,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) =  
270.27 
p = 0.00 
M6– M2 
2
dχ (3) = 93.68 
p < .05 
M7: Λx  invariant  
        νx invariant 
…..  κ5 invariant 
χ(137,N1=197,N2=119, N4=230, N5=207) = 
225.99 
p = 0.00 
M7– M2 
2
dχ (3) = 49.40 
p < .05 
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Interpretation of the resulting market structure: The global fit measures of the multiple group 
analysis with structured means are 2χ  (137) = 176.59 (p = 0.01), RMSEA = 0.038, and CFI 
= 0.99 and indicate a very good model fit. The means of the latent variables in the first 
segment, the ‘volume brands only segment’, were constrained to zero as a baseline 
comparison (see Table 2-7). The salience of the goal, status presentation, is highest in the 
‘luxury brand segment’, but almost as high in the ‘upscale segment’. The difference between 
the ‘volume brands only segment’ and the ‘volume brands segment’ is not significant. Thus 
the higher the probability of considering luxury brands, and the lower the probability of 
considering volume brands, the higher the degree to which respondents pursue the goal of 
using a car for status presentation purposes. Consumers in both the ‘luxury brand segment’ 
and the ‘upscale segment’ put a higher relevance on ‘comfort’ and ‘sporty driving’, but less 
relevance on ‘economy’, than the ‘volume brands only segment’ and the ‘volume brands 
segment’.  
 
Table 2-7: Factor Means for the Four Segments in the Product Category Goal Model 
    segment/ 
strategic group 
 
ξ1:    
Safety 
 
ξ2: 
Economy 
 
ξ3: Comfort
 
ξ4: Sporty 
driving 
 
ξ5: Status 
presentation
1:  Volume brands 
only segment 
0 
constrained 
0 
constrained 
0 
constrained 
0 
constrained 
0 
constrained 
2:  Luxury brand  
      segment 
-0.09 
t = -1.48 
-0.79* 
t = -7.54 
0.20* 
t = 2.55 
0.77* 
t = 8.64 
0.42* 
t = 5.26 
4:  Upscale   
      segment 
-0.06 
t = -1.07 
-0.70* 
t = -9.29 
0.22* 
t = 3.29 
0.64* 
t = 7.82 
0.36* 
t = 5.42 
5:  Volume brands  
      segment 
-0.11 
t = -1.93 
-0.07 
t = -0.94 
- 0.03 
t = -0.39 
0.27* 
t = 3.18 
0.09* 
t = 1.44** 
* p < .05 
 
Apart from a picture about market segments, the proposed approach can also provide 
information about the possible strength of mobility barriers. Both Audi and VW have 
attempted to enter the luxury brand segment in the last few years. Table 2-3 shows that 
whereas only 25% of customers in this segment clearly consider Audi, 18% are at least 
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undecided (segment 2 in Table 2-3). By contrast, VW is only considered by 10% of the 
customers in this segment, plus only 7% of customers in this segment are undecided. There is 
a marked difference between whether brands that are not considered are rejected or are in a 
neutral position. It is much more difficult for a brand to move from the ‘reject set’ into the 
‘consideration set’ than it is to move from a neutral position into the ‘consideration set’. In 
the former case the brand has to overcome strong preferences against considering its 
products. Whereas 83% of the customers in the ‘luxury brand segment’ definitely reject VW, 
only 57% reject Audi. It is apparent that VW has much harder prospects in competing in the 
strategic group of luxury-car producers than Audi, because winning the ‘clear-reject’ 
customers of the associated luxury target segment will be connected with much higher 
marketing efforts, and thus sunk costs, than winning the ‘undecided’ customers to buy one’s 
product. The main difference between the luxury brand segment and the upmarket brand 
segment 4 is the barrier to entry for competitors such as VW, Opel, and Ford in the form of 
customers’ preference barriers. Structuring markets with customers’ brand categorization thus 
makes it possible to structure a market into segments as well as to map the degree of entry 
barriers for brands into these segments in the form of preference barriers. Furthermore 
analyzing benefit importance and product category goal salience helps to understand the 
determinants of those preference barriers. Customers in the ‘volume brands only segment’ 
and the ‘volume brands segment’ differ in the emphasis they put on the benefit ‘sporty 
driving’ in purchase decisions. Thus the ‘volume brands segment’ is more vulnerable to 
competition from premium brands than the ‘volume brands only segment’ (where the benefit 
sporty driving is less important), as indicated by their respective pattern of brand 
categorization. This result is plausible because up-market brands are better able to provide the 
benefit of sporty driving (e.g., through making available a powerful engine and special 
suspension system). In the ‘volume brand segment’, the probability of considering luxury 
brands, such as BMW or Mercedes-Benz, is higher, and the probability of rejecting these 
brands is clearly lower than in the ‘volume brand only segment’.  
 
2.7. Discussion 
 
An important stream of research on strategic groups has focused on managers’ mental models 
of strategic groups within their industries (Peteraf/Shanley 1997; 
Osborne/Stubbart/Ramaprasad 2001). The underlying idea of this stream of research is to 
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form groupings of firms based on managers’ cognitions (Reger/Huff 1993). From a 
psychological point of view this stream of research investigates how managers categorize 
companies into different groups. In this paper, we took a look at the other side of the coin and 
investigated how customers categorize brands. By drawing on research on categorization 
processes, we have offered a theoretical grounding for investigating a customer-side approach 
to strategic groups and mobility barriers. Building on Cooper/Inoue (1996), we proposed that 
market segments/strategic groups can be defined as types of consumers with homogeneous 
patterns of brand categorization. Using latent class analysis we could show that brands are 
not uniformly distributed throughout the competitive space. Instead we have groups or brand 
categorization types with intense rivalry between certain brands but lessened rivalry with 
other brands that are mainly considered and thus competing in other groups. Our approach 
provides both a picture of the competitive structure of a market and market segmentation by 
allowing one to assign each respondent to a brand categorization type. A look at the derived 
segments/strategic groups (see Table 2-3) can help managers understand who they are 
competing against and how this competition varies within segments/strategic groups. 
 
Although some researchers have concluded that ‘the literature is replete with sources of 
mobility barriers’ (Lee/Lee/Rho 2002, p. 731), this is the first study to investigate the strength 
of mobility barriers derived from customers’ brand perceptions. Structuring markets based on 
customers’ brand categorization patterns allows the characterization of market segments by 
the probability of brand consideration, brand rejection, and brand neutrality. We have 
demonstrated that such a characterization allows for the estimation of demand-side 
preference barriers that act as mobility barriers for firms. The outcome was a clear picture of 
preference barriers and hence – important for strategic group research - mobility barriers. 
Apart from estimating the possible strength of a demand-side mobility barrier, our approach 
can also serve to get a better picture of what kind of efforts have to be undertaken to 
overcome the identified mobility barriers. We conceptualized brand categorization as a goal-
derived categorization process and showed that the salience of a product category goal ‘status 
presentation’ determined different category-specific benefits. We further showed that, 
according to the salience of the goal ‘status presentation’ different patterns of brand 
categorization evolved. These different patterns of brand categorization determine the 
competitive structure of a market. Based on this reasoning we could show that brand 
categorization types differ with respect to the salience of the product category goal as well as 
the relevance of category-specific benefits. Since goals and benefits determine 
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categorizations and hence mobility barriers, firms willing to overcome those mobility barriers 
will need to address those prevalent customer goals and corresponding benefits. To enter the 
segment/strategic group where ‘status presentation’ is a highly salient consumer goal, a firm 
will need to put efforts into satisfying this goal with its products. Higher spending in 
marketing and advertising may be needed. For the case of the VW Phateon, such an analysis 
might have yielded the insight that only with a different brand name could this goal be 
achieved. Toyota has shown the success of such a strategy with it’s Lexus: the image of 
Lexus’ independent brand is not hurt by the identity with the corporate group of Toyota 
because brand name and dealerships are kept separate. Based on our results, we would have 
predicted that VW would have to overcome a strong mobility barrier before entering the 
luxury brand segment or strategic group of luxury car producer. Strategic group research has 
been criticized for its inability to explain how and why competitive structures in industries 
come to develop (Hodgkinson 1997). In our approach, the strategic groups could be 
differentiated by the salience of the goal, status presentation and corresponding benefits for 
their respective customers.  
 
Our research endeavour is not without limitations. Future research should investigate the 
simultaneous impact of multiple goals on brand categorization (e.g., 
Ratneshwar/Pechmann/Shocker 1996). Other possible determinants such as income or dealer 
proximity were not investigated (see e.g., Punj/Brookes 2001 for recent work on pre-decision 
constraints in consideration set formation). The restriction to six brands as observed 
indicators of the latent class variable will, as has been argued above, not deliver a complete 
picture of the market, per se. A larger data set would have allowed to include more brands in 
the model. However, the purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate the applicability of our 
approach to the analysis of strategic groups. Another future extension would be to investigate 
brand categorization on a model level. In order to apply a latent class model to a data set with 
model level data instead of brand level data, an excessive sample size would be required. 
Furthermore brand categorization can vary with time and context. Thus different competitive 
structures might exist for different consumption contexts or situations. This could be a 
promising extension of our approach for fast-moving consumer goods markets. The equation 
of market segments and strategic groups may be criticized as an oversimplification. However, 
we argue that our approach is consistent with widely shared claims for research on strategic 
groups. Our approach is in concert with Hatten/Hatten’s (1987) definition of strategic groups 
as companies whose actions are relevant for each other. A company’s sole adoption of similar 
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strategies does not yet mean that this has relevance for other companies in a strategic group, 
as could be seen in the VW example.  
 
From a managerial perspective the identification of mobility barriers is of utmost importance 
for a company’s strategy definition for a number of reasons. Structuring a market based on 
customers’ brand categorization can give insight into which segments/strategic groups can be 
entered without too much effort in terms of advertising, developing a brand image, and 
establishing distribution channels. It can also highlight the danger of sunk costs when 
preference barriers are high and successful market entry may be at risk. Further, the approach 
supports the assessment of the danger of potential competition through new competitors and 
can be part of a strategic scanning system. In the short run, BMW and Mercedes-Benz should 
not be too concerned if lets say Opel attempts to enter the luxury segment with a new model, 
because the preference barrier is very high. More than 90% of the customers in this segment 
reject Opel. This obvious mobility barrier is difficult to explain from a resource based 
perspective focusing on firm skills and key strategic variables. However, the behavioral 
perspective presented herein can provide an explanation for these preference-based mobility 
barriers. Looking again at the example of VW’s Phaeton, the reason for customers’ rejection 
will not be found in technical features but rather in customers’ brand perceptions: ‘And by all 
accounts the objective attributes of the Phaeton…are competitive with those of other luxury 
marques. Unfortunately, the company’s brand is defined not so much by its exacting 
producers as by its customers. It has virtually no brand equity among luxury buyers.’ 
(Rust/Zeithaml/Lemon 2004). Or in the words of Axel Mess, head of Audi of America: ‘It 
could be the best car, but I still would not buy it because it has the VW logo and because I 
have to go to a VW dealership where the salesmen are used to selling Jettas and Golfs’ 
(Kisiel 2004). If VW’s managers thought they could overcome the mobility barrier separating 
VW from the luxury-brand segment, then our results suggest that customers apparently 
thought differently. 
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2.9. Appendix 
 
Table 2-8: Scale Validation for Benefits  
Item Construct λ-value 
(factor 
loading) 
Construct 
reliability 
Mean SD 
Absolutely safe driving 
properties 
Safety 0.76 (24.53) ρ1 : 0.81 
 
0.69 0.64 
Highest possible safety in 
accidents 
Safety 0.80 (27.80)  
 
0.70 0.63 
100 % reliability Safety 0.73 (23.59)  
 
0.77 0.62 
Extremely sporty driving 
properties 
Sporty 
Driving 
0.79 (24.73) ρ2 : 0.69 
 
-0.42 0.89 
Extremely powerful engine Sporty 
Driving 
0.67 (20.89)  
 
-0.37 0.94 
Extremely low cost of 
maintenance 
Economy 0.79 (23.65) ρ3 : 0.76 
 
-0.31 1.07 
Extremely low fuel 
consumption 
Economy 0.77 (21.72)  
 
0.09 0.87 
Very comfortable car Comfort 1.00 (-) ρ4 :  na  0.13 0.68 
 
Table 2-9: Correlations (Below Diagonal), Chi-Square Difference Tests  
(Above Diagonal) 
Constructs ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 
ξ1 -- 151.88 226.30 421.00 
ξ2 -0.46 -- 96.02 221.41 
ξ3 0.12 -0.64 -- 223.93 
ξ4 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -- 
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3.1. Abstract 
 
Even though the notion that high customer satisfaction leads to high repurchase rates is one 
of the fundamental assumptions of relationship marketing, empirical evidence concerning the 
satisfaction-retention link is mixed. Studies who investigated the satisfaction-retention link 
have shown that the relationship is weak and that customers repeatedly defect even though 
they state to be highly satisfied. Recent research has successfully been able to identify 
variables that moderate the link between satisfaction and repurchase behavior and can 
partially explain the weak overall relationship. However, almost all of previous research has 
been conducted in single brand, business-to-consumer contexts. In contrast to these studies, 
we investigate the differential effect of the manufacturer on the satisfaction-retention link in a 
business-to-business setting. Results show, that the satisfaction-retention link is moderated by 
demographic characteristics of a decider in a buying center, characteristics of the purchasing 
company and the manufacturer. Moreover several effects of demographic and company 
characteristics are specific to the manufacturer. Implications of the results for relationship 
management and customer lifetime value are discussed. 
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3.2. Introduction  
 
The question of how customer satisfaction translates into repurchase behavior lies at the heart 
of relationship marketing. Previous studies, however, have found that satisfaction alone is a 
weak predictor of repurchase behavior. The relationship is largely dependent on moderating 
variables (see e.g., Mittal & Kamakura, 2001; Seiders et al., 2005). However, most studies 
have investigated the satisfaction-retention link in business-to-consumer relationships 
(Homburg, Giering, & Menon, 2003). Therefore, the investigated moderating variables have 
been largely specific to business-to-consumer contexts. However, there can be no doubt that 
understanding how satisfaction translates into retention is also of key relevance for business-
to-business marketing. Even though stark differences exist between business-to-business and 
business-to-consumer marketing (e.g., Jackson & Cooper, 1988) previous research has 
demonstrated that consumer concepts may be successfully transferred to the business-to-
business context (Cooper & Jackson, 1988; Durvasula et al., 1999). In line with the theme of 
the 22nd Annual IMP Conference, “Opening the network”, we investigate the satisfaction-
retention link in a business-to-business context by building on research and models that have 
been developed in a business-to-consumer context. By doing so, we not only show the 
viability of building on consumer research models for business-to-business research but also 
find that the conclusions from our research have relevance for the whole field of marketing: 
previous research has found that findings on moderating effects of customer characteristics 
from different studies were equivocal and hard to reconcile (Seiders et al., 2005). One reason 
for this may be that all of these studies investigated moderating variables in a single company 
setting. The potential moderating role of the brand or manufacturer has so far been neglected. 
Unlike previous studies we conducted a multi-manufacturer study, investigating the 
moderating role of manufacturer and whether the effects of other moderators on the 
satisfaction-retention link are manufacturer-specific. Further, we provide one of the first 
studies to investigate the satisfaction-retention link in a business-to-business setting. This 
enables us to analyze the impact of company characteristics, in addition to the demographic 
characteristics of the decider in a buying center, as potential moderators of the satisfaction-
retention link.  
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3.3. Theoretical Background  
 
Many executives seem to trust their intuitive sense that high customer satisfaction will 
eventually translate into higher loyalty and with it ultimately into improved company 
performance. Thus achieving high customer satisfaction has become a central focus of 
corporate strategy for most firms (Homburg, Koschate, & Hoyer, 2005; Honomichl, 1993). 
However, “despite the claim that satisfaction ratings are linked to repurchase behavior, few 
attempts can be found that relate satisfaction ratings to actual repurchase behaviour” (Mittal 
& Kamakura, 2001, p. 131). That the validity of this assumption is all but given, is nicely 
illustrated by Reichheld (1996), who reports that while around 90% of industry customers 
report to be satisfied or even very satisfied, only between 30% to 40% actually do repurchase. 
Some researchers have consequently even gone as far as to question the usefulness of 
satisfaction measures in general (e.g., Reichheld, 2003). Apparently, current knowledge fails 
to fully explain the prevalence of satisfied customers who defect and dissatisfied customers 
who do not (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Ganesh, Arnold, & Reynolds, 2000; Jones & Sasser, 
1995; Keaveney, 1995). One reason for that is that the relationship between satisfaction and 
retention is not a simple linear one, but moderated by several different variables. Oliva, 
Oliver and MacMillan (1992, p. 84) stated that “the response function linking […] 
satisfaction to customer response may not operate as is frequently assumed because the 
complexity of the relationship may be underestimated”.  
 
Several studies have since investigated the effect of moderating variables on the satisfaction-
retention link. However the great majority of empirical studies that examined direct and 
moderated satisfaction-repurchase effects measured repurchase intentions instead of objective 
repurchase behavior (Seiders et al., 2005). Several problems in interpretation arise through 
the use of a satisfaction measure and an intentional measure of loyalty in the same survey: 
common-method variance may inflate the relationship. Mazursky and Geva (1989) found that 
satisfaction and intention ratings were highly correlated when measured at the same time but 
had no correlation when measured at two different points in time. Additionally both ratings 
may be influenced by the same response bias thereby leading to spurious correlations 
(Arnold, Feldman, & Purbhoo, 1985; Zedeck, Kafry, & Jacobs, 1976). Studies of Mittal and 
Kamakura (2001) as well as Seiders et al. (2005) show, that the results concerning 
moderators of the satisfaction- intention link cannot simply be extrapolated to the 
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satisfaction-retention link. Seiders et al. (2005) for example could show that for low 
involvement there is virtually no relationship between satisfaction and actual repurchase 
behavior but a very strong positive relationship between satisfaction and repurchase 
intentions. Finally a central argument for investigating repurchase behavior is that both from 
a scientific and a managerial standpoint it is real repurchase behavior that we aim to 
understand. However especially in a business-to-business context, studies on the satisfaction-
loyalty link are scarce (Homburg, Giering, & Menon, 2003) and studies on the satisfaction-
retention link do not exist. One of the rare investigations has been provided by Homburg, 
Giering and Menon (2003), who investigated the impact of relational norms on the 
satisfaction-loyalty link but not on the satisfaction-retention link.     
 
A further shortcoming of the current literature is that most studies have focused on 
moderating variables in the business-to-consumer context (Homburg, Giering, & Menon 
2003). But do demographic characteristics of the buyer, like age, that have been found to 
moderate the satisfaction-retention link in a consumer setting also serve as moderators of the 
satisfaction-retention link in a business-to-business setting? Further, do company 
characteristics of the buying firm, like size of the company or branch of industry moderate 
how satisfaction translates into repurchase as has been suggested by Homburg and Giering 
(2001). Those are questions that should be of interest for business marketers but have largely 
been neglected by prior research.  
 
Overall the results of prior research concerning moderators of the satisfaction–retention link 
are not clear-cut. Summarizing the state of knowledge in this area, Seiders et al. (2005, p. 26) 
state that “Although prior research points to several variables that may moderate the 
satisfaction repurchase relationship, empirical results are equivocal and difficult to 
reconcile”. A major limitation of previous research on moderating effects of the satisfaction 
retention link has been that it solely investigated customers of one company (e.g., Mittal & 
Kamakura, 2001; Seiders et al., 2005; Homburg & Giering, 2001; etc.). However, it is 
possible that the partially equivocal findings of previous research are due to the fact, that 
results are manufacturer/brand-specific, meaning that the effects may change in size and 
direction for customers of different manufacturers or brands in a given product category.  
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3.4.  Model Development 
 
We will investigate the relationship between the two constructs satisfaction and retention and 
its potential moderators in a business-to-business setting. Following Homburg, Koschate and 
Hoyer (2005) we define customer satisfaction as the result of a cognitive and affective 
evaluation, where an actually perceived performance is matched with a comparison standard. 
In a business-to-business context customer satisfaction can then be conceptualized as a 
judgment that a long-term relationship with a supplier provides a desired level of purchase-
related fulfillment. We adopt a cumulative interpretation of customer satisfaction and 
conceptualize it as a global evaluation based on the experience with a supplier and its 
products over time (Homburg, Koschate, & Hoyer 2005). In contrast to loyalty, which is 
often operationalized as the customer’s self-reported likelihood of engaging in future 
repurchase, retention measures actual and not only intended repurchase behavior. Thus 
retention is directly related to sales figures and therefore of high managerial relevance.  
 
In order to investigate the satisfaction-retention link in a business-to-business setting we will 
build on a model developed by Mittal and Kamakura (2001) who proposed two mechanisms 
that can introduce variability into the satisfaction retention link: satisfaction thresholds and 
response bias. In the following section we will explain both mechanisms and review the 
findings on moderating effects of customer demographics based on these two mechanisms in 
business-to-consumer contexts. We will translate this model to a business-to-business context 
and develop propositions about the influence of demographic characteristics of a decider in a 
buying center and the characteristics of the purchasing company on the satisfaction-retention 
link. We will further extend existing research by incorporating the manufacturer as an 
additional moderator in the model. Of course extant research in business-to-business 
relationships has identified other determinants of retention or switching behavior. A 
significant body of research has examined switching cost as a determinant of loyalty and 
retention (e.g., Jones, Mothersbaugh, & Beatty, 2002; Burnham, Frels, & Mahajan, 2003). 
Customers might be trapped in a so-called hostage situation: their satisfaction is on a low to 
medium level, but high switching cost prevent them from switching their current supplier 
(Jones & Sasser, 1995). Other research has examined social relationships (Wathne, Biong, & 
Heide, 2001), attractiveness of alternatives (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997) as well as inertia 
(Bozzo, 2002; White & Yanamandram, 2004) as determinants of loyalty and retention in 
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industrial business relationships. Similar to all the studies cited above we do not attempt to 
develop a comprehensive model of customer retention, but rather want to answer the focused 
research question of whether demographic characteristics of the decider in a buying center, 
company characteristics and the manufacturer moderate the satisfaction-retention link. From 
an application standpoint our variables have the advantage to be easy to measure and to likely 
be available in customer databases. Thus segmenting and targeting of customers based on 
study results will be much simpler than with the above-mentioned determinants of 
satisfaction-retention link (inertia, switching cost, perception of alternatives etc.). 
 
3.4.1. Satisfaction Threshold 
 
Customers may vary systematically in their tolerance levels or thresholds toward repurchase 
that are not fully captured in their satisfaction ratings. A satisfaction threshold can be 
interpreted as a “reservation value” (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001, p. 134), i.e. the value that is 
associated with the customer’s next best alternative other than repurchasing. This evaluation 
will not only be based on the satisfaction with the previously purchased manufacturer but 
also the expected satisfaction with potential alternative manufacturers. A customer with a 
lower “reservation value” or low satisfaction threshold will be more likely to repurchase at 
the same satisfaction level as a customer with a higher “reservation value” and better 
alternatives (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001).  
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Figure 3-1: Differential Satisfaction Thresholds  
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Graphically differences in satisfaction thresholds manifest itself in differences in elevation. In 
Figure 3-1 customer group B has a lower satisfaction threshold than customer group A, i.e. at 
the same level of satisfaction repurchase probability is higher for customer group B than for 
customer group A. Mittal and Kamakura (2001) could show that the satisfaction thresholds or 
reservation values differ for customers with different demographic characteristics. They 
suggested for example, that older customers may be more likely to remain loyal to a 
manufacturer due to their accumulated investments in and knowledge about the manufacturer, 
whereas younger customers may in contrast be more willing to search for information and 
thus switch manufacturers. Subsequently they could show that younger customers have a 
higher satisfaction threshold than older customers. The open question here is whether the 
demographic characteristics of a decider in a buying center moderate the satisfaction-
retention link in a business-to-business context. We would assume similar effects for the 
business-to-business context and hence propose: 
 
P1: Satisfaction thresholds vary with demographic characteristics of a decider in a 
buying center 
 
In the following, demographic characteristics of a decider in a buying center are meant, when 
we speak of demographics. In contrast, demographic characteristics of the purchasing 
company (e.g., number of employees, branch of industry etc.) are subsequently referred to as 
company characteristics. Already Homburg and Giering (2001, p. 59) stated that, 
“organizational characteristics of the buying firm as well as relational characteristics of the 
buyer – supplier relationship might have a strong moderating influence on the relationship 
between satisfaction with a supplier and loyalty”. Following their proposition we would 
expect company characteristics such as company size to have an impact on the satisfaction 
threshold in a business-to-business context. Existing research for example shows that larger 
companies are likely to cooperate more intensively with their vendors and tend to work with 
fewer vendors (Bowman & Narayandas, 2001). Thus, with increasing size, companies are 
likely to have fewer alternatives to consider. All else being equal, the reservation value and 
thus the satisfaction threshold for larger companies should be lower than for smaller 
companies. We thus propose: 
 
P2:  Satisfaction thresholds vary with company characteristics  
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We further propose that customers of different manufacturers will differ on their existing 
alternatives and their evaluation: e.g., customers of manufacturers that have a relatively 
unique positioning in a market and are able to offer specific product benefits, relationship 
benefits, cost advantages that are not easily matched by the competition will certainly have 
less alternatives to consider than customers of an undifferentiated supplier (Ulaga & Eggert, 
2006).  In terms of Jackson’s (1985) distinction between “lost-for-good” and “always-a-
share” situations, the manufacturer with a relative unique positioning would have a higher 
likelihood to be in “lost for good” situations. The undifferentiated manufacturer in contrast 
has a higher likelihood for “always-a-share” relationships characterized by weak bonds and 
strong price competition (Freytag & Clarke, 2001; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). Thus the 
reservation value and therefore the satisfaction threshold for customers of a differentiated 
supplier would be lower than those of customers from an undifferentiated supplier. We thus 
propose: 
 
P3:  Satisfaction thresholds vary with the manufacturer 
 
Moreover, threshold effects of company characteristics could also be moderated by 
manufacturer. Assume that a certain manufacturer offers a product that is better able to serve 
specific needs of a certain branch of industry than other manufacturers. Customers of that 
specific branch of industry would have lower thresholds for that manufacturer only, 
compared to customers from other industry branches that do not desire those specific 
features. In the industry we examined in our empirical study, the commercial vehicle market, 
several manufacturers offer branch of industry specific solutions. Thus, it is for example 
likely that satisfaction threshold effects of branch of industry are manufacturer-specific.  
 
P4:  Satisfaction thresholds of company characteristics vary with the manufacturer 
 
For car purchases, Mittal and Kamakura (2001) could show that women place a higher 
importance on service quality at the dealership than men. Another study in an automotive 
context by Homburg and Giering (2001) also confirmed that women’s purchasing behavior is 
more strongly influenced by their evaluation of personal interaction processes than men’s. 
Compared to men, women are more involved in purchasing activities (Slama & Tashlian, 
1985), and pay more attention to the consulting services of the sales personnel (Gilbert & 
Warren, 1995). Assuming we would have similar differences in a business-to-business 
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context, female customers of a commercial vehicle manufacturer with a unique positioning 
on service quality at its dealerships should have lower thresholds than male customers 
specifically for this manufacturer. This means that if sex is investigated as a moderating 
variable for a manufacturer that does not place a high emphasis on service quality, chances 
are that the satisfaction thresholds for women would be substantially higher (assuming other 
manufacturers offer higher service quality). We thus propose: 
 
P5: Satisfaction thresholds of demographic characteristics of a decider in a buying 
center vary with the manufacturer 
 
Propositions four and five would explain why findings about moderating variables have been 
partially equivocal: they may be manufacturer-specific. However none of the studies 
investigating the satisfaction-retention link in a recent review by Seiders et al. (2005) has 
investigated this potential moderating effect of manufacturer even though already Mittal and 
Kamakura (2001) have called this one of the major limitations of their study and a promising 
area for subsequent research. 
 
3.4.2. Response Bias  
 
Satisfaction ratings may not be solely influenced by the true satisfaction level but are error 
prone measures of a true latent satisfaction. Ratings may be too easy or too harsh compared 
to customers’ true satisfaction (Arndt & Crane, 1975; Dwyer, 1980; Kalwani & Silk, 1982). 
This may be explained by differences in consumer socialization (see Zuckermann, 1981) and 
role theory (see Hoffman & Hurst, 1990) that may predispose some consumers to engage in 
“yes-saying” more than others.  
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Figure 3-2: Differential Response Bias 
 
Graphically, differences in response bias are depicted in differences in the slope. In Figure 3-
2 customer group B has a stronger response bias effect than customer group A. Hence the 
relation between satisfaction and retention is stronger for customer group A and satisfaction 
ratings translate better into repurchase behavior than for customer group B. Response bias 
may be due to differences in socialization as well as motivation (e.g., interest in participation 
or fatigue). For example due to generation differences older customers might be more likely 
to generally engage in yes-saying when asked to rate their satisfaction. Mittal and Kamakura 
(2001) found response bias to differ with demographic characteristics. We do not assume that 
a respondent’s response style to satisfaction questions differs fundamentally between a 
consumption situation and a business situation. Thus we expect to observe similar response 
biases that have been observed in consumer studies like e.g., for older customer in a business 
context. We therefore propose: 
 
P6: Response bias varies with the demographic characteristics of a decider in a 
buying center  
 
In addition we assume that response bias will vary for customers of different manufacturers: 
e.g., a customer of a premium manufacturer might be a harsher rater due to higher 
expectations towards the product than a customer of a low-cost manufacturer. Further, as 
Kalwani and Silk (1982) have shown response bias is inversely related to the cognitive 
resources devoted to the questionnaire. Thus systematic differences in relationship or 
involvement for different manufacturers (e.g., Martin, 1998) could translate into differential 
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attention paid to the satisfaction questionnaire and thus manufacturer-specific response bias. 
Furthermore differences in response bias for customers of different manufacturers may arise 
because manufacturers differ in how frequently they conduct market research surveys with 
their customers. An often contacted and surveyed customer is likely to respond differently 
and possibly with more fatigue than a customer who is rarely being contacted for consumer 
surveys. We hence propose: 
 
P7:  Response bias varies with the manufacturer 
 
Further, response bias effects of demographic characteristics could also be moderated by the 
manufacturer. That is, how harsh a customer of a certain age group rates may depend on his 
expectations towards the product and could be manufacturer-specific. Or building on the 
above stated relationship involvement may also vary systematically with both demographic 
characteristics and with the manufacturer. Andersen (2006) for example has shown that 
manufacturer involvement can be enhanced through web-based brand communities only for 
customer groups with certain demographic characteristics. We therefore propose: 
 
P8:  Response bias of demographic characteristics of a decider in a buying center 
 varies with the manufacturer 
 
As we cannot think of a rationale explaining why variables like branch of industry would 
influence how easy or harsh a customer rates on a satisfaction scale, we do not expect 
company characteristics to influence response bias here.  
 
In the following we will formalize the above presented propositions by building on and 
significantly expanding a model by Mittal and Kamakura (2001) who only investigated 
demographic characteristics as moderators of the satisfaction-retention link: the probability 
that a customer J with a latent (true) satisfaction level JS  with products from a manufacturer 
JM  repurchases from the same manufacturer is equal to the probability that his or her true 
satisfaction is greater than a given threshold Jμ : 
( ) ][]1[ JJJ SPrepurchaseYP μ>===  (1) 
We assume the threshold Jμ  to vary with demographic characteristics JkZ  (from 1 to K), 
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company characteristics JtC  (from 1 to T), the manufacturer JM  and the interactions of JkZ  
and JtC  with JM . The threshold is therefore regressed on the demographic and company 
characteristics, the previously purchased manufacturer and their interactions: 
(2)
1 11 1
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where Jη  is a Gumbel-distributed random error, 0γ  describes the influence of factors 
independent of differences in thresholds due to demographic, company characteristics and 
manufacturer, zkγ  the influence of demographic characteristics, ctγ  the influence of 
company characteristics, mγ  the influence of manufacturer, zmkγ  the influence of the 
interaction of demographic characteristics and manufacturer and cmtγ  the influence of the 
interaction of company characteristics and the manufacturer. This threshold defines the true 
satisfaction level necessary for the customer to be indifferent between switching or 
repurchasing from the same manufacturer.  
 
The observed satisfaction rating JO  is an indicator of the true underlying satisfaction JS , 
therefore we regress the latent satisfaction on this indicator: 
JJJJ OS εβ +=  (3) 
where Jε  is a Gumbel distributed random error and Jβ  is the response bias, representing the 
translation of true satisfaction into observed satisfaction ratings. As noted above, we assume 
that the response bias depends on demographics, manufacturer and their interaction: 
Jlml
K
k
JJk
K
k
zmkJkzkJ MMZZ δδδδβ +++= ∑ ∑
= =1 1
0
  (4) 
where 0δ  describes the influence independent of demographic characteristics, the 
manufacturer and their interaction, zkδ  describes the response bias due to demographic 
characteristics and mδ  the response bias due to manufacturer. zmkδ  describes the influence of 
the interaction between response bias due to demographics and manufacturer. By combining 
these, we arrive at the following formula where the difference between the independent and 
identically Gumbel-distributed random errors Jη  and Jε  is logistically distributed: 
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3.5. Method 
 
3.5.1. Research Setting 
 
We investigated repurchases of commercial vehicles in a non-contractual business-to-
business setting. Several manufacturers compete in this market. Customers rely on different 
vendors and usually possess mixed fleets with vehicles from different manufacturers. They 
change their allocation of purchase shares according to the record of the manufacturer’s 
performance. Similar to other studies in the business-to-business domain, a key informant 
procedure was used (e.g., Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Rindfleisch & Moorman, 2001). Prior to the 
survey respondents were screened whether they were responsible for fleet management. 
Respondents who were not responsible for fleet management were asked for the name and 
telephone number of the fleet manager and were excluded from the interview. In addition, 
each respondent was asked whether he or she was responsible for purchase decisions of new 
vehicles and supplier selection. Respondents who did not participate in purchase decisions 
and supplier selection were also excluded from the interview. In general, companies’ 
purchase decisions are multiperson processes, and different participants have different roles 
(e.g., Sheth, 1973; Webster & Wind, 1972). However, this study investigates straight rebuy 
or modified rebuy purchasing situations (companies already owned commercial vehicles). 
These more routine types of buying situations are often carried out by small buying centers 
(Anderson et al., 1987), and decisions are more likely to be made autonomously (Sheth, 
1973). Considering the type of purchase and in line with extant literature (e.g., Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Rindfleisch & Moorman, 2001; Bowman & Narayandas, 2004) the key 
informant approach was deemed to be an acceptable choice. 
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3.5.2. Data Collection 
 
The data is part of a large multi-client study of new commercial vehicle buyers in a major 
European market. All relevant commercial vehicle manufacturers in this market participated 
in this survey and provided name and telephone number of customers that have just 
purchased (a) new vehicle(s) to a commercial research company. The commercial research 
company conducted telephone interviews with these new commercial vehicle buyers. 
Respondents were randomly sampled from the customer database that consisted of the 
addresses and telephone numbers of new vehicle customers provided by the sponsoring 
manufacturers. Interviewers asked respondents to participate in a survey of new vehicle 
owners’ perceptions and experiences of the purchase process. As stated above, prior to the 
main survey respondents were screened to assure that they were responsible for fleet 
management and that they participated in purchase decisions of new vehicles. Surveys 
averaged 25 minutes in length. Overall 4997 respondents were interviewed. The response rate 
was 27,76 %, which is acceptable, compared to other published studies in a business-to-
business setting (e.g., Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Homburg, Giering & Menon, 2003). The 
sample distribution on branch of industry, number of employees and fleet size was compared 
with aggregate data provided by the manufacturers association for the respective study year. 
No notable discrepancies were found. Even though only respondents who stated that they 
were responsible for fleet management and participated in the purchase decision were eligible 
for the survey, an initial question block was administered to measure the degree of 
participation in the purchase decision. Of the surveyed respondents 91.6% stated that they 
were very involved in the purchase process, whereas only 8.4% stated that they were only 
somewhat involved. Furthermore 88,2 % of the respondents stated that they participated in 
trade talks at dealerships and 95.8 % of the respondents stated that they were involved in day-
to-day running of the vehicles. Furthermore respondents had to indicate the type of 
purchase/buying decision. 70 (1.4%) of the respondents conducted a new buy and the 
purchased vehicle was their first commercial vehicle. 1662 (33.25%) respondents conducted 
a modified rebuy in that the new vehicle was used for fleet expansion and not replacing an 
existing vehicle. Finally 3265 (65.33%) respondents replaced an existing vehicle with the 
new vehicle. However 941 (18.83%) of those respondents replaced a vehicle from a different 
category (e.g., a passenger car, an estate vehicle or a truck) with a commercial vehicle. For 
replacement purchases where a vehicle from a different category was replaced with a 
commercial vehicle other factors than the satisfaction with the replaced vehicle may have 
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impacted the purchase decision (i.e. many of the replaced passenger cars, estate vehicles or 
trucks come from brands or manufacturers that do not offer commercial vehicles). The 
remaining 2324 (46.50%) respondents conducted straight rebuys, in which a commercial 
vehicle was actually replaced by a commercial vehicle with the same specifications and were 
retained for the analysis. Those who replaced a vehicle with one from the same manufacturer 
were considered loyal, those who did replace the vehicle with one form another manufacturer 
were not considered as loyal. After listwise deletion of cases with missing values on the 
model variables 1493 cases remained for the analysis. In order to ensure that the data 
adequately represented the actual market situation data was weighted by vehicle registration 
data of the respective market and year. The high level of self-stated involvement in the 
purchase process as well as the fact that we only analyzed straight repurchases further 
supported the choice of the key informant approach.  
 
3.5.3. Sample Characteristics and Measures  
 
The survey contained various themes around the new vehicle purchase: exact specification of 
the vehicle (i.e. number of seats), specification of the previous vehicle (i.e. make, model), 
intended usage (i.e. which goods will be transported), payment condition (i.e. discounts, 
source of credit), satisfaction with the purchase process, alternatives considered, reason for 
purchase/rejection, company characteristics and demographics of the respondent. Satisfaction 
with the replaced vehicle was measured on a Likert-scale ranging from 1 = “completely 
dissatisfied” to 5 = “completely satisfied”. The question read as follows:  “Please think about 
your ownership experience with your previous vehicle. Overall how satisfied have you been 
with your previous vehicle”. When the new vehicle was from the same manufacturer as the 
replaced vehicle a customer was considered to be loyal. Table 3-1 gives an overview of the 
sample distribution of the demographics variables as well as the company characteristics that 
we used in the model. Additionally the average satisfaction ratings and average repurchase-
probabilities are shown for each level of the model variables. The following demographic and 
company characteristics were surveyed: 
 
Demographic characteristics: sex, age and consideration of other manufacturers (whether 
other manufacturers than that of the replaced vehicle were considered prior to purchase).  
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Company characteristics: branch of industry, number of employees, fleet size (only 
commercial vehicles), average length of vehicle ownership (for the whole commercial vehicle 
fleet). 
Manufacturer of the replaced commercial vehicle: previous manufacturer, this variable was 
collapsed to three categories (in order to have sufficient cell sizes), the first two representing 
the two major manufacturers in the market and the third category containing all other 
manufacturers.  
 
Table 3-1: Sample Characteristics of the German CV-Market  
Variables Percentage Average 
Satisfaction 
Rating 
Percentage 
Repurchasing
Male 87,6 3,67 65,8% Sex 
Female 12,4 3,70 67,8% 
18-35 years 24,5 3,61 58,3% 
36-45 years 33,6 3,60 64,5% 
46-55 years 25,6 3,72 68,5% 
Age 
56 years and more 16,3 3,86 76,2% 
Yes 58,2 3,60 56% 
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
Consideration 
of further 
manufacturers No 
41,8 3,78 79% 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
8,6 3,65 66,3% 
Retail 16,4 3,62 65,9% 
Construction/ 
Handcrafts 
49,8 3,67 66,3% 
Service 18,0 3,73 65,4% 
Branch 
Else 7,3 3,77 65,5% 
1-9 52,1 3,67 66,1% 
10-50 36,4 3,71 64,3% 
Number of 
employees 
51 and more 11,5 3,61 71,5% 
1  31,7 3,70 65,9% 
2-9 57,6 3,66 65,1% 
Fleet size 
(commercial 
vehicles) 10- 10,7 3,71 71,8% 
-3 37,4 3,64 74,6% 
4-7 40,4 3,58 61,6% 
C
om
pa
ny
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Average length 
of ownership 
(in years) 8 and more 22,2 3,91 59,9% 
Mercedes-Benz 19,6 3,64 73,5% 
Volkswagen 31,2 3,93 69,7% 
M
an
u
fa
ct
ur
er
 
Previous 
manufacturer 
 Other 49,2 3,45 58,4% 
N=1493 
 
We used logistic regression analysis to predict repurchase. Specifically we conducted a 
stepwise logistic regression and estimated seven different models. Model selection and 
3   Satisfaction and Repurchase Behavior in a Business-to-Business Setting 
 106
interpretation is based on the omnibus likelihood ratio chi square tests for the different 
variable sets entered in each step as well as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which 
penalizes less parsimonious models1 (see e. g. Franses & Paap, 2004).  
 
In model 1 (AIC = 1,238) we included only satisfaction as independent variable. Although 
becoming significant, the model containing satisfaction alone hardly does a better job at 
correct classification (67,3%) than the model containing only the constant (66,1%). In model 
2 we included all possible threshold effects of customer, company characteristics and 
manufacturer (in terms of the model estimates satisfaction thresholds are captured by the 
main effects) (AIC = 1,154). The highly significant omnibus likelihood ratio chi square test 
indicates that at least some of the investigated main effects are different from zero. In model 
3, threshold effects (main effects in terms of the model) moderated by previous manufacturer 
(AIC = 1,145) were included. Again the highly significant omnibus likelihood ratio chi 
square test allowed to clearly reject the null-hypothesis that the effect of all manufacturer-
moderated threshold effects are zero. Response bias effects (interaction with satisfaction in 
terms of the model) for demographics and previous manufacturer were included in model 4 
(AIC = 1,149). Here the null hypothesis of the omnibus test could not be rejected. The 
response bias effects of both manufacturer and demographics are not significantly different 
from zero. In model 5 we subsequently included also the moderated response bias effects of 
demographics by previous manufacturer resulting in our proposed model. This model 
resulted in the best model fit with the smallest AIC-value (AIC = 1,144). Furthermore the 
highly significant omnibus likelihood ratio chi square test clearly indicates that the moderated 
response bias effects of demographics by manufacturer are different from zero. In order to 
test our proposition that company characteristics would not have a significant influence on 
response bias we estimated two additional models, that contained response bias effects of 
company characteristics in model 6 (AIC = 1,152) and also the moderated response bias of 
company characteristics by manufacturer in model 7 (AIC = 1,159). Both models resulted in 
higher AIC-values. The explanatory power of model 6 and model 7 in terms of Nagelkerke’s 
R-square and the percentage of cases correctly predicted did only marginally increase by 
including the additional interaction effects compared to model 5. Furthermore the omnibus 
                                                 
1 Several other information criteria exist, such as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or the consistant 
Akaike Information criterion (CAIC). As “there is no clear answer as to which criterion if any should be 
preferred”, from a decision-theoretic perspective the choice should depend on the purpose of the model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p 279). As the purpose of the here proposed model is to better understand the link 
between satisfaction and repurchase by incorporating moderating variables we chose to use the AIC, which less 
severely penalizes model size than CAIC and BIC. 
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likelihood ratio chi square test for both the interactions between satisfaction and company 
characteristics in model 6 and the three-way interaction between satisfaction, company 
characteristics and manufacturer of the previous vehicle in model 7 are not significant. Thus 
for both model 6 and model 7 we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the estimated effects 
are zero. These results confirm that our proposed model, model 5, possesses the best fit to the 
data. This model was therefore retained and interpreted. 
 
Table 3-2: Model Iterations German CV-Market 
M  Variables Chi-
square 
df Delta Sig. -2log-
likelihood
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Percent 
correct 
pred. 
AIC 
 Constant       66,1  
1 SAT 67.11 1   1845,74 0,061 67,3 1,238
2 SAT, DEM, COM, 
MAN 225.24 18 158.13 0.00 1687,61 0,194 71,8 1,154
3 SAT, DEM, COM, 
MAN, DEM*MAN, 
COM*MAN 298.72 48 73.48 0.00 1614,13 0,251 72,8 1,145
4 SAT, DEM, COM, 
MAN, DEM*MAN, 
COM*MAN, 
SAT*DEM, 
SAT*MAN 306.89 55 8.17 0.318 1605,96 0,257 72,7 1,149
5 SAT, DEM, COM, 
MAN, DEM*MAN, 
COM*MAN, 
SAT*DEM, 
SAT*MAN, 
SAT*DEM*MAN 334.57 65 27.69 0.002 1578,28 0,278 74,4 1,144
6 SAT, DEM, COM, 
MAN, DEM*MAN, 
COM*MAN,  
SAT*DEM, 
SAT*MAN, 
SAT*DEM*MAN, 
SAT*COM 342.30 75 7.73 0.655 1570,55 0,284 74,5 1,152
7 SAT, DEM, COM, 
MAN, SAT*COM, 
DEM*MAN, 
SAT*DEM, 
SAT*MAN, 
SAT*DEM*MAN, 
COM*MAN, 
SAT*COM*MAN 373.02 95 30.72 0.059 1539,83 0,306 75,0 1,159
SAT=Satisfaction, DEM = Demographics , COM=Company Characteristics, MAN= Previous Manufacturer; 
N=1493 
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3.5.4. Thresholds  
 
In terms of the model estimates, satisfaction thresholds are captured by the main effects of 
company, demographic characteristics, and previous manufacturer (γ parameters in the 
model). Positive coefficients indicate lower thresholds compared to the reference category. A 
customer with a lower “reservation value” or lower satisfaction threshold will be more likely 
to repurchase at the same satisfaction level as a customer with a higher “reservation value” 
and better alternatives. An example might illustrate the interpretation of the threshold 
parameters. Consider the positive and significant coefficient of 0.769 for the length of 
ownership of up to three years versus the reference category of length of ownership of eight 
years and longer. This positive coefficient and thus lower threshold would indicate that 
customers who hold their vehicles three years and less would have higher repurchase 
probabilities at the same level of satisfaction as the reference category (customers who hold 
their vehicles more than eight years). This result is nicely illustrated in Figure 3-3. Further the 
interactions of manufacturer with company and demographic characteristics can be 
interpreted as thresholds moderated by previous manufacturer (manufacturer of the replaced 
vehicle). That is, threshold effects of company or demographic characteristics depend on the 
manufacturer of the replaced vehicle. Table 3-3 shows the γ coefficients of the logistic 
regression. To enhance readability, the significant coefficients are highlighted. 
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Table 3-3: Satisfaction Thresholds  
Indices Variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error p-Value 
1zγ  Satisfaction 0,378 0,326 0,247 
 Age   0,769 
2zγ  Age(1) = 18 to 35 years -0,778 1,088 0,475 
3zγ  Age(2) = 36 to 45 years -1,064 1,049 0,311 
4zγ  Age(3) = 46 to 55 years -1,032 1,139 0,365 
5zγ  Sex(1) = Male 0,468 0,925 0,613 
6zγ  Consid(1) = Consideration of other vehicles -1,706* 0,680 0,012 
 Branch   0,349 
1cγ  Branch(1) = Manufacturer -0,977 0,541 0,071 
2cγ  Branch(2) = Retail -0,375 0,459 0,415 
3cγ  Branch(3) = Construction -0,644 0,412 0,118 
4cγ  Branch(4) = Service -0,546 0,452 0,227 
 Number of employees   0,064 
5cγ  Number of employees(1) = 1 to 9  -0,713 0,469 0,129 
6cγ  Number of employees(2) = 10 to 50 -0,978* 0,456 0,032 
 Length of ownership (Lenown)   0,000 
7cγ  Lenown(1) = up to 3 years 0,769** 0,282 0,006 
8cγ  Lenown(2) = 4 to 7 years -0,100 0,268 0,711 
 Number of CVs   0,362 
9cγ  Number of CVs(1) = 1 -0,418 0,425 0,326 
10cγ  Number of CVs(2) = 2 to 9 -0,133 0,396 0,736 
 Manufacturer (Manu)   0,000 
1mγ  Manu(1) = Mercedes-Benz 4,590 2,551 0,072 
2mγ  Manu(2) = Volkswagen -7,167** 2,285 0,002 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
 
Of all demographic characteristics only consideration of other manufacturers had a 
significant effect, providing general support for proposition P1. Customers considering not 
only the replaced manufacturer prior to purchase show a higher satisfaction threshold 
(indicated by the negative coefficient), hence a lower repurchase probability at an equivalent 
level of satisfaction, than customers considering only the replaced manufacturer ( 6zγ  = -
1,706, p<.05). Further, the company characteristics, number of employees and length of 
ownership significantly affected the satisfaction threshold, providing support for proposition 
3   Satisfaction and Repurchase Behavior in a Business-to-Business Setting 
 110
P2: companies with 10-50 employees have a significantly higher threshold than companies 
with more than 50 employees ( 6cγ  = -0,978, p<.05). This result is in line with Bowman and 
Narayandas (2001) finding that larger companies tend to work with fewer vendors and thus 
are likely to have lower thresholds compared to smaller companies. Companies that hold 
their commercial vehicles for a short term (on average up to three years) evidenced a 
significantly lower satisfaction threshold (thus higher repurchase probabilities with 
equivalent levels of satisfaction)  ( 7cγ  = 0,769, p<.01), than companies holding their 
commercial vehicles eight years and longer. Further, manufacturer significantly influenced 
the satisfaction threshold. Customers whose previous vehicle was from Volkswagen, 
evidenced a significantly higher threshold than customers of other manufacturers ( 2mγ  = -
7,167, p<.01). Apparently Volkswagen has a less loyal customer base than other 
manufacturers. Hence, these findings support proposition P3. In the market under study, the 
commercial vehicle market, Volkswagen is a large volume producer. In the European Market 
where we conducted our study its market share was above 30% at the time of the survey. 
Large volume producer have traditionally less loyal customers than smaller producers with 
often stronger brands such as Mercedes-Benz.   
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Figure 3-3: Differential Satisfaction Threshold of Length of Ownership  
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Figure 3 exemplarily gives a graphical depiction of one of the found effects, the differential 
threshold effects of length of ownership. It becomes apparent that customers who on average 
keep their vehicles for a shorter period of time have lower satisfaction thresholds: at the same 
satisfaction level customers with shorter ownership cycles have a higher probability of 
repurchase than customers with an on average longer ownership cycle. We depict only the 
three highest levels of the satisfaction measure because the two lower satisfaction levels 
combined contain only around 10% of the respondents.  
 
Table 3-4: Manufacturer-Specific Satisfaction Thresholds 
Indices Variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error p-Value 
 Age * Manufacturer (Manu)   0,063
1zmγ  Age(1) by Manu(1) -5,130* 2,121 0,016
2zmγ  Age(1) by Manu(2) 1,571 1,826 0,390
3zmγ  Age(2) by Manu(1) -3,296 1,997 0,099
4zmγ  Age(2) by Manu(2) 1,963 1,601 0,220
5zmγ  Age(3) by Manu(1) -1,672 2,212 0,450
6zmγ  Age(3) by Manu(2) 2,913 1,865 0,118
 Manu * Sex   0,120
7zmγ  Manu(1) by Sex(1) -1,940 1,715 0,258
8zmγ  Manu(2) by Sex(1) 2,272 1,723 0,187
 Manu * Consideration of other vehicles (Consid)    0,129
9zmγ  Manu(1) by Consid(1) 1,726 1,115 0,122
10zmγ  Manu(2) by Consid(1) 2,028 1,143 0,076
 Branch * Manu   0,000
1cmγ  Branch(1) by Manu(1) 1,926* 0,872 0,027
2cmγ  Branch(1) by Manu(2) 1,412 0,732 0,054
3cmγ  Branch(2) by Manu(1) -0,045 0,778 0,954
4cmγ  Branch(2) by Manu(2) 1,574* 0,664 0,018
5cmγ  Branch(3) by Manu(1) 0,588 0,703 0,403
6cmγ  Branch(3) by Manu(2) 1,742** 0,576 0,002
7cmγ  Branch(4) by Manu(1) 1,128 0,792 0,154
8cmγ  Branch(4) by Manu(2) 0,636 0,630 0,313
 Manu * Number of employees    0,842
9cmγ  Manu(1) by Number of employees(1)   0,084
10cmγ  Manu(1) by Number of employees(2) -0,103 0,693 0,882
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11cmγ  Manu(2) by Number of employees(1) 0,659 0,670 0,325
12cmγ  Manu(2) by Number of employees(2) 1,164 0,620 0,060
 Manu * Length of ownership (Lenown)    0,055
13cmγ  Manu(1) by Lenown(1) -0,108 0,501 0,829
14cmγ  Manu(1) by Lenown(2) 0,768 0,412 0,063
16cmγ  Manu(2) by Lenown(1) 0,086 0,446 0,848
17cmγ  Manu(2) by Lenown(2) 1,032** 0,374 0,006
 Manu * Number of CVs     0,179
18cmγ  Manu(1) by Number of CVs(1) 0,431 0,752 0,567
19cmγ  Manu(1) by Number of CVs(2) -0,491 0,670 0,464
20cmγ  Manu(2) by Number of CVs(1) 0,382 0,624 0,540
21cmγ  Manu(2) by Number of CVs(2) -0,189 0,571 0,741
Note: *=p<.05, **=p<.01 
 
Whereas age does not show a significant threshold effect on its own, it significantly 
influences the threshold when moderated by manufacturer, showing support for proposition 
P5. Mercedes-Benz customers who are between 18 to 35 years old have a significantly higher 
threshold ( 1zmγ  = -5,130 p<.05) than older customers. This effect however cannot be found 
for other manufacturers. This result stands in line with findings of Mittal and Kamakura 
(2001) who found that older customers have lower satisfaction thresholds. The same result 
can be found for branch of industry: no threshold effect can be found if the manufacturer 
variable is neglected. However it becomes clear from Table 3-4 that thresholds differ 
significantly for different branches of industries if the manufacturer is taken into account. The 
threshold effect of length of ownership, it appears is also moderated by manufacturer: 
whereas Figure 3-3 shows a strong threshold effect of length of ownership, the analysis on a 
manufacturer level shows, that this effect only holds true for Volkswagen, not however for 
Mercedes-Benz or other manufacturers, also confirming proposition P4.  
 
Figures 4a-c graphically depict the differential impact of length of ownership for customers 
of different manufacturers. The importance of taking the manufacturer into the analysis 
becomes apparent: a general inspection of moderating effects has shown that customers with 
a lower length of ownership have a lower satisfaction threshold and hence a higher intrinsic 
retainability. An analysis on a manufacturer level however shows that this holds true only for 
customers who have replaced a vehicle from Volkswagen, not so for customers of Mercedes-
Benz and other manufacturers. Summarizing, we could provide support for all our 
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propositions concerning satisfaction threshold effects as captured in P1 to P5. 
Figure 3-4: Differential Satisfaction Thresholds of Length of Ownership for Different 
Manufacturers  
 
3.5.5. Response Bias  
 
In terms of the model estimates the response bias is captured by the interactions between 
satisfaction ratings and the demographics, respectively satisfaction ratings and manufacturer 
(δ  parameters) implying that even after accounting for the differences in average rating, the 
translation of reported satisfaction into repurchase depends on demographic characteristics 
and the previous manufacturer. Negative coefficients indicate higher response bias compared 
to the reference category. Again higher response bias implies that satisfaction ratings 
translate less well into repurchase behavior. Graphically this results in a flatter slope of the 
satisfaction-repurchase probability line. Not a single demographic characteristic in our model 
shows a significant response bias effect on its own, clearly rejecting proposition P6 and 
standing in contrast with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Mittal & Kamakura, 2001). 
Only manufacturer has a significant response bias effect, providing support for proposition P7 
(see Table 3-5).  
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Table 3-5: Response Bias Effects  
Indices Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-Value 
 Age * Satisfaction   0,657
1zδ  Age(1) by Satisfaction 0,045 0,287 0,874
2zδ  Age(2) by Satisfaction 0,266 0,279 0,341
3zδ  Age(3) by Satisfaction 0,257 0,307 0,402
4zδ  Satisfaction by Sex(1) -0,138 0,256 0,589
5zδ  Consideration of other vehicles (1) by Satisfaction 0,230 0,192 0,230
 Manu * Satisfaction   0,000
1mδ  Manu(1) by Satisfaction -1,416* 0,614 0,021
2mδ  Manu(2) by Satisfaction 1,469* 0,574 0,011
Note: For an explanation of the abbreviated categories see Table 3-3; *=p<.05, **=p<.01 
 
The fact that no single demographic characteristic has an effect on response bias is particular 
striking as all of them evidence significant effects on response bias when the manufacturer 
was taken into account, providing clear support for proposition P8 and strongly highlighting 
the necessity to investigate the effect of manufacturer on response bias effects (see Table 3-
6). 
 
Table 3-6: Manufacturer-Specific Response Bias Effects 
Indices Variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error p-Value 
 Age * Satisfaction * Manu   0,040
1zmδ  Age(1) by Satisfaction by Manu(1) 1,358* 0,541 0,012
2zmδ  Age(1) by Satisfaction by Manu(2) -0,470 0,479 0,327
3zmδ  Age(2) by Satisfaction by Manu(1) 0,638 0,508 0,209
4zmδ  Age(2) by Satisfaction by Manu(2) -0,659 0,422 0,118
5zmδ  Age(3) by Satisfaction by Manu(1) 0,355 0,560 0,526
6zmδ  Age(3) by Satisfaction by Manu(2) -0,736 0,490 0,133
 Satisfaction * Sex * Manu   0,012
7zmδ  Satisfaction by Sex(1) by Manu(1) 0,814 0,448 0,069
8zmδ  Satisfaction by Sex(1) by Manu(2) -0,789 0,472 0,094
 Consid * Satisfaction * Manu   0,062
10zmδ  Consid(1) by Satisfaction by Manu(1) -0,487 0,307 0,113
11zmδ  Consid(1) by Satisfaction by Manu(2) -0,679* 0,305 0,026
Note: For an explanation of the abbreviated categories see Table 3-3; *=p<.05, **=p<.01 
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For young customers (18 to 35 years) the response bias is lower, meaning that changes in 
their satisfaction ratings strongly translate into repurchase for this age group only for 
Mercedes-Benz ( 1zmδ =1,358; p<.05) whereas there is no significant difference in response 
bias due to age for customers of other manufacturers.  
 
Figure 3-5: Differential Response Bias Effect of Age for Customers of Different 
Manufacturers 
 
It can be seen clearly from figure 3-5 that differences in satisfaction ratings translate better 
into repurchase behavior for younger customers than for older customers. Apparently 
response bias is stronger for older customers than for younger customers. However this is 
only the case for customers of Mercedes-Benz (respondents who replaced a vehicle from 
Mercedes-Benz). Younger customers of other manufacturers do not show a lower response 
bias than older customers.  Similarly differential effects of response bias for manufacturers 
can be found for sex and consideration of other manufacturers. Customers of Volkswagen 
who considered more than the replaced manufacturer prior to their purchase show a 
significantly higher response bias (meaning their satisfaction ratings translate less well into 
repurchase behavior) than customers who only consider the replaced manufacturer ( 11zmδ =-
0,679; p<.05). The translation of satisfaction ratings into repurchase behavior for customers 
of Mercedes-Benz and other manufacturers however does not differ with the consideration of 
other manufacturers. Summarizing our results support P7 and P8 while P6 has to be rejected 
and further underscores the utility and also necessity to include manufacturer as an additional 
moderating variable. Table 3-7 provides an overview of our findings. 
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Table 3-7: Overview of Propositions and Findings 
Propositions Findings 
P1 Satisfaction thresholds vary with demographic characteristics of a 
decider in a buying center 
supported 
P2 Satisfaction thresholds vary with company characteristics supported 
P3 Satisfaction thresholds vary with the manufacturer supported 
P4 Satisfaction thresholds of company characteristics vary with the 
manufacturer 
supported 
P5 Satisfaction thresholds of demographic characteristics of a decider in a 
buying center vary with the manufacturer 
supported 
P6 Response bias varies with the demographic characteristics of a decider 
in a buying center 
rejected 
P7 Response bias varies with the manufacturer supported 
P8 Response bias of demographic characteristics of a decider in a buying 
center varies with the manufacturer 
supported 
 
3.6. Discussion 
 
A prerequisite for the management of business relationships is a thorough understanding of 
the drivers of loyalty and retention, especially in markets with heterogeneous customer bases 
(Eriksson & Mattson, 2002). Especially in business markets it is important to identify 
customers that have a high propensity to be loyal and thus also profitable in order to help 
vendors more effectively allocate customer management efforts across the customer base and 
better target customer groups (Palmatier, Gopalakrishna, & Houston, 2006). By building on 
and expanding a model developed by Mittal and Kamakura (2001) we found, that 
demographic, company characteristics and manufacturer all have a significant influence on 
satisfaction thresholds. For example, customers considering more than one manufacturer have 
a higher satisfaction threshold than customers considering more, companies with 10 to 50 
employees have a higher threshold than companies with more than 50 employees and 
Volkswagen customers have higher satisfaction thresholds than customers of other 
manufacturers. These easy to measure variables can help identify customer groups that have a 
low satisfaction threshold and thus a high probability to repurchase from the same 
manufacturer. In addition we found that the effects of demographic- and company 
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characteristics on the satisfaction thresholds largely depends on the manufacturer. 
Furthermore we could show that the manufacturer had a significant impact on response bias 
and that the impact of demographic characteristics on response bias is manufacturer-specific. 
For example, satisfaction ratings of young Mercedes-Benz customers translate much better 
into actual repurchase than those of older Mercedes-Benz customers, a finding that is specific 
to Mercedes-Benz and could not be found for customers of other manufacturers. Our results 
imply that great care should be paid when generalizing findings on the moderating role of 
demographic characteristics on the satisfaction retention link from one manufacturer to 
another. Further we could show that satisfaction alone is a very weak predictor of repurchase 
behavior, highlighting the importance of taking into account moderating variables in a 
business-to-business setting.  
 
3.6.1. Managerial Implications  
 
Identifying manufacturer-specific satisfaction thresholds and response biases may be useful 
to managers for various reasons: manufacturer-specific customer groups defined by certain 
demographics or company characteristics with low satisfaction thresholds can be viewed as 
inherently loyal customers. Several authors stress the importance of identifying customers 
with high levels of intrinsic retainability on which companies can focus their relationship-
building efforts (Reichheld, 1996; Reinartz & Kumar, 2000). A key conclusion of Reinartz 
and Kumar’s (2000) study is that a substantial group of intrinsically short-lived customers 
exists and that it is necessary to identify this group as early as possible and stop investing in 
them. Instead, relationship building should focus on customers with higher levels of intrinsic 
retainability (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001; Reichheld, 1996). These customers can also be seen 
as a shelter from competition by other manufacturers as they apparently see fewer 
alternatives other than to repurchase from the manufacturer even when their satisfaction is 
low. Thus our results can further be used for customer value models and value based 
segmentation approaches for relationship marketing purposes. Customers belonging to a 
group with low satisfaction threshold for a certain manufacturer will be more likely to 
repurchase at the same satisfaction level and thus represent long-term customers for that 
manufacturer. All relevant relationship marketing measures, that management deems 
appropriate, can be offered to this group (Reinartz & Kumar, 2003). In contrast, customers 
with high satisfaction thresholds are inherently short-lived and following Reinartz and 
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Kumar’s (2003, p. 79) suggestion, companies should stop “chasing these customers”. Our 
results show that the retention rates differ substantially for certain customer groups with 
similar satisfaction scores. Since our grouping variables were easy to measure demographic 
variables of a decider in a buying center and company characteristics that are often available 
in customer data bases, our analyses can provide an actionable framework for management to 
identify potential life-time customers and differentiate their relationship marketing efforts.  
 
However, as our results show, managers cannot rely on general findings about moderating 
characteristics but are well advised to tap into their own customer base. Apart from 
identifying satisfaction thresholds of one’s own customer base, identifying customers with 
high satisfaction thresholds of key competitors’ may also provide valuable insight. Those 
customers should be the most volatile and the most easy to specifically target and conquer 
when entering a new segment or placing a new product.  
 
Research on the high defection rate of satisfied customers has left managers with an irritation 
about how to interpret satisfaction surveys or if to conduct them at all: “They tend to be long 
and complicated, yielding low response rates and ambiguous implications that are difficult 
for operating managers to act on” (Reichheld, 2003, p. 47). Identifying customer specific 
response biases’ may help managers to better interpret satisfaction survey results. Questions 
like “for what customers do changes in satisfaction ratings translate into changes in 
repurchase behavior?” are extremely relevant for managers. Managers may then want to 
monitor satisfaction ratings of those customer groups with low response bias more closely 
than satisfaction ratings of other customer groups with high response bias. Only for customer 
groups with low response bias changes in satisfaction scores are managerially relevant: For 
these, changes directly translate into changes in repurchase behavior. 
 
3.6.2. Limitations and Future Research  
 
Why do certain customer or company characteristics positively impact on satisfaction 
thresholds and response bias whereas others possess a negative impact? And why does a 
certain characteristic impact on the response bias for one manufacturer but not for another? It 
seems hardly feasible to provide a solid theory for those differences and thus we refrained 
from deriving specific hypotheses and hence also abstained from providing ex-post 
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explanations of why certain characteristics impacted on the satisfaction-threshold in a certain 
way and why others did not. The selection of our sampled and investigated characteristics as 
well as our selection of categories may thus seem arbitrary from a theoretical viewpoint. 
However we did not aim at providing and testing a theory of why certain characteristics 
impact on the satisfaction-retention link in a certain way but at showing that moderating 
effects are manufacturer-specific and that company characteristics have to be taken into 
account as moderators in business-to-business contexts. Further, we focused largely on 
demographic characteristics of the key decider in a buying center as well as demographic 
company characteristics. The aim was to investigate, whether demographic variables serve as 
moderators of the satisfaction-retention link in a business-to-business setting as was found for 
business-to-consumer settings. The answer is yes. Both can serve as moderators in business-
to-business settings. However, business settings allow for further potential moderators that 
have not been investigated in this study, like the ability to switch from one supplier to another 
(see Jones & Sasser, 1995) or relational norms (see Heide & John, 1992). Future research 
should aim at testing their moderating role on the satisfaction-retention link. 
 
We investigated the commercial vehicle market in a major European market. The majority of 
customers for commercial vehicles are handcraft companies (painters, plumbers, builders 
etc.), as well as small retail and service companies. Larger retailers typically have their own 
truck fleets or employ professional shipping companies. The market is therefore dominated 
by small companies. In the country of our study over 887.000 handcraft enterprises exist. 
More than 94% employ less than 20 employees. Thus our sample contains predominantly 
small and medium-sized companies. Buying decisions in smaller companies are typically less 
collective and are closer to buying behavior for consumer goods than buying decisions in 
very large companies. On the one hand side this fact supports our key informant approach, 
but on the other hand side it raises the question whether buying decisions for very large 
companies do deviate from the obtained results. Since our sample reflected the population 
under study the proportion of large companies was too small to allow separate analyses for 
larger companies. This only would have been possible with a boost sample of only large 
companies. Even though this limits the generalizability of our findings to business markets 
with only few very large customers, our results and methodology can still aid managers to 
understand the satisfaction-retention link, where it is most needed: for markets with a large 
and heterogeneous customer base of predominantly small to medium sized companies 
(Eriksson & Mattsson, 2002). 
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One may criticize, that we did not use a longitudinal design as would be desirable in 
investigations of the satisfaction-retention link in a business-to-consumer setting. However 
constructing a longitudinal design where satisfaction and repurchase is measured at two 
different points in time is difficult to impossible in a business-to-business setting for one 
reason: contrary to the business-to-consumer context, in a business-to-business context a high 
number of vehicles are purchased over time. Asked at one point in time to give a satisfaction 
rating with a specific vehicle, it will be hard to impossible for a customer to specify at a 
different point in time if that exact same vehicle was replaced with one of the same or another 
manufacturer as many new vehicles may have been purchased in the elapsed time. In order to 
assure a clear link between satisfaction and retention we thus decided to measure satisfaction 
with a vehicle that has just been replaced with a new vehicle with similar specifications. 
Nevertheless we are aware that this may have led to an inflated relation of the investigated 
satisfaction retention link. Cognitive dissonance theory would predict that customers who 
repurchased the same vehicle give higher and customers who switched to another 
manufacturer give lower satisfaction ratings to their replaced vehicle (see Festinger, 1957). 
This would in effect to lead to a stronger relationship between satisfaction and repurchase. 
However the influence of satisfaction alone on repurchase was low anyhow, and rose only by 
incorporating further variables.  
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4.1. Abstract 
 
In recent years, consumers and their interactions with brands have been studied from a 
relationship perspective. In particular, it has been posited that norms play a crucial role in 
understanding how consumers respond to brand behavior. However, prior research has relied 
upon broad and undifferentiated operationalizations of the norm concept. More generally, 
empirical research on norms in real brand relationships in the field has been lacking. Little is 
known about the type of norms that may operate and what impact they may have on 
consumers’ reactions to brand behavior. In this paper, the authors draw upon Macneil’s 
Relational Exchange Theory and expand it from the business-to-business to the consumer-
brand domain. They develop a conceptual framework modeling the impact of norms on 
consumers’ reactions to brand transgressions and test it in an empirical study in the banking 
sector. The results provide evidence that relational exchange norms do operate in consumer-
brand relationships and that they are conceptually distinct from concepts such as trust or 
satisfaction. 
 
4.2. Introduction 
 
Practitioners and scholars largely agree that brands may constitute one of the most important 
intangible assets under a company’s control (e.g., Srivastava, Tasadduq, and Fahey 1998; 
Hunt 2000). Consequently, brand management counts as one of marketing’s core processes. 
According to Ailawadi and Keller (2004, p. 338) the key question in defining brand potential 
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thereby is, „what should the brand promise be? How should the brand be competitively 
positioned?“ and according to Herbert Hainer, CEO of adidas Inc., the world’s second largest 
sports goods manufacturer, “who reneges on this promise will loose” (Hainer 2006, p. 1). Put 
differently, brand management is about making and keeping promises. But what precisely 
happens when brand promises are broken? From a consumer-brand relationship perspective 
such incidents are of pivotal importance because people primarily derive inferences about 
their relationship partner from negative acts. As Ybarra and Stephan (1999, p. 719) explain 
“negative behavior seems to provide the perceiver with a window into the dispositional 
qualities of the person.” Given that building long-term relationships with customers is a core 
objective in relationship marketing, understanding consumers’ reactions toward 
transgressions is an important research topic. Surprisingly few studies, however, have 
investigated this issue. Fournier and Brasel (2002, p. 102) comment, “work focusing on 
mistakes that companies or brands inevitably make has been rare in relationship research”. 
Actors in a relationship develop expectations about what type of behavior towards the other 
party is appropriate (Macneil 1980). In marketing and in other disciplines such expectations 
have been referred to as relational norms (e.g., Ivens and Blois 2004). Relational norms 
represent informal rules, i.e. they are not written down in formal contracts. When a person 
experiences that his relationship partner has behaved in a manner inconsistent with a 
relational norm, this partner’s behavior is considered a transgression (e.g., Baumeister, 
Stillwell, and Heatherton 1995; Boon and Holmes 1999). 
 
In a longitudinal field experiment, Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel (2004) investigated the 
moderating effect of brand personality (see Aaker 1997) on consumers’ perception of 
marketing failures. They found that one and the same transgression led to different results in 
relationship strength depending on the brand’s personality. They argue that essentially 
consumers must have formed different kinds of expectations toward the different brands and 
that those expectations must have been the cause for different reactions towards the same 
service failure: “Findings corroborate the view that objective evidence, such as that revealed 
by a transgression, may be interpreted differently depending on prior experiences and 
relationships” (Aaker et al. 2004, p. 13).  It thus appears in their study that the one brand’s 
personality has elicited certain expectations towards the relationship that the other one hasn’t, 
making the same incident a transgression in the one relationship but not in the other. In a 
similar perspective, Aggarwal (2004) has dealt with the question whether one and the same 
brand behavior leads to different consumer responses. Instead of focusing on brand 
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personality however, Aggarwal directly influenced participants’ relationship norms, by 
applying a social relationship framework (Clark and Mills 1993), differentiating between 
essentially two types of relationships, communal and exchange relationships. He found that 
consumers evaluated the brand’s action - charging a fee for a service - differently depending 
on the kind of brand relationship norm that was activated. Although Aggarwal’s (2004) 
results highlight the potential role of relationship norms in consumer-brand relationships 
several conceptual problems arise from his study. At the centre lies the question, whether 
Clark and Mills’ relationship framework is at all applicable to the brand context. As 
consumer-brand relationships are at their very core based on exchange it is at least 
questionable whether communal relationships (the central norm in a communal relationship is 
to give without expecting to get something back in return) at all exist in the consumer-brand 
domain. Even more importantly however, Aggarwal did not measure actual brand 
relationships but confronted participants in an experiment with hypothetical descriptions of 
relationships. Johar’s (2005, p. 26) key question, “Is there a norm attached to brand 
behavior?” hence still remains unanswered.  
 
In addition to answering whether norms do evolve in brand relationships and guide 
consumers’ behavior, researchers have asked that future research should “ideally specify the 
contract terms that govern each relationship type” (Aaker et al. 2004, p. 14). The purpose of 
this paper is to provide more detailed insights into which role relational norms play in 
consumer-brand relationships. More precisely we draw upon the extant literature in the field 
of legal sociology as well as business-to-business relationships. In these fields, Macneil’s 
(1978, 1980, 1981) Relational Exchange Theory (RET) builds the foundation for the study of 
norms and their impact on relationship quality. The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: in a first step we introduce Relational Exchange Theory and discuss its applicability 
to the field of consumer-brand relationships. Secondly, we analyze the importance of norms 
in understanding consumers’ reactions to relationship transgressions. We develop a 
conceptual model and formulate hypotheses about the impact of relational norms on 
consumers’ coping strategies. Next we present the design and the results of an empirical 
study conducted in the banking sector. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical as well 
as managerial implications and we present avenues for further research.  
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4.3. Relational Exchange Theory 
 
The general idea that economic exchange is influenced by norms is prominent in many 
different research streams, including sociology (e.g., Granovetter 1985), organization theory 
(e.g., Ouchi 1980), negotiation theory (e.g., Greenhalgh 1987), strategy (e.g., Gulati 1995), 
contract law (e.g., Macneil 1981), economics (e.g., Gibbons 1999), industrial marketing (e.g., 
Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990), channel relationships (e.g., Jap and Ganesan 2000), and 
consumer behavior (e.g., Aggarwal 2004). Norms can be defined as unwritten or informal 
codes of conduct that either prescribe or discourage behaviors for actors by defining them as 
illegitimate in the context at hand (Coleman 1990; Gibbs 1981). The overwhelming part of 
articles on relationship norms in marketing has drawn upon Ian Macneil’s Relational 
Exchange Theory (see e.g., Macneil 1978, 1980, 1981; for reviews see Heide and John 1992; 
as well as Ivens and Blois 2004). Macneil as well as other authors (e.g., Kaufmann and Stern 
1988; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Heide 1994; Lusch and Brown 1996) have 
identified several norms (e.g., solidarity, flexibility, or reciprocity) that structure and govern 
exchange relationships. So far, empirical tests of these norms have only been conducted in 
the field of business-to-business relationships. The literature on the role of norms in 
consumer-brand relationships has been scarcer. And extant work in this field has not 
operationalized norms by drawing upon Relational Exchange Theory. For example, Aggarwal 
(2004) in an experimental study finds empirical evidence for the importance of norms in 
consumer-brand relationships. However his focal point of investigation were hypothetical 
brand relationships, the investigation of the type of norms guiding actual brand relationships 
has so far been widely neglected. Hence, we propose to test the applicability of Macneil’s 
Relational Exchange Theory in the context of consumer-brand relationships.  
 
Exchange theory lies at the core of marketing (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). RET allows 
understanding the different facets of exchange by developing a framework of several 
exchange norms. It assumes that exchange is not only an economic phenomenon but 
characterizes all forms of interaction and posits that exchange acts (transactions) differ 
according to their character (Macneil 1980). They can be classified on a continuum that 
ranges from discrete to relational exchange. Purely discrete exchange, however, constitutes 
an exception and consequently most transactions have relational character (Macneil 1983). 
Agreements between two parties can contain explicit as well as implicit arrangements - 
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relational norms (e.g., Hadfield 1990). The norm concept has been applied to the analysis of 
interactions between individuals or groups in different disciplines (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; 
Axelrod 1986; Bendor and Mookherjee 1990). Macneil (1980) considers exchange processes 
(regardless whether discrete or relational) to be fundamental and omnipresent social 
phenomena (Whitford 1985). He developed a comprehensive set of common norms for the 
governance of exchange processes, which he interpreted as principles of right action with 
binding character. In this perspective, their function is to guide and control behavior. In 
addition to their ex ante role as expectations (Heide and John 1992; Lipset 1975) or 
guidelines for appropriate behavior (Scanzoni 1979), norms have an ex post function as 
reference points for the evaluation of the behavior actually shown in a given situation. They 
permit the judging of the conformity of a party’s actions with the established standards.  
 
4.4. Discussion of the Applicability of RET to Consumer-Brand 
 Relationships  
 
Some elementary differences exist between the nature of business-to-business and consumer-
brand relationships, which raises the question of the applicability of Macneil’s RET to the 
consumer-brand domain. Whereas business-to-business relationships are often characterized 
by a high degree of interpersonal interaction between relationship partners, consumer-brand 
relationships usually involve little if any interpersonal interaction. So one central question is, 
how relationship expectations can evolve in such relationships. Undoubtedly, brand 
management creates at least unilateral expectations on the customer side. It does so by 
making value propositions, by using the marketing mix, or through the behaviors of brand 
representatives (managers, sales people, or celebrity endorsers). The customer receives 
signals from which he derives the brand’s personality structure and, through inference (Johar, 
Sengupta, and Aaker 2005), develops a set of expectations what behavior he may expect from 
the brand (see Aaker et al., 2004).  
However, for at least some brands a more interactive perspective on the exchange with its 
customers seems to be justified, in which norms can be interpreted as joint expectations and, 
hence, as governance mechanisms for the relationship. In fact Muniz and O’Guinn (2001) 
argue that brands are social objects and that consumers are actively involved in their creation. 
Brands interact with their customers in various ways. In fact, Fournier (1998, p. 345) argues 
that, “everyday execution of marketing plans and tactics can be construed as behaviors 
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performed by the brand acting in its relationship role.” On the one hand they actively 
communicate their personality traits in a unidirectional and rather anonymous way through 
mass media. However, in addition to this, many brands attempt relating to customers in a 
more bidirectional, individualized and direct manner through relationship marketing tools 
such as customer clubs, event marketing, direct mail and the like. In reaction to these 
communication efforts, customers provide feedback in the form of purchases and 
communication through letters, telephone calls, emails, Internet blog entries or brand 
communities (see McAlexander, Schouten, and Koenig 2002).  Muniz and O’Guinn (2001) 
argue that brand communities represent a form of consumer agency. France and Muller 
(1999) suggest that due to their collective nature new forms of computer-mediated 
communication, consumers now have a greater voice than they have in more isolated 
situations. As an example of interactive consumer-brand communication, in 2005 the internet 
blog author Jeff Jarvis stirred up strong customer and media attention by describing his 
difficulties in getting his Dell computer repaired and coining the term “Dell Hell” (Daily 
Telegraph 2/20/07). This eventually led Dell to significantly increase its customer service 
efforts and even create an own website called www.dellideastorm.com, a community site for 
customers to share and discuss their ideas and concerns concerning service, products and 
even future products with Dell. Via these channels, customers transmit valuable information 
about their expectations and about brand behaviors they consider to be unacceptable. In fact 
Moon (2000, p. 325) argues that, computer technology is making reciprocal exchange 
between brands and customers increasingly tractable:  
 
“Marketers have already discovered that one of the advantages of such technology 
is its ability to engage in one-on-one interactions on a large scale. And as computer 
programs become increasingly sophisticated, it is reasonable to assume that their 
ability to carry on “intelligent” conversations—that is, conversations that can 
address an individual in a personalized manner and respond to that individual in 
some contingent fashion (Deighton 1996)—will only improve over time”.  
 
In addition, researchers have formulated the notion that companies, too, have specific 
expectations towards their customers’ behavior: “There's a balance between giving and 
getting in a good relationship. But when companies ask their customers for friendship, 
loyalty, and respect, too often they don't give those customers friendship, loyalty, and respect 
in return” (Fournier, Dobscha, and Mick 1999, p. 44). From this vantage point, norms emerge 
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through interactions taking place between the customer and the brand. In fact some scholars 
have argued for a paradigm shift to interactive marketing, promoted by advances in 
technology (Deighton 1996). Through a process of signaling and adjustment both parties may 
eventually form joint expectations. This dynamic evolvement of norms in the relationship 
development process was confirmed in a longitudinal study of consumers of an Internet 
grocery service provider (Fournier, Avery, and Wojnicki 2005). In terms of relationship 
phases (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987), norm formation was especially prevalent in the 
relationship expansion phase, providing initial qualitative support for our reasoning.   
 
Whereas RET norms are conceptualized to complete written agreements in business-to-
business relationships, few if any written agreements exist in most consumer-brand 
relationships. However, even more so, norms should take over the governing role in the 
absence of written agreements. According to Macneil (1980) norms should evolve in all 
relationships. A relationship exists as soon as exchange exceeds the single discrete 
transaction (Macneil 1983). This conceptualization of relationships seems far more applicable 
to the consumer-brand domain than conceptualizations that lean on the interpersonal 
relationship domain (see Fournier 1998). That means, consumers do not have to feel like their 
relation to a brand resembles a relationship with a friend, spouse or colleague for the brand 
relation to qualify as a relationship in RET terms. Although several boundary conditions for 
the emergence of norms are likely to exist in the consumer-brand domain, previous research 
(see Aaker et al. 2004; Aggarwal 2004; Aggarwal and Law 2005; Aggarwal and Zhang 2006) 
clearly points to the possibility that norms can at least potentially emerge in real consumer-
brand relationships. However it is left to empirical research to test whether RET norms do 
govern actual consumer-brand relationships. It is the aim of this paper to attempt such a first 
empirical investigation.  
 
4.4.1. What Norms Govern Consumer-Brand Relationships? 
 
As in most empirical studies on RET we focus on three norms to span the domain of social 
norms in exchange relationship (see e.g., Kaufman and Stern 1988; Heide and John 1992). 
The three norms we identify as having particular relevance to the study of consumer-brand 
relationships are the norms of reciprocity, flexibility and solidarity.  
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Reciprocity: 
Reciprocity is a norm of distributive justice. No exchange relationship continues unless both 
partners are making some kind of profit (Homans 1961). Reciprocity is characterized by 
mutually agreeable amounts of give and take (Gouldner 1960). Both sides expect that none of 
the actors will try to benefit solely on the cost of the other. Whereas reciprocity is more 
apparent in a discrete exchange than in a relational one because of the immediacy of a 
discrete exchange, the vital point in relational exchange is a more open-ended perception of 
reciprocity, i.e. both parties assume that in the long run mutual concessions will even out, so 
that both benefit from the relationship (see Ivens and Blois 2004). A sense of reciprocity is a 
condition sine qua non for the establishment of long-term relationships in any context. Such 
an attitude prevents the parties from maximizing their individual relationship benefits at the 
expense of the exchange partner. Houston and Gassenheimer (1987) argue that reciprocity is 
said to transform the relationship between the exchange partners, establishing a bond between 
the donor and recipient. According to Miller and Kean (1997), reciprocal behavior permeates 
everyday living from the micro level of social exchange between family members to the 
macro level of international trade agreements.  
 
Reciprocity is an important variable in marketing relationships and has been advanced as a 
key to creating successful commercial interaction by some scholars (e.g., Anderson 1994). 
Similarly, Fournier (1998, p. 345) argues for the applicability of the reciprocity norm to 
consumer-brand relationships: 
 
“Undoubtedly, there exists a lack of parallelism in applying the reciprocity 
criterion to an inanimate brand object. A brand may enjoy selected animistic 
properties, but it is not a vital entity. In fact, the brand has no objective existence at 
all: it is simply a collection of perceptions held in the mind of the consumer. The 
brand cannot act or think or feel — except through the activities of the manager 
that administers it. In accepting the behavioral significance of marketing actions, 
one accepts the legitimacy of the brand as contributing relationship partner.”  
 
According to Fournier (1998) consumers expect some degree of reciprocity from their brands 
through actions taken on the brand’s behalf by the associated firm. In fact, in identifying 15 
different types of consumer-brand relationships, reciprocity is one of the key differentiating 
features Fournier draws on.  
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For Cowles (1996, p. 3) reciprocity between customer and company is a precondition for 
trust to emerge in relationships, “if firms ask for customer trust, they should also trust their 
customers in return”. Miller and Kean (1997) found that reciprocity can be a more important 
factor to the longevity of consumer-retailer relationships than economic motives or utility 
alone. In personal as well as service relationships people expect significant levels of 
reciprocity. For example, sharing personal information tends to be a mutual exchange 
between hairstylist and customer in a strong service relationship (Price and Arnould 1999). In 
an experimental investigation Moon (2000) has applied the reciprocity principle to 
information exchange in consumer-brand relationships and could show that consumers are 
willing to disclose even intimate personal information as long as it is preceded by some 
disclosure from the company side, so that consumers feel a sense of reciprocity.  
 
Flexibility: 
Flexibility is a bilateral expectation of willingness to make adaptations as circumstances 
change (Noordewier et al. 1990). It provides for relationship adaptation through the 
modification of agreements in response to unforeseen events and changing circumstances 
(Macneil 1980; Boyle et al. 1991; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). The probability that at 
least one party feels the need to adapt the original agreement to changed circumstances 
increases with the length of the time horizon in a relationship (Ganesan 1994). Flexibility 
hence describes an actor’s willingness and his expectation of the partner’s willingness to 
adapt an existing implicit or explicit agreement to new environmental conditions 
(Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). Since consumers, just as much as professional 
purchasing managers, make agreements or conclude contracts under conditions of 
uncertainty, the underlying causes of the need for flexibility are identical in all those 
consumer-brand relationship in which a consumer enters some sort of explicit agreement or 
contract (e.g., in the form of subscriptions to tickets or magazines, insurance contracts, 
buying agents, service agreements, auction platforms and the like).   
 
Solidarity:  
The norm of solidarity can be defined as the willingness of relationship parties to strive for 
joint benefits (Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Antia and Frazier 2001; Heide and John 1992; 
Kaufmann 1987; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). Solidarity is expressed through 
behaviors that contribute directly to the relationship maintenance (Heide and John 1992; 
Macneil 1980; Kaufmann and Stern 1988). In practice, a solidarity norm manifests in the 
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form of a ‘we- feeling’ or shared identity between the exchange partners (Etzioni 1988; 
Greenhalgh 1987; Macneil 1980; Takahashi 2000). Evidence for the fact that consumers can 
in some cases develop such a ‘we-feeling’ with their brands can be found for example in 
research on brand communities where members report to feel an important connection to the 
brand (see Muniz and O’Guinn 2001). One way this ‘we-feeling’ can materialize is in 
customers’ strong and public opposition to the brand’s competitors (for example Apple users 
outlying the disadvantages of Windows-PCs on personal web-sites) or by celebrating the 
brand’s history (see Muniz and O’Guinn, 2001).  
 
The norm of solidarity becomes especially relevant in situations in which the relationship 
partner is in predicament. It promotes a bilateral approach to problem-solving and supports 
mutual adjustments within the exchange relationship (Macneil 1980; Poppo and Zenger 
2002). As an example of solidarity in consumer-brand relationships, a customer in a 
relationship high on the norm of solidarity who experiences temporary liquidity problems, 
failing to keep up his payments (e.g., monthly installments) should expect the seller to 
express his solidarity by not insisting on a prompt payment (see Achrol 1997).  
 
Relationalism as a meta-norm: 
Although reciprocity, flexibility and solidarity are conceptually distinguishable, RET norms 
are usually conceptualized as highly interrelated dimensions of a higher-order construct 
relationalism (REL; see e.g., Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990; Heide and John 1992). As 
Macneil (1980) notes, one of the sources of reciprocity is solidarity, but at the same time 
solidarity cannot survive long in the face of perceptions that one side is constantly getting too 
good a deal, which is a perceived failure of reciprocity. Likewise, long-term reciprocity can 
hardly be achieved without at least some degree of flexibility (Gundlach et al. 1995). Hence, 
Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) argue that relationalism can be appropriately viewed as 
an underlying syndrome or a higher order norm, which gives rise to other, more specific 
norms. Heide and John (1992) found empirical support for such a higher second order norm: 
although all three norms had good measurement qualities by themselves and could be seen as 
single factors they strongly loaded on a higher order factor. Although these three dimensions 
have distinct elements, they originate from a single order relational norm (Noordewier, John, 
and Nevin 1990). Similar to Heide and John (1992) our measurement structure hence models 
relational norms as a single second-order factor with three first order factors, representing the 
three dimensions, reciprocity, flexibility, and solidarity.  
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4.4.2. Norms’ Guiding Role in Consumers’ Reactions to Relationship Transgressions  
 
A transgression is usually defined as a violation of the implicit or explicit rules guiding 
relationship performance and evaluation (Metts 1994). It has been argued that how people 
cope with negative incidents in relationships has greater impact on relationship strength than 
positive relationship features (Rusbult et al. 1991). This is because of the high levels of 
salience and the high diagnosticity of negative events (Fiske 1980). From a marketing 
perspective, how consumers choose to react to such a transgression is of special relevance. 
Do they actively engage in joint problem solving or do they simply exit the relationship 
towards a competitor’s brand? Three responses to relationship problems in marketing have 
received special scrutiny: loyalty, voice and neglect. Several authors have confirmed the 
existence of these responses to relationship problems in marketing contexts (e.g., Andreasen 
1985; Ping 1993, 1997; Singh 1990). Further, research has proposed that these constructs 
should be antecedents of exiting (see Duck 1982; Ping and Dwyer 1991; Rosse and Miller 
1984), something Ping (1999) could empirically show in a marketing context.  
 
Loyalty: 
Hirschman (1970) described loyal behavior as remaining silent with confidence that things 
will eventually get better or simply refusing to exit. He argues that the decision to stay loyal 
should be based on a) an evaluation of the chances of getting back on track with the firm 
through the actions of others (e.g., the firm) and b) the judgment that it is worth to trade the 
uncertainty of an alternative relationship against those chances. Loyal behavior is a passive 
response strategy because no action is taken to improve conditions instead it is expected that 
conditions will improve by actions of the partner or others. Several studies have since 
conceptualized and operationalized loyal behavior as remaining silent, confident things will 
get better in the future (e.g., Farrell 1983; Ping 1993; Paulssen and Bagozzi 2007).  
Voice:  
When loyal consumers believe solving relationship problems is desirable, but that the 
situation won’t change through the actions of others, Hirschman (1970) argues they will try 
to voice the problem and only exit after having voiced the issue fails to improve things. 
Rusbult, Johnson, and Morrow (1986) operationalized voice as alerting the relationship 
partner, working out relationship problems and improving objectionable relationship 
conditions. In contrast to loyal behavior, voice is an active response to relationship problems 
because the relationship partner attempts to take action in order to deal with problematic 
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incidents and remedy the relationship (Hirschman 1970; Ping 1997, 1999; Fornell and 
Wernerfelt 1987). Both, voice and loyal behavior are constructive responses that are 
generally intended to maintain or revive the current relationship (Geyskens and Steenkamp 
2000). 
 
Neglect:  
Rusbult Zembrodt, and Gunn (1982) identified relationship neglect as an additional response 
to relationship problems in long-term relationships that occurs before exiting. Ping (1993) has 
argued that a firm can react to relationship problems by emotionally exiting that relationship, 
which is by neglecting it. Neglect involves not caring about the relationship, expending no 
effort to maintain it, and a willingness to let the relationship deteriorate. According to Ping 
(1993) neglect involves reduced contact and social exchanges with the offending partner firm. 
Neglect can be seen as a passive response strategy because no action is taken to change the 
problem at hand. In contrast to loyal response behavior and voice, neglect tends to be 
destructive in regard to the future of the current relationship (Geyskens and Steenkamp 
2000). 
 
From a company perspective it is of pivotal importance that consumers engage in relationship 
prolonging behavior such as loyal or voicing behavior in reaction to a relationship problem. 
The reason being, that in general, the longer a customer stays with a company, the more a 
customer is worth (Reichheld 1996), which has to do with the usually higher costs of 
attracting new customers than retaining existing ones (Fornell 1992; Fornell and Wernerfeldt 
1987). A customer choosing to neglect a relationship is likely to exit at a later stage. 
Customers voicing a problem however not only provide the company with valuable feedback 
but also are more likely to remain loyal to the brand over the long-run. Consumers differ in 
their response tendencies toward service failure encounters depending on the nature of their 
relationship with the organization (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999).  
 
It is the proposition of this paper, that the degree of relationalism in the form of the 
prevalence of the three norms, reciprocity, flexibility and solidarity in consumer-brand 
relationships is a key determinant of consumers’ choice of a conflict resolution strategy. In 
relationships high in relationalism, parties view the exchange relationship as important in and 
of itself (Kaufmann and Stern 1988) and hence should engage in more cooperative and 
constructive resolution strategies. Further, as relational forms of governance imply continuity 
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of exchanges and future cooperative intent (Macneil 1980, 1981) parties should engage in 
problem solving behavior that promotes the relationship to continue. Through recurrent 
cooperative interaction, parties intentionally create mutual reputations for commitment to the 
preservation of the relationship leading to more cooperative forms of conflict resolutions 
(Kaufman and Dant 1988). Similarly, Kaufman and Stern (1988, p. 535) argue that “when … 
a serious conflict episode occurs, the norms under which the exchange relationship generally 
operates will play an important role in determining the parties' reactions to each other's 
behavior during and after the dispute”. And Dant and Schul (1992, p. 40) contend that 
reactions to relationship problems are at least partially dependent on “relationship 
characteristics or the elements defining the character of the exchange relationship itself”. 
Hence we expect that a high degree of relationalism will lead to the use of more constructive 
coping strategies, thereby enabling the relationship to continue, while it should discourage 
destructive coping strategies that lead to the deterioration of the relationship. Hence we 
propose:  
 
 H1: Relationalism increases the likelihood of constructive coping. 
 
 H2: Relationalism decreases the likelihood of destructive coping. 
 
Transgression severity and service failures have received some attention by researchers (see 
e.g., Maxham and Netemeyer 2002; Gilly and Gelb 1982; Hoffman, Kelley, and Rotalsky 
1995; Richins 1983; Weun, Beatty, and Jones 2004). Aaker et al. (2004, p. 14) argue, that in 
order to understand the severity of transgressions, research needs to specify the contract terms 
that govern consumer-brand relationships, such as relational norms: “this would further serve 
to sharpen the conceptualization of transgression events themselves, and provide a framework 
for understanding transgression severity”. The underlying idea is, that whether a certain 
incident is perceived as a severe transgression or not depends largely on whether it violates a 
norm or relational rule (see e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1995; Boon and 
Holmes 1999). RET norms are conceptualized as rules “of right action binding upon the 
members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable 
behavior” (Macneil 1980, p.38). Kaufman and Dant (1988, p. 535) have argued that, “norms 
governing commercial exchange relationships affect perceptions of unfair treatment during 
serious disputes”. Aggarwal (2004) found that depending on the activated relationship norm, 
consumers found a certain marketing action more or less appropriate. Similarly McGraw and 
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Tetlock (2005) could show in a scenario based study that certain incidents did not matter as 
long as they were couched in a relationally acceptable way but had especially negative effects 
when they violated relationship-expectations. Hence we argue that the extent of relationalism 
in a consumer-brand relationship should influence the perceived severity of a transgression.  
 
 H3: Relationalism increases the perceived severity of a transgression. 
 
Apart from the direct effect of relationalism on perceived severity of brand behavior and the 
choice of coping strategy, we also hypothesize an effect of perceived severity on the choice 
of a coping strategy. In general it is reasonable to assume that the more severe a consumer 
perceives a transgression, the more likely he is to act on it and the less likely he is to “let it 
pass”. High severity should hence lead to more active and less passive coping.  
 
 H4: Severity increases the likelihood of active coping. 
 
 H5: Severity decreases the likelihood of passive coping. 
 
Figure 4-1 depicts our proposed model structure. 
REL
SOL FLEX REC
Constructive Coping
Destructive Coping
Passive
Active
Passive
Voice
Loyalty
NeglectSeverity
+
+
+
-
+
-
-
 
Figure 4-1: Proposed Model Structure 
Note: SOL – Solidarity, FLEX – Flexibility, REC – Reciprocity, REL - Relationalism  
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Few research has investigated the link between RET and other key marketing constructs. An 
exception is Ganesan’s (1994) work, showing that trust and satisfaction have a positive 
impact on the norm of long-term orientation. Although in general, a positive relationship 
between REL and key brand relationship constructs like trust, satisfaction and 
recommendation behavior can be assumed we argue that REL is conceptually different from 
them. Based on that we assume that they cannot explain differences in coping and trust above 
REL and that the proposed effects of REL on severity and the effects of REL and severity on 
coping strategies hold when trust, satisfaction and recommendation behavior are controlled 
for.  
 
 H6: Trust, satisfaction and recommendation behavior cannot explain differences  in 
 coping strategies above REL. 
 
 H7: Trust, satisfaction and recommendation behavior cannot explain differences  in 
 perceived severity above REL. 
 
 H8: The effects of REL on coping strategies hold when trust, satisfaction and 
 recommendation behavior are controlled for. 
 
 H9: The effect of REL on perceived severity holds when trust, satisfaction and 
 recommendation behavior are controlled for. 
 
 H10: The effect of perceived severity on coping strategies holds when trust, 
 satisfaction and recommendation behavior are controlled for. 
 
In understanding exchange relationships, trust is considered to be a construct of major 
importance and has been shown to be an essential ingredient for successful relationship 
marketing (Doney and Cannon 1997; Morgan and Hunt 1994; etc.). Customer satisfaction has 
generated extensive amounts of research in marketing and can be defined as a consumer’s 
“judgment that a product or service feature, or the product or service itself, provided (or is 
providing) a pleasurable level of consumption-related fulfillment, including levels of under- 
or over-fulfillment” (Oliver 1997, p.13). Because customer satisfaction has often been shown 
to be a weak predictor of loyalty (see e.g., Seiders et al. 2005) some scholars have argued that 
recommendation behavior is a more predictive measure than satisfaction (Reichheld 2003, p. 
48).   
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4.5. Scale Development 
 
Based on Macneil’s theoretic work several scales have been developed to measure the extent 
of a norm orientation in business-to-business relationships (see Kaufman and Dant 1992; 
Ganesan 1994; Kaufman and Stern 1988; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Jap and Ganesan 2000; 
Heide and John 1990; Dant and Schul 1992; Noordewier et al. 1990; Lusch and Brown 1996; 
Kim 2000; Heide 1994; Gassenheimer, Calantone, and Scully 1995; Cannon and Homburg 
2001; Cannon and Perreault 1999). The norm scales were based on established scales from 
the literature and slightly adapted to fit the consumer-brand relationship context (see Table 4-
5 in the appendix). Specifically, the solidarity scales were based on scales by Heide and John 
(1992) and Lusch and Brown (1996), flexibility scales were based on scales by Heide and 
John (1992) as well as Kaufmann and Dant (1992) and reciprocity scales were based on 
scales by Ganesan (1994).  
4.6. Study Design 
 
The banking sector was chosen as an ideal setting for our investigation due to its interactive 
nature and high customer involvement. 343 bank customers participated in the study either 
filling out a paper pencil questionnaire or an online questionnaire, 201 of which were 
completed fully and further served as the basis for evaluation. The sample consisted of a 
60.2% working population, 27.4% students and 12.4% others. Average duration of their 
brand relationship was 5.8 years (SD = 5.4) with 37.1% of the participants having a personal 
bank account representative. Participants were asked about their trust in their bank on three 
five-point scales (α = .81), their recommendation behavior on three five-point scales (α = 
.87) and satisfaction on three five-point scales (α = .85). Subsequently they were asked to 
rate their relationship with their bank on three seven-point solidarity scales (α = .78), four 
seven-point flexibility scales (α = .91) and four seven-point reciprocity scales (α = .87). 
Following that, participants were given two scenarios and asked to imagine that this incident 
would happen in the relationship with their bank. These scenarios were designed to violate 
the three relationship norms but not constitute a transgression in relationships low on these 
relationship norms.  
 
 
 
4   When Implicit Promises are Broken 
 143
The two scenarios read the following: 
Scenario 1: Imagine that five years ago you closed a building loan contract with your bank 
that requires regular monthly deposits from you. Recently however, you decided to take a 
sabbatical from work, which means that you will have to get along with a lower income for 
that time. Hence you inquire at your bank whether you can suspend the monthly payments 
until you return to your job. An account representative of your bank however informs you 
that such an option is not provided for in the contract and that you would loose all benefits 
when suspending your monthly deposits. The bank is not willing to make an exception despite 
your unique situation.  
 
Scenario 2: Imagine that you want to close a long-term oriented savings plan at your bank. In 
a sales talk with an account representative of your bank, the representative tries to persuade 
you of the benefits of a certain plan that has a 5 % issue surcharge. It becomes obvious to 
you that he wants to talk you into making high initial deposits in order to increase his own 
provisions. 
Following each of the two scenarios, participants were asked how severe they would find the 
incident, in case it would happen in the relationship with their bank, on three seven-point 
scales (2002; scenario 1: α = .91; scenario 2: α = .90; see table 4-5 in the Appendix for a 
description of the items and their origin) and about the likelihood that they would resolve the 
situation using one of the following strategies on one five-point scale per coping strategy: 
loyalty, meaning remaining silent with confidence that things will eventually get better, voice, 
meaning actively trying to talk with their bank about the issue and trying to find a joint 
solution, or neglect, doing nothing and slowly letting the relationship deteriorate.  
 
4.7. Results 
 
4.7.1. Measure Validation Procedure 
 
For the multi-item measures each set of items was initially subjected to an examination of 
item-to-total correlations to identify items that did not belong to the specific domain. 
Subsequently item were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis to verify the hypothesized 
factor structure. The relational norm items were hypothesized to have a factor structure with 
the three factors solidarity, flexibility and reciprocity comprising the higher-order norm 
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relationalism (REL). This structure corresponds to a second-order confirmatory factor model 
in which the observed items are hypothesized to originate from the three first-order factors 
and the three first-order factors in turn originate from one second-order factor. The 
hypothesized factor structure and MPLUS parameter estimates are shown in Figure 4-2. The 
proposed model showed good fit (χ2 (41) = 68.28, p = .00, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .057). 
 
REL
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Figure 4-2: Second-Order Factor Model for Relational Norms 
Note: SOL – Solidarity, FLEX – Flexibility, REC – Reciprocity, REL - Relationalism 
 
Evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981) between the three norm 
constructs solidarity, flexibility, and reciprocity as well as trust, satisfaction, recommendation 
behavior and severity was also obtained: the average variance extracted clearly exceeded the 
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shared variance of the constructs (see Table 4-1). 
 
Table 4-1: Correlations between Constructs 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Solidarity .51        
2. Flexibility .58 .73       
3. Reciprocity .65 .66 .63      
4. Trust .39 .23 .33 .60     
5. Satisfaction .12 .07 .14 .59 .64    
6. Recommendation  .21 .15 .24 .39 .68 .72   
7. Severity (s1) .18 .17 .13 -.05 -.12 -.05 .80  
8. Severity (s2) .06 .15 .18 -.11 -.17 .04 .28 .75 
NOTE: The average variance extracted for each construct is provided in the diagonal of the matrix. The notation 
in brackets indicates the scenario: s1 for scenario 1 and s2 for scenario 2. The average variance extracted 
exceeded the shared variance (squared correlations) with other constructs for all model constructs.  
 
4.7.2. Test of Hypotheses 
 
We tested the proposed model structure for both scenarios. The overall fit for the model was 
good for both scenarios (scenario 1: χ2(109) = 156.60 (p=.001), RMSEA = .047, and CFI = 
.98; scenario 2: χ2(109) = 165.17 (p=.000), RMSEA = .051, and CFI = .97).  
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Figure 4-3: Tested Model Structure 
SOL – Solidarity, FLEX – Flexibility, REC – Reciprocity, REL - Relationalism 
 
Impact of REL on Coping: 
Hypothesis 1 states that relationalism increases the likelihood of constructive coping. Loyalty 
and voice are constructive coping strategies because they are intended to maintain or revive 
the relationship. As proposed, REL had a significant positive impact on voice in both 
scenarios (scenario1: γ51 = .39, p < .01; scenario2: γ51 = .40, p < .01) and loyalty in scenario 
1, however slightly missed statistical significance in scenario 2 (scenario1: γ61 = .18, p < .05; 
scenario2: γ61 = .14, p < .10). Hypothesis 2 states that relationalism decreases the likelihood 
of destructive coping. Neglect can be considered a destructive coping strategy because it lets 
the relationship deteriorate. As predicted, REL had a significant negative impact on neglect in 
both scenarios (scenario1: γ71 = -.24, p < .01; scenario2: γ71 = -.28, p < .01).  
 
Impact of REL on Severity: 
Hypothesis 3 states that relationalism increases the perceived severity of a transgression. As 
proposed, relationalism had a significant positive influence on perceived severity of the 
incident in both scenarios (scenario1: γ41 =.20, p < .05; scenario2: γ41 =.18, p < .05). As was 
suggested, when consumers carry high expectations towards the solidarity, reciprocity and 
flexibility of their partner, a transgression that violates these norms is seen as more severe.  
4   When Implicit Promises are Broken 
 147
Table 4-2: Effects of REL on Severity and Coping Strategies 
 
Coping 
Strategy 
 
Model 
Fitted 
 
REL 
ξ1 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Severity 
η4 
 
no controls 
controls 
γ41 = 0.20* (t = 2.33) 
γ41 = 0.25* (t = 2.47) 
γ41 = 0.18* (t = 2.09) 
γ41 = 0.20* (t = 2.04) 
Voice 
η5 
 
no controls 
controls 
γ51 = 0.39* (t = 4.30) 
γ51 = 0.44* (t = 4.12) 
γ51 = 0.40* (t = 4.32) 
γ51 = 0.40* (t = 3.93) 
Loyalty 
η6 
 
no controls 
controls 
γ61 = 0.18* (t = 2.15) 
γ61 = 0.08 (t = 0.84) 
γ61 = 0.14 (t = 1.67) 
γ61 = 0.06 (t = 0.70) 
Neglect 
η7 
 
No controls  
controls 
γ71 = -0.24* (t = -2.89) 
γ71 = -0.29* (t = -2.87) 
γ71 = -0.28* (t = -3.28) 
γ71 = -0.28* (t = -2.92) 
All tests of significance are two-tailed. *p < .05 
 
Impact of Severity on Coping:  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that severity increases the likelihood of an active coping strategy. 
Voice can be considered an active coping strategy because the consumer actively engages in 
problem solving by talking about it with a company representative. As proposed, perceived 
severity had a significant positive influence on voice for scenario 1, however slightly missed 
significance for scenario 2 (scenario1: β54=.17, p < .05; scenario2: β54=.12, p < .10).  
 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that severity decreases the likelihood of a passive coping strategy. Both 
neglect and loyalty can be seen as passive coping strategies because the consumer does not 
take any action to resolve the problem. Perceived severity had a significant negative influence 
on neglect for scenario 2 however slightly missed significance for scenario 1 (scenario1: β74 
=-.11, p > .05; scenario2: β74 =-.21, p < .01). No significant effects could be found for 
severity on loyalty (see Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3: Effects of Severity on Coping Strategies 
 
Coping 
Strategy 
 
Model 
Fitted 
 
Severity 
η4 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Voice 
η5 
 
no controls 
controls 
β54 = 0.17* (t = 2.52) 
β54 = 0.17* (t = 2.45) 
β54 = 0.12 (t = 1.72) 
β54 = 0.12 (t = 1.70) 
Loyalty 
η6 
 
no controls 
controls 
β64 = -0.05 (t = -0.64) 
β64 = 0.00 (t = 0.00) 
β64 = 0.02 (t = 0.32) 
β64 = 0.06 (t = 0.77) 
Neglect 
η7 
 
No controls  
controls 
β74 = -0.11 (t = -1.51) 
β74 = -0.11 (t = -1.55) 
β74 = -0.21* (t = -2.89) 
β74 = -0.22* (t = -3.03) 
All tests of significance are two-tailed. *p < 0.05 
 
Effects of Trust, Satisfaction and Recommendation Behavior on Coping:  
In order to test whether relationalism is different from other key relationship marketing 
constructs we ran models that included trust, satisfaction and recommendation behavior. 
These models had a good model fit (scenario 1: χ2(271) = 409.05 (p=.000), RMSEA = .050, 
and CFI = .96; scenario 2: χ2(271) = 386.29 (p=.000), RMSEA = .046, and CFI = .96).  
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Figure 4-4: Tested Model Structure with Trust, Satisfaction and Recommendation 
Behavior 
Note: SOL – Solidarity, FLEX – Flexibility, REC – Reciprocity, REL – Relationalism 
 
As stated in hypothesis 6, we assumed that neither trust, nor satisfaction, nor 
recommendation behavior would be able to explain differences in the choice of coping 
strategies above relationalism. As can be seen in Table 4-4, neither trust nor satisfaction or 
recommendation did have a significant effect on voice, loyalty or neglect. Hypothesis 8 states 
that the effect of REL on coping strategies should hold when trust, satisfaction and 
recommendation behavior are controlled for. The effect of REL on voice and neglect did hold 
when including trust, satisfaction and recommendation behavior in the model (see Table 4-2). 
However the effect of REL on loyalty lost its significance. Hypothesis 10 states that the 
effect of perceived severity on coping strategies would hold when trust, satisfaction and 
recommendation behavior are controlled for. As hypothesized the effect of perceived severity 
on voice and neglect did hold when including trust, satisfaction and recommendation 
behavior in the model (see Table 4-3). 
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Effects of Trust, Satisfaction and Recommendation Behavior on Severity:  
Further, as stated in hypothesis 7, we assumed that trust, satisfaction and recommendation 
behavior would not explain differences in perceived severity of a transgression above REL. 
As seen in Table 4-4 neither trust nor recommendation behavior did impact on severity. 
Satisfaction did not significantly impact on severity in scenario 1 however did so in scenario 
2 (γ73 =  -.27, p < .05). As assumed and stated in hypothesis 9 the effect of REL on severity 
did hold when including trust, recommendation behavior and satisfaction in the model (see 
Table 4-2). Interestingly, whereas relationalism showed a positive effect on severity, 
satisfaction showed a negative effect on severity in scenario 2, meaning the more satisfied a 
customer was with his bank the less severe he found the transgression. Whereas satisfaction 
apparently can work as a buffer against perceiving a transgression as severe, relationalism 
increases perceptions of severity. This also shows the conceptual differences of relationalism 
and satisfaction. In addition, the fact that relations score high in relationalism does not 
necessarily mean that consumers are more satisfied, which is mirrored in the relatively low 
correlations between satisfaction and the three norm constructs (see Table 4-1).  
 
Table 4-4: Effects of Trust, Satisfaction and Recommendation Behavior on Coping 
Strategies 
 
Coping 
Strategy 
Trust 
ξ2 
Satisfaction 
ξ3 
 
 
Recommendation 
Behavior 
ξ4 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Voice 
η4 
γ42 = -0.16 
(t = -1.51) 
γ42 = -0.16 
(t = -1.49) 
γ43 = 0.15 
(t = 1.22) 
γ43 = 0.15    
(t = 1.19) 
γ44 = -0.02 
(t = -0.19) 
γ44 = 0.13 
(t = 1.19) 
Loyalty 
η5 
γ52 = 0.08 
(t = 0.76) 
γ52 = 0.03 
(t = 0.28) 
γ53 = 0.10 
(t = 0.81) 
γ53 = 0.13   
(t = 0.99) 
γ54 = 0.18 
(t = 1.71) 
γ54 = 0.16 
(t = 1.44) 
Neglect 
η6 
γ62 = 0.12 
(t = 1.04) 
γ62 = 0.11 
(t = 1.00) 
γ63 = -0.23 
(t = -1.74) 
γ63 = -0.19 
(t = -1.47) 
γ64 = 0.13 
(t = 1.22) 
γ64 = -0.02 
(t = -0.16) 
Severity 
η7 
γ72 = -0.09 
(t = -0.80) 
γ72 = -0.10 
(t = -0.90) 
γ73 = -0.10 
(t = -0.69) 
γ73 = -0.27* 
(t = -1.97) 
γ74 = -0.01 
(t = -0.10) 
γ74 = 0.21 
(t = 1.84) 
All tests of significance are two-tailed. *p < 0.05 
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4.8. Discussion  
 
4.8.1. Discussion of the Results 
 
The scale developed for measuring relationalism showed very good scale properties. For the 
second order model we observed good fit, indicating that, although solidarity, flexibility and 
reciprocity are different constructs, they are rooted in the higher order construct 
relationalism. The results of both tests for scenario 1 and 2 support our notion that consumers 
in relationships characterized by high levels of relationalism have a higher likelihood of 
reacting with a constructive than a destructive coping strategy. In fact it seems that 
relationalism serves as a buffer against destructive coping.  
 
On the other hand, a high norm orientation toward the relationship partner was also shown to 
lead to stronger perceptions of severity when an incident violated these norms. The more 
consumers perceived an incident as severe the more likely they were to choose an active 
coping strategy and the less likely they were to choose a passive coping strategy. Whereas 
with incidents perceived low in severity consumers may decide to “let it pass”, when 
incidents violate the core of their relationship expectations, they are likely to take action.  
 
Tests of discriminant validity showed that relationalism is not the same as trust, satisfaction 
or recommendation behavior. Further model tests showed that when relationalism was 
included as a predictor, neither trust, nor satisfaction, nor recommendation behavior could 
predict the choice of response strategies. Whereas including them into the model did not alter 
the effect of relationalism on voice and neglect, it did “steal” variance from relationalism in 
predicting loyalty.  
 
4.8.2. Contributions of the Paper 
 
Although some research has turned to the topic of norms in consumer-brand relationships in 
recent years, several open questions have remained: first of all, little attention has been 
devoted to a conceptual discussion of what contract terms may govern consumer-brand 
relationships (Aaker et al. 2004). Instead most prior research has drawn upon norm concepts 
from the interpersonal domain without a thorough discussion of whether these norms do 
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apply to the consumer-brand domain (compare Aggarwal 2004; Aggarwal and Law 2005; 
Aggarwal and Zhang 2006). This article fills that gap by providing a critical discussion of the 
nature of consumer-brand relationships and the applicability of the norm concept in general. 
In our theoretical discussion, while acknowledging that certain limitations may exist we have 
provided arguments for the transferability of Macneil’s (1980) RET framework. Prior 
research has suffered from conceptual problems, applying communal relationship norms 
(giving without expecting something in return) without providing evidence whether 
communal relationships at all exist between consumers and their brands. In contrast we have 
drawn on norms developed in the context of Relationship Exchange Theory (Macneil 1980), 
thereby focusing on norms in commercial exchange relationships. 
 
Second, a major problem of recent research has been the lack of research of actual consumer-
brand relationships, which prompted Johar (2005, p. 26) to proclaim that it is still unclear 
whether there is in fact “a norm attached to brand behavior?” Prior research has mainly 
focused on hypothetical consumer-brand relationships in scenario-based studies.  Based on 
Relationship Exchange Theory we have developed scales for the norms of reciprocity, 
solidarity and flexibility that have been found in prior research to play an important 
governing role in business-to-business relationships. An empirical investigation of actual 
consumer-brand relationships provided evidence for the notion that norms can evolve in 
consumer-brand relationships. Further, prior research has suggested that norms should guide 
the differential evaluation of a transgression and reactions following such events (Aaker et al. 
2004). Our empirical investigation has found support for both assumptions: transgressions 
were perceived as more severe when relationships were high in relationalism. Second 
reaction intentions were influenced by the extent of relationalism above some of the central 
existing relationship marketing concepts. In a broader picture we thereby also strengthened 
the notion that consumers do form relationships with brands (Fournier 1998).  
 
Third, our results provided support for Macneil’s (1980) notion that most transactions are 
guided by relational norms. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
theoretically and empirically investigate the applicability of relational exchange norms as 
developed by Macneil (1978, 1980, 1981) and subsequent contributions in the field of 
marketing (e.g., Heide and John 1992; Jap and Ganesan 2000) to the consumer domain. 
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4.8.3. Managerial Implications 
 
From a managerial perspective the topic of norms is of special interest in order to understand 
when certain marketing tactics or strategies may potentially violate established brand-specific 
expectations and, in turn, make consumer behavior more predictable. According to RET, 
norms “increase the probability of one type of action occurring within the choice set 
available” (Ivens and Blois 2004, p. 241). In other words, depending on the specific 
constellation of relationship norms formed over time consumers expect specific brand 
behaviors and exclude others from their set of tolerable brand behaviors. Norms serve as 
reference points and determine how acceptable consumers find actual brand behaviors. The 
outcome of the comparison between observed and expected brand behavior has an impact on 
the consumer’s reactions. Although there is variance in consumers’ reactions to the same 
brand behavior, knowing that consumers feel that a specific relational norm has emerged in 
their relationship with a brand makes certain reactions more likely; even if norms “do not 
erase individual freedom of choice but contribute to the convergence of plans by increasing 
the probability of one type of action within the choice set available” (Gloria-Palermo 1999, p. 
145). Hence, norms influence the course of action consumers take in reaction to norm 
relevant brand behavior. This observation can be relevant for companies in several situations. 
A field where it is of paramount importance is complaint management. 
 
When a person experiences that his relationship partner has behaved in a manner inconsistent 
with a relational rule or norm, this partner’s behavior is considered a transgression (see e.g., 
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1995; Boon and Holmes 1999). Surprisingly few 
studies have been concerned with the question of how consumers react to brand 
transgressions: “Work focusing on mistakes that companies or brands inevitably make has 
been rare in relationship research” (Fournier and Brasel 2002, p. 102). From a relationship 
perspective, transgressions are of pivotal relevance because people derive inferences about 
their relationship partner especially from negative acts: “Negative behavior seems to provide 
the perceiver with a window into the dispositional qualities of the person” (Ybarra and 
Stephan 1999, p. 719). Such inferences may be crucial for a consumer’s willingness to 
continue a relationship and may thereby threaten a central goal of relationship marketing:  
building long-term relationships.  Understanding which norms are salient in consumer-brand 
relationships and which behaviors and marketing actions constitute a norm violation is 
therefore crucial for relationship management. It may allow structuring a company’s 
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complaint management system. First of all, it can build the starting point for a segmentation 
of consumers’ complaint behavior. By analyzing its customer base’s expectations in 
interactions with the brand, a company may structure the customer portfolio into groups of 
homogeneous complainers. Second, depending upon the complaint segment and customer 
norms companies may also develop strategies how to cope with customers who feel that a 
transgression has taken place. Finally, companies may use knowledge about norms governing 
consumer-brand relationships in order to train their employees. This is particularly relevant 
for brands in which customers interact with the brand through employees. 
 
A company would thus be more than well advised to be aware of the relational norms that 
govern their customer relationships. This knowledge should guide decisions in brand 
management. In addition, it could also be used to potentially alter prevalent norms so that 
harmful effects of certain necessary marketing actions can be buffered. The norm-like 
expectations a customer develops toward a brand are mainly formed through perceptions of 
signals the brand sends out. Hence, companies should analyze how precisely their 
communication impacts norm formation. By identifying signals that lead to the formation of 
norms the company can actively communicate in advance when it cannot conform to certain 
expectations – before transgressions hurt their customer relationships.  
 
4.8.4. Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
 
As one of the first attempts to apply Macneil’s (1980) RET framework to the consumer 
domain, this study provides first support for our general notion that certain RET norms can 
evolve over time in consumer relationships and guide consumers’ behavior especially in 
conflict situations. However several boundary conditions exist concerning the extent to which 
our results are generalizable to other brand relationship domains. In general, consumer 
relationships to their banks are characterized by a relatively high degree of interaction. In 
addition there usually is a high degree of interpersonal contact. Although we specifically 
asked participants about norms in the relationships with their banks and not their individual 
account representatives, we cannot exclude that interaction with individuals representing the 
brand may have played a role in forming expectations. It remains for future research to 
investigate whether the norms of reciprocity, solidarity and flexibility evolve in consumer 
relationships where no personal contact to brand representatives exists at all. Further 
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consumer relationships to their banks usually are characterized by a relatively consistent 
interaction (the average length of subjects’ relationship to their bank was 5.8 years in our 
sample). In consumer-brand relationships - as compared to the business-to-business context - 
discrete transactions may be more frequent with fewer real brand relationships evolving (see 
Fournier, Dobscha, and Mick 1998). Hence future research should determine whether norms 
operate in all types of consumer-brand relationships.  
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4.10. Appendix 
 
Table 4-5: Constructs and Measures  
Scale Items (Scale) Standard 
Loading 
M SD Item origins 
 Solidarity (7-point) .78*    
SOL1 When problems arise in the 
course of the relationship 
with my bank, the parties 
treat them as joint rather 
than individual 
responsibilities. 
.58 5.86 1.22 Heide and John 
(1992) 
SOL2 When I incur financial 
problems, I expect my bank 
to support me also beyond 
contractual obligations if 
necessary. 
.85 4.82 1.83 Lusch and Brown 
(1996) 
SOL3 When I incur problems, I 
expect that my bank will try 
to help.  
.80 5.21 1.72 Lusch and Brown 
(1996) 
 Flexibility (7-point) .91*    
FLEX1 My bank and I expect that 
agreements or contracts are 
renegotiable under certain 
circumstances.  
.89 4.90 1.50 Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992) 
FLEX2 My bank and I expect that 
we react flexibly if one of us 
needs to make changes to 
agreements or contracts.  
.88 4.90 1.51 Heide and John 
(1992) 
FLEX3 My bank and I expect to be 
able to make adjustments in 
the ongoing relationship to 
cope with changing 
circumstances. 
.85 5.13 1.36 Heide and John 
(1992) 
FLEX4 When some unexpected 
situation arises, my bank and 
I would rather work out a 
new deal than hold each 
other to the original terms. 
.79 5.01 1.33 Heide and John 
(1992) 
 Reciprocity (7-point) .87*    
REC1 My bank and I expect, that 
none of us solely looks for 
his own individual benefit in 
this relationship.  
.86 4.45 1.73 Ganesan (1994) 
Note: * Construct Reliability; all loadings are significant at p < .01  
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Table 4-5: Constructs and Measures (continued) 
Scale Items (Scale) Standard 
Loading 
M SD Item origins 
REC2 In the long run we expect 
that mutual concessions will 
even out in this relationship. 
.84 4.62 1.55 Ganesan (1994) 
REC3 My bank and I expect that 
mutual concessions are 
characteristic for this 
relationship. 
.76 4.79 1.41  
REC4 My bank and I expect that 
our relationship is governed 
by the principle of fairness.  
.71 4.95 1.54  
 Trust (5-point) .81*   Paulssen 
(forthcoming) 
 I can completely rely on my 
bank. 
.85 3.44 0.85  
 I am convinced that my bank 
will treat me fairly in the 
future. 
.80 3.55 0.80  
 My bank keeps all the 
promises that it makes. 
.68 3.49 0.89  
 Satisfaction (5-point) .85*   Gremler and 
Gwinner (2000) 
 How satisfied are you 
overall with the services 
provided by this bank? 
.72 4.00 1.01  
 Overall, I am satisfied with 
the decision to use this bank. 
.92 4.16 0.94  
 I think I did the right thing 
when I decided to use this 
bank. 
.82 4.28 0.83  
 Recommendation (5-point) .87*   Maxham and 
Netemeyer (2002) 
 How likely are you to spread 
positive word of mouth 
about your bank? 
.89 3.28 1.13  
 If one of my friends was 
looking for a bank I would 
advise him to go to mine. 
.89 3.52 1.05  
Note: * Construct Reliability; all loadings are significant at p < .01 
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Table 4-5: Constructs and Measures (continued) 
Scale Items (Scale) Standard 
Loading 
M SD Item origins 
 I have already recommended 
my bank to a friend or 
colleague. 
.76 2.81 1.39  
 Severity Scenario 1  
(7-point) 
.91*   Maxham and 
Netemeyer (2002) 
 In my opinion the banking 
problem that I experienced 
was a minor problem – 
major problem. 
.95 5.61 1.46  
 In my opinion the banking 
problem that I experienced 
was a small inconvenience – 
big inconvenience. 
.95 5.40 1.49  
 In my opinion the banking 
problem that I experienced 
was a minor aggravation – 
major aggravation. 
.76 5.53 1.65  
 Severity Scenario 2  
(7-point) 
.90*   Maxham and 
Netemeyer (2002) 
 In my opinion the banking 
problem that I experienced 
was a minor problem – 
major problem. 
.91 4.53 1.89  
 In my opinion the banking 
problem that I experienced 
was a small inconvenience – 
big inconvenience. 
.91 4.15 1.80  
 In my opinion the banking 
problem that I experienced 
was a minor aggravation – 
major aggravation.  
.77 4.92 1.87  
Note: * Construct Reliability; all loadings are significant at p < .01  
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5. Article 4: When Bad News Really Hurts – the Differential 
Effect of Message Elaboration in the Light of its Source 
 
 
 Together with Gita V. Johar and Jaideep Sengupta 
 
 
To be submitted to Journal of Consumer Research 
 
 
5.1. Abstract 
 
When does bad news weaken consumers’ brand attitudes? Consumers are frequently 
confronted with negative brand information (e.g., in the form of product reviews or consumer 
reports) without a clear understanding of how credible the information actually is. In our 
research, we investigate the effect of source credibility and time the source is known on the 
impact of negative brand information on consumers’ attitude strength. In two studies we find 
that message elaboration is heightened when participants receive information about the 
source of the negative information after the message – but only when the source is clearly 
credible or non-credible, not when it is ambiguous. The effect on attitude strength is twofold: 
when credible source information follows the negative message, a weakening effect to the 
attitude results from the heightened elaboration. When non-credible source information 
however follows the message, the heightened elaboration results in a strengthening effect to 
the attitude. We propose that the quality of elaboration essentially differs depending on 
whether the negative message is elaborated on in the light of a credible or non-credible 
source.   
 
5.2. Introduction 
 
Negative brand information is increasingly common for consumers. This is especially true 
now with the Internet and the rise of Internet blogs allowing average consumers to spread the 
word about their negative experience with brands. Jeff Jarvis caused a ruckus in 2005 when 
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he detailed his quest to fix a Dell PC, leading to an outburst in negative customer advocacy, 
“the computer makers reputation could scarcely be lower…the internet is littered with 
websites detailing customers’ frustrations of wading through ‘Dell Hell’“(Daily Telegraph, 
2/20/07). Negative brand information on the web however is not an isolated phenomenon of 
tech brands. ACNielsen (2005) found, that of the top 50 UK grocery brands, almost 40% of 
the first ten Google-search results contained negative brand information ranging from 
government official sites to individuals’ blogs, whose credibility often remained unclear or 
become clear only after reading the information. In a recent prominent example the CEO of 
Whole Foods, posted over a thousand blog entries containing critical reviews of competitor 
Wild Oats under a pseudonym. The source of these reviews came to light well after 
consumers had read the original postings (USAToday 7/12/07).  
 
A key question concerns the impact of such negative information on attitudes and attitude 
strength. Attitude strength concerns “the extent to which attitudes manifest the qualities of 
durability and impactfulness” (Krosnick & Petty, 1995, p. 3). In this paper we propose that 
negative information can have either a strengthening or a weakening effect on brand attitudes 
depending on two critical factors: a) the credibility of the source providing the negative 
information, and b) whether the recipient is made aware of the source credibility before or 
after processing the negative information. Specifically we propose that the nature of 
elaboration that is prompted by the source information differs depending on whether the 
message is elaborated on in the light of a credible or non-credible source.  
 
We will argue that when consumers are made aware of high source credibility after they have 
read a negative product message, this will alert them to the relevance of the message and 
prompt further elaboration of the message. Likewise they should be alerted when they learn 
after having read the message that it came from a non-credible source, which should also 
prompt further elaboration. We will further argue and show, that the effect of the heightened 
elaboration on attitude strength should differ fundamentally depending on the source that 
prompted it: when elaboration is prompted by a credible source, it should be aimed at 
maintaining the negative information and hence weaken a prior positive attitude. When 
elaboration is prompted by a non-credible source however, elaboration should be aimed at 
overcoming the potential biasing effect of the message and the initial attitude should be 
strengthened.  
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5.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
An entire research stream has been concerned with the question of what makes persuasive 
attempts – be it in the form of pro- or counter-attitudinal messages – effective. A key role in 
the effectiveness of a persuasion attempt is the amount of careful elaboration on the message. 
Attitudes that are the result of scrutiny on the message’s arguments are stronger than attitudes 
that are based on less effortful thought on the message (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, 
Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995; Petty, Priester, & Wegener, 1994, for reviews). They not only 
have been found to persist longer than attitudes based on less thoughtful processes (e.g., 
Chaiken, 1980; Elms, 1966; Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; Verplanken, 1991), but also to be 
more resistant to counter-attitudinal persuasion attempts (e.g., Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; 
Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994) and – of specific relevance for marketers- more predictive of 
behavior (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriquez, 1986; Kallgren & Wood, 1986; Leippe & 
Elkin, 1987; Verplanken, 1991).  
 
Elaboration on a persuasive message can differ systematically:  current theories of attitudes 
and persuasion such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 
1986) and the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) hold 
that attitude change can be the result of two qualitatively different processes. According to 
these models, attitude change can be the result of careful and effortful elaboration of a 
message or less cognitively effortful inferences and associative processes. Because 
individuals generally seek to hold accurate attitudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), scrutiny of the 
message will be higher when the source cannot be used as a cue from which to infer its 
accuracy: receiving a cue that validates a message before the message itself may satisfy 
recipients and prevent or reduce further scrutiny of the message arguments.  
 
In two experiments Priester and Petty (1995) could show that participants who are low in 
need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; i.e., people who do not enjoy careful 
thinking and are especially miserly in their expenditure of cognitive resources) elaborated 
less on a message when they knew before that it was from a trustworthy source, than when 
they knew that it was from an untrustworthy source. Apparently the fact that participants 
knew about the high trustworthiness was sufficient for them to accept the message and 
prevented careful argument scrutiny. They further found that argument quality (i.e., whether 
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arguments of the message were strong or weak) did not have an effect on attitudes when the 
message came from a trustworthy source; a further indication that participants did not 
elaborate on the arguments from a trustworthy source. However, when the message was from 
an untrustworthy source, participants did elaborate carefully on the message and hence 
messages containing strong arguments influenced participants more than messages containing 
weak arguments. Priester and Petty (2003) could replicate these findings and show that the 
higher elaboration led to stronger – more accessible – attitudes.  
 
According to the dual process models (ELM and HSM) source credibility can prevent careful 
elaboration of a message when given before the message itself. In line with these models 
research has mostly focused on the role of source credibility when presented before the 
message. In this article we argue and show that source credibility can also affect elaboration 
when presented after the message.  
 
5.3.1. Source Credibility and Message Diagnosticity 
 
Source credibility has been conceptualized as a message source’s perceived expertise and 
trustworthiness (e.g., Kelman & Hovland, 1953). Source credibility hence can reveal 
something about the diagnosticity of the message. Diagnosticity differentiates the message as 
being relevant from other less relevant information, “the diagnosticity of an input is largely 
driven by the ability of that input to discriminate the best alternative from the rest” (Alba, 
Hutchinson, & Lynch, 1991, p. 29) and is conceptually related to Hampton’s (1987) concept 
of importance, or Rosch’s (1974) cue validity. Especially in the marketing domain, where 
consumers are often confronted with a plethora of brand information of often dubious 
credibility (e.g., in advertisement claims), high source credibility should lend high 
diagnosticity to the message, meaning that in contrast to other messages (of unknown 
credibility) this message is relevant for attitude formation. Argument quality can also serve as 
a source for diagnosticity of the message when source information is unavailable. However, 
argument quality of typical brand messages (e.g., advertisements) is often low: “Even a 
cursory review of advertising reveals that many of the stimuli within an add are devoid of any 
information about the product itself” (Miniard, Sirdeshmukh, & Innis, 1992, p. 226).  
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As was outlined, being made aware of the high source credibility of a message before the 
message can lead participants to simply accept the message as being relevant without 
carefully elaborating on it (Priester & Petty, 1995, 2003). However, what happens when 
participants are made aware of the source after they have read a message? Receiving relevant 
source information after the message carries an element of surprise because it disconfirms 
expectations. According to Grice’s (1975) maxim of manner, recipients expect information to 
be presented in a manner that is as clear and as orderly as it can be, avoiding any ambiguity 
or obscurity. Grice developed a theory of conversational implicature, according to which 
conversations are guided by a set of four central tacit expectations people carry. These are 
quantity, quality, relation and manner. When recipients are presented with a cue that contains 
information about the message’s high credibility after presenting the message, this should 
violate the maxim of manner. It should make participants engage in questions like: “Why am 
I being told this now? Obviously, this has relevance to the message I just read.” 
 
It has been found in several studies that violating expectations prompts careful elaboration. 
Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) found that when message quality differed from participants’ 
expectations, the message was processed more carefully. Likewise Baker and Petty (1994) 
showed that participants expect the majority to agree with their position and the minority to 
disagree. A violation of this expectation led to higher message scrutiny. Smith and Petty 
(1995) found that people who expected a negatively framed message and received a 
positively framed (or vice versa) engaged in more careful processing of that message. The 
effect of disconfirmation of expectations on elaboration has also been shown in research on 
causal attribution (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Wong & Weiner, 1981) and on 
impression formation (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hastie, 1984; Srull & Wyer, 1989) 
showing that perceivers engaged in increased effortful processing after their expectations 
were disconfirmed (see Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996; Stangor & McMillan, 1992, for 
reviews). Similarly, Miller and Kahn (2005) found that violating consumers’ conversational 
expectations by giving them ambiguous color names led to higher elaboration.  
Hence, opposed to previous studies, which found that presenting high source credibility 
before the message could prevent message elaboration, we propose that presenting credible 
source information after the message can actually increase elaboration. In contrast, unclear 
source credibility information should not prompt further elaboration because it does not 
reveal any further relevant information about the diagnosticity of the message. 
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Similar to learning that the source is very credible after the message is presented, learning 
that the source is very non-credible after the message should also violate expectations and 
result in heightened elaboration. Grice (1975) formulates this in his maxim of quality. The 
maxim of quality states that recipients expect the information not to be false or stating 
something for which adequate evidence is lacking. When consumers receive a brand message 
and are told afterwards that it was from a non-credible source they should engage in thoughts 
like, “Why am I being told this now? If the message was not credible, why was I given it in 
the first place?” Elaboration prompted by non-credible source information should be aimed at 
removing the potential bias from the invalid brand message. Hence, although elaboration 
should be heightened in both cases, quality of elaboration should differ. This will be outlined 
in the following.  
 
5.3.2. Differential Effects of Elaboration on Attitude Strength 
 
Consumers usually carry positive attitudes towards their brands. Hence when negative brand 
information is encountered, the new information is inconsistent with consumers’ prior 
attitude.  Different predictions prevail in the literature concerning the effect of elaboration on 
attitude inconsistent information. Traditionally it has been argued that greater elaboration 
should lead to stronger attitudes (Petty et al., 1995). We propose that the effect of elaboration 
on attitude strength should differ depending on the credibility of the source. Specifically we 
argue that elaboration on attitude inconsistent information from a non-credible source has 
refutational character – aimed at overcoming the persuasive attempt and refuting possible 
structural inconsistencies of the attitude. This refutational elaboration should result in a 
strengthening of the attitude. Conversely, elaboration on inconsistent information from a 
credible source should have the opposite effect: increased elaboration should lead to the 
maintenance of the structural inconsistencies, resulting in a weakening of the attitude.  
 
Strengthening Effect of Elaboration: 
Based on the premise that people are spontaneously motivated to arrive at an integrated 
evaluation (Hastie, 1980; McGuire, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989) careful consideration of 
positive and negative aspects in relation to each other may create an integrated judgment 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989). By drawing on the heuristic-systematic 
model, Jonas, Diehl, and Brömer (1997) showed that inconsistent brand information 
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decreased participants’ confidence in their attitude prompting systematic processing of the 
relevant information. This systematic processing in turn increased structural consistency 
between attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
 
Refutational Elaboration: 
When encountering a persuasive attempt from a non-credible source, elaboration should be 
aimed at removing the potential bias. Research on correction processes supports this view. 
Past research has shown that when individuals become aware of a persuasion attempt, they 
may attempt to correct for the influence by adjusting their attitude in the opposite direction of 
the persuasion attempt (Wegener & Petty, 1995). Correction processes like these are based on 
implicit theories people hold about their own cognitive processes (Jost, Krugklanski, & 
Nelson, 1998). For example, when people believe that a contextual factor such as source 
trustworthiness influences them unfavorably, correction instructions cause them to adjust 
their judgments away from that influence, but when they believe that the context influences 
them negatively, the instructions cause them to adjust their judgments toward the context 
(Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998).  
 
Specifically research has revealed recipients’ active counter-arguing as a key mechanism 
through which recipients resist persuasion (e.g., Brock, 1967; Killeya & Johnson, 1998; 
Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981).  Tormala and Petty (2002) found that not only did counter-
arguing lead recipients to resist the persuasion attempts but it actually made them more 
certain of their original attacked attitudes. They proposed a meta-cognitive framework, 
arguing that people perceive their own resistance, reflect on it and in turn form attribution-
like inferences about their own attitudes. In a series of experiments participants were 
presented with counter-attitudinal messages and instructed to counter-argue. When they 
successfully counter-agued, their initial attitudes became more certain than they had been on 
the outset. Specifically, when participants believed persuasive messages to contain strong 
arguments, resisting strengthened the attitude, not so however when messages were perceived 
as weak. Hence, only when participants believed that they had overcome a strong persuasive 
attempt, they reasoned, that their initial attitude must have been very valid otherwise it would 
not have resisted their attack. Such an attribution-like inference however is only justified 
when a strong, not when a weak attack is overcome.  
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Based on these findings we argue that when elaboration is prompted by non-credible source 
information elaboration on the message should be in the light of this new information. People 
should engage in meta-cognitive thinking, wondering whether the message from a non-
credible source potentially did influence their attitude. Similar to when participants are being 
made aware of a persuasive attempt, elaboration should resemble the counter-arguing in 
Tormala and Petty’s (2002, 2004) work in that it is aimed at refuting the message’s impact on 
the attitude. As a result this refutational elaboration should lead to a rejection of the 
message’s inconsistent negative information and similar to Tormala and Petty’s findings 
result in stronger attitudes, and in line with Wegener & Petty’s (1995) findings also in more 
positive attitudes.   
 
Weakening Effect of Elaboration: 
In a different perspective, research on the structure-strength relationship has argued that an 
attitude based on inconsistent elements should be weaker than an attitude based on mutually 
consistent elements. The existence of separate conflicting dimensions increases the likelihood 
that attitude and behavior are based on discrepant elements lowering the correspondence 
between them (Lavine et al., 1998). Structural inconsistencies that exist and are not 
reconciliated have been shown to lower attitude stability (Rosenberg, 1968) and the attitude-
behavior link (Norman, 1975). In addition response competition between conflicting 
evaluations should reduce attitude accessibility (Bargh et al., 1992; Bassili, 1998). In recent 
research Sengupta and Johar (2002) found that elaboration on inconsistent information 
decreases attitude strength when conditions are unfavorable for reconciliation. Under most 
conditions individuals should be motivated to arrive at an integrated evaluation by 
reconciliating inconsistent information (Hastie, 1980; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & 
Wyer, 1989). However under certain circumstances (e.g., individuals’ motivation to minimize 
regret) individuals may be motivated to maintain evaluative inconsistencies. Under these 
conditions, Sengupta and Johar found that elaboration of inconsistent information actually led 
to weaker as opposed to stronger attitudes.  
 
Maintenance Elaboration: 
It was proposed above that receiving high source credibility information after the message 
should lend further diagnosticity to the message. This in turn should prompt additional 
elaboration on the message. In the light of the newly acquired information that the message 
was of importance for attitude formation it should be weighted more heavily.  Receiving the 
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source info after the message was already scrutinized should also alert the recipient to the 
question whether he took the message into account sufficiently. In contrast to when 
elaboration is in the light of a non-credible source with a refutation aim, when elaboration is 
prompted by a credible source it should be aimed at making sure the information was indeed 
taken into account. Hence we propose that elaboration prompted by a highly credible source 
should lead to the maintenance of structural inconsistencies and in line with theories on the 
structure-strength relationship lead to weaker attitudes.  
 
Summarizing, we assume that when the source of the inconsistent message is credible, and 
people learn of this source after the message, this should prompt elaboration, which in turn 
should weaken the attitude. We test this proposition in experiment 1. In contrast, when the 
elaboration is prompted by a non-credible source we expect the elaboration to strengthen the 
attitude. We will test that assumption in experiment 2.  
 
5.4. Experiment 1: Weakening Effect of Elaboration on Attitude Strength 
 
This experiment is concerned with the effect of credible vs. ambiguous source credibility and 
the time consumers learn about the source on elaboration and the effect of the resulting 
elaboration on attitude accessibility. Attitudes can be seen as associations between objects 
and evaluations (Fazio, et al., 1982). The strength of the object-evaluation association can 
vary. This associative strength is the major determinant of attitude accessibility, the 
likelihood that the attitude will be activated from memory when the individual encounters the 
attitude object. Central measure for attitude accessibility is the latency with which individuals 
respond to an inquiry about their attitudes. The reasoning for this is, that the more accessible 
an associated evaluation is from memory, the less cognitive work an individual would have to 
do to respond to an attitudinal inquiry and the more automatic such a process would be 
(Fazio, 1995). The link between associative strength and automatic activation has been 
shown in several studies (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; Sanbonmatsu, Osborne, & Fazio, 1986) and 
has been shown to be of high reliability in meta-analytic studies (Fazio, 1993). Several 
studies have validated response time latency as a valid predictor of other facets of attitude 
strength: Houston and Fazio (1989) found that more accessible attitudes are more stable over 
time than less accessible ones. Similarly Bassili and Fletcher (1991) found that more 
accessible attitudes are more resistant to counter-arguments. Concerning the attitude behavior 
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link it has been found that enhancing the strength of the attitude accessibility led to an 
increase in attitude-behavior consistency (Fazio et al., 1982), and that voters’ attitudes were 
far more predictive of actual voting behavior when they were highly accessible. Similarly in a 
consumer context, Fazio, Powell, and Williams (1989) found that the more accessible 
subjects’ attitudes were towards consumer products, the more predictive they were of their 
actual product selection. Comparing, response time latencies, an implicit measure of attitude 
strength, with respondents’ self expressed confidence in their attitudes, an explicit measure of 
attitude strength, Bassili (1993) found response time latencies to be a better predictor of 
actual voting behavior than voters’ expressed attitudinal confidence.  
 
Experiment 1 was designed for two purposes: first to investigate whether giving credible 
source information but not ambiguous source information after the message would prompt 
additional elaboration on the message. Second, to test whether the elaboration on the 
additional negative information would weaken the overall attitude. As argued above, when 
consumers receive negative brand information that is inconsistent with prior positive 
information, this may lead to attitudinal conflict and result in ambivalence. Attitude 
ambivalence involves a response competition between the positive and the negative 
components of the attitude, which has been shown to lead to higher response times (Bargh et 
al., 1992). Hence we assume that the extended elaboration on the negative information from a 
credible source should lead to a response time competition and hence extended response time 
latencies. 
 
5.4.1. Design and Procedure of Study 1 
 
Eighty students at Columbia University participated in the 2 x 2 experiment manipulating 
source credibility (high vs. ambiguous) and time the source information was given (before vs. 
after negative brand information). Participants were informed that the experimenters were 
interested in evaluations of a new DVD-player, the VX-5000. All participants were initially 
presented with attribute information allegedly from an independent consumer research 
agency about the VX-5000 and two competitors’ brands, aimed at eliciting an initial positive 
brand attitude towards the VX-5000. After reading the initial information, participants were 
given additional information about the VX-5000 that reportedly came from a Google-search 
on the brand. Both, the initial positive as well as the additional negative information 
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contained eight pieces of information. Whereas the initial information focused on picture 
quality attributes, the additional information focused on the durability and workmanship of 
the DVD-player. By focusing on different attributes we aimed to avoid that initial and 
additional information would contradict each other. Participants were either presented with a 
description of the website that contained the product evaluation or with the product 
evaluation itself at first. Participants who first read the description of the website were given 
the product evaluation after reading the information about the source and vice versa. The 
product evaluation information was the same in all four conditions. Participants were either 
told that the source was the official website of the Consumer Union, describing it in a way 
aimed at eliciting highly credible evaluations of the site or that the source was a website 
where consumers freely publish their own evaluations. This site was described in a way 
aimed at eliciting ambiguous evaluations of source credibility: Participants were told that this 
site had been criticized in the past for publishing reports of dubious credibility, and that it 
was not always clear whether the published statements were consumers’ honest opinions.  
 
This was followed by a reaction time procedure, aimed at measuring participants’ attitude 
accessibility. We thereby followed a procedure and instructions recommended by Fazio 
(1990). We specifically instructed participants to react as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. We instructed them to press the “agree” button when they agreed or even mildly 
agreed with the statement concerning the VX-5000 and to press the “disagree” button when 
they disagreed or even mildly disagreed with the statement. Participants were first confronted 
with a practice trial, and were then given two attitudinal statements concerning the VX-5000.  
This was followed by three seven-point attitude scales (α= .96). Subsequently participants 
were asked to list their thoughts concerning the negative information about the VX-5000 and 
afterwards asked to rate the amount they elaborated on the additional negative information on 
two seven-point scales (α= .84). As a manipulation check of the credibility manipulation 
subjects were then asked on two seven-point scales how credible they found the source (α= 
.90).  
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5.4.2. Results of Study 1 
 
Table 5-1: Weakening Effect of Elaboration on Negative Brand Information 
 High Source credibility Ambiguous source credibility 
 Before After Before After 
Credibility  5.20 (1.30) 5.73 (1.11) 3.34 (1.01) 3.67 (1.29) 
Subjective 
Elaboration 4.86 (1.12) 5.60 (0.79) 4.53 (0.98) 4.16 (1.61) 
Objective 
Elaboration 1.29 (1.38) 2.25 (1.41) 1.10 (1.12) 1.00 (1.11) 
Attitude 4.59 (0.89) 4.05 (1.48) 4.92 (0.77) 5.02 (1.07) 
Accessibility 
(msec) 1151.38 (542.35) 1677.76 (946.71) 1317.10 (680.77) 1110.89 (357.60) 
Note. – Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
Analyses were conducted in the context of a 2 x 2 ANOVA (source credibility: high vs. 
ambiguous; time source is known: before vs. after negative information), unless otherwise 
mentioned.  
 
Manipulation Check Credibility. Analyses suggested that the manipulation of the source 
credibility worked as intended. Participants in the conditions with the information coming 
from a highly credible source considered the source to be fairly credible (M=5.46), whereas 
participants in the conditions where source was meant to induce an ambiguous impression 
concerning credibility on average rated the credibility to be unclear (M=3.50). A main effect 
of credibility (F(1,73) = 52.49, p< .01) could be found. 
 
Amount of Elaboration.  We expected that receiving the source after the negative information 
would lead to higher amounts of elaboration on the negative information when the source is 
credible but not when source is ambiguously credible. Analyses on subjects’ subjective sense 
of their elaboration on the negative information revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1,76) 
= 11.76, p < .01) and an interaction effect (F(1,76) = 4.60, p < .05). Further, a t-test revealed 
a significant difference in subjective elaboration between condition 1 (high source credibility; 
before) and 2 (high source credibility; after; t(1,39) = -2.45, p < .05). The total number of 
thoughts listed by the participants on the additional negative information further provided an 
indication of the extent to which the negative information on the VX-5000 was elaborated on 
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(see Sengupta & Johar, 2002). Analyses revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1,76) = 6.42, 
p < .01) as well as an interaction effect (F(1,76) = 3.53, p < .10). Further, a t-test revealed a 
significant difference between condition 1 and 2 (t(1,39) = -2.21, p < .05).  
 
Attitude. No assumptions were made about the effect of increased elaboration on negative 
information from a credible source on the attitude itself. ANOVA results only revealed a 
main effect of credibility (F(1,76) = 7.10, p < .01).  
 
Attitude Accessibility. We expected that the extended elaboration on the additional negative 
information on the VX-5000 should lead to a response competition and hence extended 
response time latencies. Response time latencies were analyzed in a manner recommended by 
Fazio (1990). Data was screened for outliers; in addition, in order to deal with the problem of 
individually different baseline response times we used the mean latencies from the practice 
trials as covariates, as is commonly employed (see Smith & Lerner, 1986; Fazio, 1990). 
Mean latencies across two attitude statements served as dependent variables in an ANCOVA. 
Analysis revealed a significant interaction effect (F(1,74) = 5.56 , p < .05). Further contrasts 
between condition 1 and 2 revealed significant differences (F(1,37) = 4.19, p < .05).  
 
5.4.3. Discussion of Study 1 
  
According to ELM and HSM, giving credible source information prior to the message can 
potentially prevent careful argument scrutiny for participants low in NFC (Priester & Petty, 
1995). Our results do not show such a difference in elaboration when source is presented 
before the message: participants who received the credible source information before the 
message did not elaborate less on the message than those receiving ambiguous source 
information before the message. This may be due to the fact that we did not differentiate 
between people who are high and low in NFC.  
 
However in line with our prediction, we found that elaboration was elevated when credible 
source information followed the message as compared to when it preceded it, not however 
when ambiguous source information followed the message. Neither ELM nor HSM can 
explain these differences. According to them, amount of elaboration should have been the 
same independent of whether the source information after the message was credible or 
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ambiguous. Our results hence suggest that the credible source prompted further elaboration 
on the message, but not the ambiguous source. Presenting credible source information after 
the message seems to have served as a marker, to recall the just processed information and 
make sure it was firmly understood.  
 
Further, as hypothesized, the heightened elaboration on the inconsistent negative brand 
information led to a weakening of the attitude as measured by response latencies. Participants 
receiving the credible source information after the message showed the longest response 
latencies. In line with past research on the effect of structural inconsistencies on attitude 
strength, inconsistent brand information apparently led to higher attitudinal conflict. As 
proposed elaborating on negative brand information in the light of a highly credible source 
apparently maintained the structural inconsistencies in the attitude.  
 
5.5. Experiment 2: Strengthening Effect of Elaboration on Attitude 
Strength  
  
Experiment 2 was conducted for three purposes: first, to replicate the weakening effect of 
increased elaboration on credible inconsistent information on attitudes; second, to investigate 
whether elaboration similarly increases when consumers learn about a non-credible source 
after receiving the message as opposed to before; third, to examine the effect of elaboration 
on a message from a non-credible source on attitude strength. Different from elaboration that 
is prompted by a credible source we argue that elaboration prompted by a non-credible source 
should differ qualitatively, aimed at refuting structural inconsistencies and hence lead to 
stronger attitudes and in line with Wegener and Petty’s (1995) research on bias correction to 
more positive attitudes.  
 
5.5.1. Design and Procedure of Study 2 
 
Sixty-eight students at Columbia University participated in the 2 x 2 experiment 
manipulating source credibility (high vs. low) and time of source information (before vs. after 
negative information). The procedure was similar to that of study 1 with the difference that in 
contrast to study 1, the low source credibility information was aimed at eliciting highly non-
credible evaluations. Specifically, participants in the low source credibility conditions were 
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told that the information was from a competitor’s website that allegedly has a history of 
competing very aggressively and has already gotten into several litigations for publishing 
tests of dubious validity.  
 
As in study 1 participants were either given the negative information first and the source 
information later or vice versa. After that a reaction time procedure was used, aimed at 
measuring participants’ attitude accessibility (the same procedure as in study 1 was used, 
based on instructions by Fazio, 1990). Participants were asked to answer as quickly and 
accurately as possible by clicking either a key on the keyboard that was assigned to the 
answer “agree” or a key that was assigned to the answer “disagree”. After a practice trial they 
were asked to agree or disagree as fast as possible with two attitudinal statements concerning 
the VX-5000. This was followed by three attitude questions (α= .95). Subsequently 
participants were asked to list their thoughts concerning the negative information about the 
VX-5000. Following that, participants were asked to rate the amount they elaborated on the 
additional negative information on two seven-point scales (α= .82). As a manipulation check 
of the credibility manipulation, subjects were then asked on two seven-point scales how 
credible they found the source (α=  .97). 
 
5.5.2. Results of Study 2 
 
Table 5-2: Weakening and Strengthening Effect of Elaboration on Negative Brand 
Information 
 High Source credibility Low source credibility 
 Before After Before After 
Credibility  5.22 (1.50) 5.63 (0.97) 2.53 (1.23) 2.53 (1.17) 
Subjective 
Elaboration 4.94 (0.96) 5.78 (1.15) 3.18 (1.33) 4.47 (1.03) 
Objective 
Elaboration 1.38 (0.96) 2.33 (1.33) 0.79 (0.92) 1.47 (1.25)  
Attitude 4.44 (1.23) 4.41 (1.55) 4.88 (1.92) 5.67 (0.94) 
Accessibility 
(msec) 1787.91 (665.16) 2123.44 (854.55) 1847.63 (913.33) 1348. (366.65)  
Note. – Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
Analyses were conducted in the context of a 2 x 2 ANOVA (source credibility: high vs. low; 
time source is known: before vs. after negative information), unless otherwise mentioned.  
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Manipulation Check Credibility. Analyses suggested that the manipulation of the source 
credibility worked as intended. Participants in the conditions with the information coming 
from a highly credible source considered the source to be fairly credible (M = 5.42), whereas 
participants in the conditions with the information coming from a low credible source 
considered the source to be rather non-credible (M = 2.53). A main effect of credibility 
(F(1,59) = 85.95, p < .01) could be found.  
 
Amount of Elaboration.  We expected that elaboration should be higher when either high or 
low source credibility is given after the negative information than when it is given before the 
information. Analyses on subjects’ subjective sense of elaboration on the negative 
information revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1,64) = 30.55 , p < .01) and time of 
information (F(1,64) = 14.66, p < .01), further, t-tests revealed significant differences 
between condition 1(high source credibility; before) and 2 (high source credibility; after; 
t(32) = -2.29, p<.05) as well as between condition 3 (low source credibility; before) and 4 
(low source credibility; after; t(32)=-3.09, p<.01). As in study 1, the total number of thoughts 
listed by the participants on the additional negative information further served as an indicator 
of the extent to which the negative information on the VX-5000 was elaborated on (see 
Sengupta & Johar, 2002). Analyses revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1,64) = 7.05, p < 
.01) and time of information (F(1, 64) = 8.94 , p < .01). T-Tests between condition 1 and 2 
showed significant differences (t(32) = -2.39, p<.05) as well as between condition 3 and 4 
(t(32) = -1.83, p<.10).  
 
Attitude. Analysis revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1,64) = 7.66, p < .01). Based on the 
findings on bias correction (Wegener & Petty, 1995) we expected that participants who, after 
having read the negative information about the VX-5000, learn about the non-credible source 
of the information should re-adjust their attitude towards a more positive attitude. A t-Test 
between condition 3 and condition 4 revealed that participants in condition 4 in fact did have 
the highest attitudes (t(32) = -2.09, p<.05). 
 
Attitude Accessibility. Analysis of reaction time latencies were conducted in the manner 
described in experiment 1 with mean latencies from the practice trials serving as covariates 
and mean latencies of two attitude measures serving as dependent variables in an ANCOVA. 
Analysis revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1,62) = 2.87 , p < .01) and an interaction 
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effect (F(1,62) = 5.99 , p < .05). As in study 1 we expected that the extended elaboration on 
credible negative information should lead to a weakening effect of the attitude and hence to 
the highest latencies in condition 2. Contrasts between condition 1 and 2 slightly missed 
significance. However, contrasts between condition 2 and condition 1, 3, 4 revealed that 
participants in condition 2 did have the highest reaction times over all conditions (F(1,64) = 
4.88, p< .05). We further expected that the extended elaboration on the information from a 
non-credible source should lead to a strengthening effect and hence to the lowest latencies. 
Contrasts between condition 3 and 4 were significant (F(1,30) = 4.17, p< .05). Likewise 
contrasts between condition 4 and condition 1, 2, 3 revealed that participants in condition 4 
had the lowest reaction times over all conditions (F(1,64) = 6.09, p< .05).  
 
5.5.3. Discussion of Study 2 
 
We were able to replicate our main findings from study 1 in study 2: presenting participants 
with a credible source after the message increased elaboration. The increased elaboration in 
turn apparently led to the maintenance of structural inconsistencies of the attitude, resulting in 
weaker attitudes as found in the highest response latencies. In addition, as assumed, also 
presenting non-credible source information after the message led to higher elaboration 
compared to when it was presented before the message. Neither ELM nor HSM would have 
predicted such a difference. Similar to receiving credible source information after the 
message, receiving non-credible source information after the message prompted further 
elaboration.  
 
As predicted, the effect of elaboration that was prompted by the non-credible source 
information differed from the effect of elaboration prompted by credible source information. 
In line with Wegener and Petty’s (1995) findings, the extended elaboration resulted in more 
positive attitudes. Apparently being made aware of the non-credible source after the message 
alerted participants of the potential biasing effect of the message. As a result, they apparently 
tried to correct for the false negative message, which resulted in a more positive attitude. In 
addition to the effect on the attitude we could further show an effect on attitude strength. 
Similar to Tormala and Petty’s (2002, 2004) finding that actively counter-arguing a message 
strengthens the original attitude, being made aware of the potential biasing effect of a non-
credible message similarly strengthened the initial attitude.  
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Although elaboration is heightened when non-credible source information follows the 
message, as opposed to when it precedes it, our results also show that elaboration is lower 
when receiving non-credible source information as opposed to credible source information 
before the message. This finding is not in line with prior findings in the tradition of the dual 
process models which found that information from untrustworthy sources actually tends to be 
elaborated on more than from trustworthy sources (e.g., Priester & Petty, 1995).  
 
5.6. General Discussion 
 
When consumers incur negative brand information, how does it affect their attitudes and the 
strength of their attitudes? In the current study we investigated the effect of source position 
relative to the message and the source credibility on elaboration and resulting attitude 
strength. Two major findings emerged. The first concerns the role of the source in prompting 
further message elaboration, meaning the source’s role in influencing the quantity of 
elaboration. The second concerns the differential effect of elaboration on attitude strength. 
Concerning the relative role of source position, current research holds that source information 
can prevent elaboration when presented before the message because it leads recipients to 
accept the message without elaborating carefully on the quality of the arguments. In this 
article we proposed and showed that when consumers received credible or non-credible 
source information after the message, the source information prompted further elaboration on 
the message. Hence we extended current research on the role of cue position by showing that 
a) a cue can affect elaboration also when given after the message as opposed to before, and b) 
only when that cue is relevant (i.e. credible or non-credible source information) elaboration is 
prompted. A non-diagnostic cue, such as source information that is ambiguous did not 
prompt further elaboration.  
 
Our findings imply a difference in quality of elaboration. Little research has dealt with the 
quality of elaboration as opposed to the quantity of elaboration. Recent research on 
persuasion has been concerned with the role of people’s meta-cognitions (Tormala & Petty, 
2002, 2004) and has shown that people engage in meta-cognitive processes inferring 
information about the validity of their own attitude from their own counter-arguing of 
persuasive messages. In a similar vain, when recipients are made aware after the message of 
the lack of its credibility, they are likely to wonder whether the information did not invalidly 
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impact their judgment. This is nicely illustrated in a comment one of our participants in 
experiment 2 gave who had received non-credible source information after she had read the 
negative message: „Well it’s hard not to think about it because I read it before I knew that the 
credibility of the source was no good. So while I know that the negative information may not 
be true it’s still sort of in the back of my head.“ Being made aware of the potential biasing 
effect of the invalid brand information, elaboration is likely to be aimed at refuting the 
persuasive attempt. Such elaboration should qualitatively differ from elaboration in the light 
of a credible source that prompted it. Whereas in the case of a non-credible source recipients 
should engage in meta-cognitive processes concerned with whether the invalid message 
impacted their judgment too much, recipients who received the credible source should be 
concerned whether the valid message did impact their judgment sufficiently. Hence 
elaboration in the latter case should be aimed at maintaining the structural inconsistencies of 
the attitude caused by the inconsistent information. This notion is in line with current meta-
cognitive conceptualizations of attitude formation (Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2007).  
 
Concerning the effect of elaboration on attitude strength, our results showed that extended 
elaboration on attitude inconsistent information can do both: strengthen and weaken an 
attitude. What effect the quantity of elaboration has on attitude strength should depend on the 
quality of elaboration. We could thereby extend recent research (Sengupta & Johar, 2002) 
that investigated the effect of inconsistent information on attitude strength by showing that 
whether a strengthening or weakening effect results also depends on source credibility and 
time participants learn about the source. In addition, recent research that has been concerned 
with meta-cognitive processes in overcoming persuasive attempts has solely focused on a 
strengthening effect of attitudes (Tormala & Petty, 2002, 2004). Our research extends this 
work by suggesting that meta-cognitive processes may result in weakening effects likewise. 
 
In addition to the theoretical contributions, our research provides interesting practical insights 
for consumer researchers and practitioners. Despite the prevalence of negative information 
about brands especially with the rise of consumer complaints on Internet blogs, the effect of 
information inconsistencies on consumers’ brand attitudes has remained a research field with 
relatively little attention devoted to (Sengupta & Johar, 2002). In the modern marketing 
sphere, receiving information about brands of invalid source credibility or learning about the 
credibility after having heard or read the message becomes increasingly common. Sources 
like the Internet provide outraged consumers and cunning competitors alike with a quick tool 
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to publish their comments without revealing their identities. Hence, how worried should 
marketers be about the increasing amount of negative messages about their brands? Our 
results are two-fold: when allegations are from non-credible sources and consumers find out 
about this, marketers do not need to worry too much, even when consumers learn of the 
invalidity of the message after they have already processed the message. On the contrary, our 
results suggest that such an attack on the brand may even strengthen consumers’ attitudes. On 
the other side, our results suggest that mentioning the credible source after the message can 
strengthen the persuasive impact of a counter-attitudinal message, leading to weaker 
attitudes. Something companies may want to engage in when planning an attack on 
competitors’ brands. 
 
Our results may further provide interesting insights for companies’ communication strategies 
in response to false allegations and rumors. When the sources of such allegations are 
sufficiently non-credible, simply re-stating them and clearly pointing out the non-credible 
source may provide an effective refutation strategy. Some boundary conditions however have 
to be pointed out: the conditions under which our experiments were run were such that 
participants were presented with prior positive brand information (to insure a positive prior 
attitude) and had the ability to process the information (i.e., they were not distracted or 
capacity restrained, something that may not necessarily be the case in a non-laboratory 
setting).  
 
Some limitations of this research should also be acknowledged. Both experiments focused on 
one brand from a single product category. Future research should aim to replicate these 
findings with brands from other product categories. In addition future research should aim at 
investigating the behavioral relevance of our results. While previous research has found that 
more accessible attitudes have more behavioral relevance, future research should replicate 
our results showing an effect on actual behavior. More importantly future research should 
specifically look at the process of how structural inconsistencies are refuted or maintained by 
the different kinds of elaboration.  
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6.1. Abstract 
 
This research note uses scientific research on persuasion to develop recommendations on 
what to say (and what not to say) when your brand is in crisis, that is, in those situations 
where a brand faces significant criticism in the marketplace and media. We develop 
communication strategies that help the brand recover from a crisis and restore consumer trust 
and liking for the brand. Six examples illustrate the range of responses to crisis situations and 
serve as cases to apply the proposed communication framework. 
 
6.2. Introduction  
 
“We’re Mad as Hell…”3 
 
“Travelers Suffer ‘JetBlues’ on Valentine's Day”4 
 
“Can one very bad week for JetBlue Airways wipe out years of industry-leading customer 
satisfaction ratings?”5 
                                                 
2 Ronnie Sacco and Shamik Chakraborty provided research assistance fort this article  
3 Newsweek Web Exclusive (2/16/07), We’re Mad as Hell.  
4 Fox News (2/15/07), More Flights Canceled as Midwest, Northeast Recover From Valentine’s Day Storm. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252122,00.html 
5 New York Times (2/17/06), Long Delays Hurt Image of JetBlue.  
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What should JetBlue say when faced with these adverse comments from consumers and the 
media? Should it apologize? Should it blame the bad weather for flight delays and absolve 
itself of blame? And should it focus on different messages to different audiences? In this 
research note, we draw on scientific research on persuasion to develop recommendations on 
what to say when your brand is in crisis. We develop communication strategies that help the 
brand recover from a crisis and restore consumer trust and liking for the brand. We define 
crisis situations as those where a brand faces significant criticism in the marketplace and 
media. 
 
6.2.1. Post-Crisis Communication  
 
When JetBlue was criticized for operational failure, it seemed that customers previously 
ecstatic with JetBlue’s fares and service would lose faith in the brand. The brand failure and 
accompanying negative publicity would make customers like the brand less, feel negatively 
toward it and if these feelings were strong enough, would make them abandon the brand and 
switch to other (possibly low-fare) airlines. Potential customers who have never flown 
JetBlue may make a mental note to never book a flight on that airline. JetBlue management 
had a choice—to be resigned to this fate or to use the powerful tool of communication to 
recover from the crisis. The goal of the communication strategy should be to restore the 
brand’s image to pre-crisis state. And here’s an amazing thing: recovering from a crisis in the 
“right” way may sometimes even improve brand image!6 By the same token, using the 
“wrong” communication strategy in a given situation (one that could be appropriate in a 
different situation but does not fit the current situation) could damage the brand beyond 
repair. 
 
The goal of this note is to recommend the communication strategy that should be used in 
different crisis situations to restore brand image with customers (other stakeholders such as 
investors need to be considered as well; however, this note focuses on best practices in 
response to customers). We illustrate our recommendations using cases of successful as well 
as unsuccessful handling of the recovery from brand crises. At the end of this note, you 
should know what to say as well as what not to say in different crisis situations. 
                                                 
6 Aaker, J., Fournier, S. & Brasel, S. A. (2004). When Good Brands Do Bad. Journal of Consumer Research, 31 
(1), 1-16. 
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6.2.2. Navigating the Crisis  
 
When the crisis hits, or better yet when you anticipate a crisis, ask yourself how severe the 
crisis is from the viewpoint of the current and potential customer. Will customers classify the 
event precipitating the crisis as serious? What will be the media slant on the crisis, and how 
will this influence perceived crisis severity by the customer? Crisis severity lies in the eyes of 
the beholder, in this case the customer. From the brand management’s standpoint, the 
incident that sets off a crisis could seem minor. Yet, it could be magnified by circumstances 
or by buzz. For example, in the case of Proctor & Gamble (P&G), distributors of a 
competitor’s brand, Amway, started spreading a rumor that over the years developed into a 
“public relations nightmare”: the story claimed that P&G donated large amounts of its 
revenues to the church of Satan.7 As obscure as this rumor may sound, it has troubled P&G’s 
management for decades and has led to several lawsuits. P&G says it has sustained major 
losses, including hundreds of millions of dollars in sales and other damages.8  
 
Based on the crisis severity analysis, put yourself in your customers’ shoes and try to predict 
what they will think about the crisis. Will the crisis-precipitating event be believed by 
customers (note that this is as important as whether the event is objectively true or a rumor)? 
Who will customers blame? Will they consider the transgression to be intentional, and will 
they believe that this type of thing is likely to happen again? Most important, what can you 
say to customers to reduce their perception of your culpability or reduce their perception of 
how indicative the crisis is of your brand’s true colors?  
 
6.2.3. Customers’ Thoughts and Attribution  
 
Events that precipitate crises are not the norm and are unexpected by consumers for the most 
part. If there is no pattern of crisis-prone behavior, then consumers are likely to start thinking 
about the event and why it happened.9 When the JetBlue disaster hit, consumers reading or 
hearing about it likely asked themselves such questions as: Is this true? Who is responsible? 
Was it intentional? Will the brand do this again? What does this event say about the 
                                                 
7 New York Times (3/27/01), Proctor & Gamble Suit Over Satan Rumor Resurrected. 
8Ibid. 
9 Johar, G. V. (1996). Intended and Unintended Effects of Corrective Advertising on Beliefs and Evaluations: 
An Exploratory Analysis. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 5 (3), 209–30. 
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brand/firm? Research in consumer psychology helps us understand what the answers to these 
questions are likely to be under different types of crisis situations. 
 
6.2.4. Is this True? 
 
Did JetBlue customers really get no warning that the flights would be canceled? Did they 
really sit in planes on the tarmac for 10 hours or more? Is it true that they did not get 
compensated? Customers’ beliefs regarding the validity of the event provoking the crisis are 
likely to be based on whether someone they know experienced it or where they saw or heard 
about it (i.e., source credibility10), how often they are exposed to it11 and how plausible it is 
that the brand would behave that way. Stories covered by CNN and the New York Times are 
likely to be believed more than those covered by blogs. At the same time, hearing about the 
event repeatedly, even if the repeated messages are from sources of dubious repute, will make 
consumers believe that the event was real. Consumers who are ambivalent about the brand 
are likely to believe even somewhat implausible rumors about the brand because, in an 
attempt to solidify their brand attitudes, they will not check the veracity of the source.12 
Finally, consumers are likely to think that negative events are true if there is a history of 
transgressions by the brand.  
 
6.2.5. Who is Responsible? 
 
Consumers are likely to blame the brand for the transgression if they do not feel favorably 
about the brand (e.g., the brand has an unfavorable reputation13) or are not committed to the 
brand,14 do not trust the brand,15 if the crisis is severe16 or if there is no easy-to-expect 
alternative to blame. For example, with flight delays, the weather is a convenient scapegoat. 
                                                 
10 Tybout, A. M. (1978). Relative Effectiveness of Three Behavioral Influence Strategies as Supplements to 
Persuasion in a Marketing Context. Journal of Marketing Research, 15 (May), 229-42. 
11 Roggeveen, A. & Johar, G. V. (2002). Perceived Source Variability Versus Recognition: Testing Competing 
Explanations for the Truth Effect. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12 (2), 81-91. 
12 Zemborain, M. & Johar, G. V. (2007). Attitudinal Ambivalence and Openness to Persuasion: A Framework 
for Interpersonal Influence. Journal of Consumer Research, 33 (4), 506–14.  
13 Laczniak, R. N., DeCarlo, T. E. & Ramaswami, S. N. (2001). Consumers’ Response to Negative Word-of-
Mouth Communication: An Attribution Theoretic Perspective. Journal of Consumer Psychology, (11) 1, 57-73. 
14 Johar, G. V. (1996). Intended and Unintended Effects of Corrective Advertising on Beliefs and Evaluations: 
An Exploratory Analysis. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 5 (3), 209–30. 
15 Gorn, G. J., Jang, Y. & Johar, G. V. (2007). Babyfaces, Trait Inferences, and Company Evaluations in a PR 
Crisis. Columbia Business School Working Paper. 
16 Robbennolt, J. K. (2000). Outcome Severity and Judgments of Responsibility: A Meta-analytic Review. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 30 (12), 2575-609. 
6   Brand Recovery 
203
Brands that have a history of flight delays, however, are less likely to get away with this 
excuse and are likely to be held responsible for the delay. Hence, one way to reduce being 
blamed in case of a crisis is to build up a good reputation beforehand. For example, a 
company that has a reputation of being very environmentally conscious will be held less 
responsible in case of a crisis affecting the environment than one that is known to care little.17 
In really severe and valid crises, there may be no one else who can be blamed.18 Consider, for 
example, the case of GlaxoSmithKline’s diabetes drug Avandia. In a scientific study 
including more than 28 thousand patients, it was found that usage of Avandia increases the 
risk of heart attack by 43%.19 In response, the Food and Drug Administration issued a public 
safety alert and advised an estimated two million patients worldwide to consult their doctors. 
GlaxoSmithKline issued news releases that it “strongly disagrees” with the finding of the 
study, however, its shares fell by nearly 8% in response.20  
 
6.2.6. Was it Intentional? 
 
Did JetBlue abandon its customers on purpose? Or was it unaware of what was happening? 
Could it have averted the 10-hour wait on the tarmac? Was it misinformed by the airport 
control tower? The answers to these questions will determine how hard the brand needs to 
work to regain consumer trust. Part of the answers comes from media reports on the event 
and the rest from consumers’ inferences based on their feelings toward the brand, past history 
of the brand and plausibility of innocence on the part of the brand. Consider the extreme case 
of Ford’s Pinto in the 1960s. In an attempt to build a car that could sell for under $2,000, 
Ford’s management knowingly sacrificed customers’ safety for the sake of finance: after the 
production line was already set, engineers found that the Pinto had a potentially lethal flaw—
in rear-end collisions the fuel system ruptured easily and could cause the car to catch fire. 
Management calculated the costs of fixing the flaw versus managing lawsuits from deaths 
and injuries and decided to go ahead with the launch of the faulty car. However, the costs of 
                                                 
17 Klein, J. & Dawar, N. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility and Consumers’ Attributions and Brand 
Evaluations in a Product-Harm Crisis. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 21, 203-217. 
18 Gorn, G. J., Jang, Y. & Johar, G. V. (2007). Babyfaces, Trait Inferences, and Company Evaluations in a PR 
Crisis. Columbia Business School Working Paper.  
19 Reuters (6/4/07), Interview—Avandia-type crisis could hit other drugs—Hassan. 
20 New York Times (5/22/07), Heart Attack Risk Seen in Drug for Diabetes. 
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lawsuits turned out to be much higher than the engineering solutions would have been, not to 
mention the damage in reputation and customers’ trust.21 
 
6.2.7. Will the Brand Do This Again? 
 
Consumers could infer that JetBlue makes razor-thin margins, so this type of incident is 
inevitable when circumstances are not ideal (e.g., there is bad weather). Or they could forgive 
the brand and consider this event a one-time transgression. Consumers’ predispositions 
toward the brand are likely to determine which of these inferences is made. Those who have 
had prior positive experiences and like the brand are more likely to forgive it, as long as there 
is a way to reason why it won’t happen again. If consumers believe there is a recurring 
pattern of transgression, they are likely to leave the brand altogether. This is likely even if the 
crisis is not very severe, as in the case of New-York based ice cream chain CremaLita. The 
continuous misstatement of its product’s fat content led to severe short-term drops in sales 
and the closing of more than half of its Manhattan stores during the year of the crisis. 
Ironically, severe crises may be perceived as relatively rare, and consumers may be less likely 
to believe that a negative event of this magnitude would happen again. 
 
6.2.8. What Does this Event Say about the Brand? 
 
Is JetBlue any different from other airlines? After deregulation, aren’t they all equally bad? If 
other airlines are reported to have had problems similar to JetBlue’s (even if on a slightly less 
severe scale), consumers may not make sweeping generalizations about the brand. However, 
if it looks like other airlines weathered the storm, consumers may draw inferences about 
JetBlue that even go beyond its operational abilities. For example, they may also disparage 
JetBlue’s service and schedules.22 This type of “halo” effect—where an isolated negative 
event with direct implications for one feature of the brand (operational efficiencies in this 
case) also spills over to affect beliefs about other features—is especially likely with less loyal 
and less-committed customers.23 
                                                 
21 Coombs, T. (2006). Code Red in the Boardroom. Crisis Management as Organizational DNA. Praeger: 
Westport. 
22 Johar, G. V., Sengupta, J. & Aaker, J. (2005). Two Roads to Updating Brand Personality Inferences: Trait 
Versus Evaluative Inferencing. Journal of Marketing Research, 42 (November), 458-69. 
23 Ahluwalia, R. (2000). Examination of Psychological Processes Underlying Resistance to Persuasion. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 27 (2), 217-32; Ahluwalia, R., Burnkrant, R. E. & Unnava, H. R. (2000). Consumer 
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6.3. Communication Arsenal when the Transgression is Real 
 
Your communication strategy should provide consumers with an answer to the questions 
posed above. To be sure, the answer you provide depends on whether the information 
provoking the crisis (the transgression) is objectively true or not. We provide normative 
communication strategies that answer consumers’ questions in two situations—when the 
transgression is objectively real versus not (e.g., a rumor). We start with the first situation. 
 
6.3.1. The ‘Come Clean’ Response  
 
If the brand is clearly at fault, and the crisis is severe, come clean at once. Apologize and 
accept responsibility, do not try to minimize the situation but communicate all the bad news 
at once. If it was unintentional (e.g., the Exxon Valdez oil spill), explain this by 
communicating regulations and safety procedures that should have prevented the oil spill. 
Help consumers make sense of the event. Discuss how you will prevent these types of events 
from occurring again. If this information is made compelling, customers may have even 
stronger attitudes toward the brand than they did before the crisis hit.24 
 
In severe cases where the brand is at fault, corrective action may be necessary in addition to 
an admission of guilt and an apology. Take JetBlue, for example. The company apologized in 
mass media publications as well as directly to its customers. To show that it means what it 
says, since the crisis JetBlue has canceled flights rather than take chances with the weather. 
Consumers may be influenced by what you say. But even more, they are influenced by what 
you do and whether you live up to your words. Corrective action can forestall the inference 
that this type of event will be associated with the brand in the future and may even reduce 
perceptions of responsibility and intentionality. 
 
Another example of a severe crisis that called for an apology and corrective action is that of 
the Tylenol tampering incident. Johnson and Johnson (J&J) simultaneously launched a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Response to Negative Publicity: The Moderating Role of Commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37 
(May), 203–14; Johar, G. V., Jaideep, S. & Aaker, J. (2005). Two Roads to Updating Brand Personality 
Inferences: Trait Versus Evaluative Inferencing. Journal of Marketing Research, 42 (November), 458-69. 
24 Sengupta, J. & Johar, G. V. (2002). Effects of Inconsistent Attribute Information on the Predictive Value of 
Product Attributes: Toward a Resolution of Opposing Perspectives. Journal of Consumer Research, 29 (June), 
39-56. 
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communication campaign issuing warnings to customers and withdrew the approximately 30 
million bottles on store shelves. This quick information campaign coupled with corrective 
action ensured that J&J did not suffer much fallout from the disaster. The media praised the 
firm’s handling of the crisis, and Tylenol recovered its market share of 35% in less than a 
year (from an 8% low at the time of the crisis). The Tylenol strategy worked with current 
customers by illustrating the firm’s responsiveness and providing them with reasons to stay 
with the company, and it worked with potential customers by assuring them of absence of 
risk.25The apology and admission of guilt strategy should be accompanied by a “Polish the 
halo” strategy to overcome the potential backlash to the brand.26 
 
6.3.2. The ‘Polish the Halo’ Response  
 
When an apology becomes necessary, the brand may also need to bolster its image so that 
less-committed customers do not become even more negative toward the brand27 or transfer 
their negative beliefs about certain features to other features of the brand (a so-called 
“spillover” effect).28 Brands need to be vigilant and guard against spillover from features that 
are central to the crisis to other features of the brand. One way to prevent spillover is to 
buffer the brand by polishing the brand image. Less-committed customers interpret 
information through a broader lens and use their liking for the brand to determine what the 
information means in terms of brand features.29 Brand advertising and PR activities could 
bolster brand image immediately in the aftermath of a crisis. An image-building campaign 
emphasizing the positive aspects of the brand should accompany or follow the apology 
without seeming to excuse the transgression in any way.  
 
Consider the example of Pepsi India, who faced accusations in 2003 concerning the low 
quality and possibly toxic nature of the water used for its products. A denial and attack the 
accuser strategy proved to be ineffective and similar accusations were made by the media 
                                                 
25 Dawar, N. & Pillutla, M. (2000). The Impact of Product–harm Crises on Brand Equity: The Moderating Role 
of Consumer Expectations. Journal of Marketing Research, 37, 215–26.  
26 Johar, G. V. (1995). Consumer Involvement and Deception from Implied Advertising Claims. Journal of 
Marketing Research, Volume 32, no. 3: 267–79. 
27 Johar, G. V. (1996). Intended and Unintended Effects of Corrective Advertising on Beliefs and Evaluations: 
An Exploratory Analysis. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 5 (3), 209–30. 
28 Einwiller, S. & Johar, G. V. (2007). Preventing Damage from Accusations—The Case of WalMart. European 
Marketing Conference, Reykjavik. 
29 Johar, G. V., Sengupta, J. & Aaker, J. (2005). Two Roads to Updating Brand Personality Inferences: Trait 
Versus Evaluative Inferencing. Journal of Marketing Research, 42 (November), 458-69. 
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three years later. With great media attention and personal efforts by the company’s CEO, 
Pepsi used a “Polish the halo” strategy in 2006, publicly announcing its efforts to help India 
monitor and improve its quality of water and food supply. This strategy eventually led the 
media to lavishly praise the company and its CEO.30 The “Polish the halo” strategy has the 
advantage of working even without consumers’ extensively processing the message. This 
makes it a viable choice in less severe cases in which customers invest less attention to the 
specifics of the crisis. This strategy is of special importance for uncommitted customers who 
are far less likely than committed customers to refute the message themselves.  
 
6.3.3. The ‘Not Just Me’ Response 
 
This response can help consumers understand the bigger picture. For example, it may be that 
the transgression is not something unique to your brand, but could happen to any other brand 
as well. If consumers understand this, then they are less likely to generalize from the crisis 
instance to other aspects of the brand, including its future trajectory. Give consumers 
information to consider when they ask themselves whether the crisis-provoking event was 
unique to your brand. For example, could market conditions have provoked this crisis for any 
competing brand as well? Provide cues that help consumers construct a narrative (a story with 
a sequence of events) that absolves your brand of the sole responsibility for the event. This 
message can help consumers put the transgression in perspective and lead the way to brand 
forgiveness. The “Not just me” response should be especially effective with committed 
customers. These customers are prone to counterargue themselves and just need to be 
provided with ammunition in the form of information cues.  
 
6.3.4. The ‘Yes, But…’ Response  
  
This response involves explaining the reasons for the crisis and/or downplaying the damage 
done. This justification response can only be used when the accusation is valid and the crisis 
is not severe. Justification is especially needed for customers who are less committed to the 
brand (see Exhibit 1 for a definition of commitment), because they will not generate these 
excuses for themselves. They are likely to believe that the transgression was intentional and 
the brand is to blame. Further, they may believe that this is the “true face” of the brand and 
                                                 
30 BusinessWeek (6/11/07), Pepsi: Repairing a Poisoned Reputation in India. 
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events such as these are likely to occur again. Providing reasons why the transgression 
occurred could make these customers’ attributions of blame less severe and help keep them in 
the brand franchise. Because uncommitted customers may not process this information in 
detail, combine this strategy with a “Polish the halo” strategy. 
 
6.4. Communication Arsenal when the Transgression is Not Real  
 
6.4.1. The ‘No, Not I’ Response  
 
If the accusation against the brand is not true, then denial could be a useful strategy if target 
consumers are committed to the brand and do not perceive the crisis to be severe. Denial 
should only be used if the accusations have gained traction, are clearly linked to your brand 
and are widely reported in the media. Otherwise, denial could be seen as an admission of 
guilt.31 In general denial has to be plausible, and the claim that the reported transgression did 
not in reality occur or that the brand has nothing to do with it has to be viewed as plausible. 
Trustworthiness of the brand’s denial message is key. Some ways to make the brand’s denial 
ring true include providing a narrative (a story line) that absolves the brand completely and 
using tactics that increase message credibility. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy 
will be most effective for committed customers. Customers who are less committed to the 
brand are unlikely to devote much attention to such a narrative and hence approaches like the 
“Polish the halo” may be more effective with them. In some cases, companies have to go to 
great lengths to develop the “No, not I” response. In 1996, rumors spread that fashion 
designer Tommy Hilfiger had appeared on the Oprah Winfrey Show stating he wished people 
of color would not wear his clothes. As Internet blogs called for boycotts, the company was 
forced to react. The firm addressed these rumors on discussion boards and created a section 
on its own website denying the claim. Hilfiger hired outside experts to try to trace the source 
of this erroneous rumor. Oprah Winfrey herself denied the allegations on her show in 1999 
and posted a statement on her website that Hilfiger had never appeared on her show. 
However, the rumor proved so persistent that in May 2007 Hilfiger did appear on Oprah 
Winfrey’s show in another attempt to make clear that the allegations were false. 
 
                                                 
31 Roehm, M. L. & Tybout, A. M. (2006). When Will a Brand Scandal Spill Over, and How Should Competitors 
Respond? Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (3), 366-73. 
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Consumers determine trustworthiness of the denial of wrongdoing based on cues such as 
company, brand and spokesperson history. Consumers also make inferences about 
trustworthiness based on surface cues such as the appearance of the spokesperson. For 
example, a large body of research suggests that characteristics associated with a babyface 
(round eyes, small chin) increase perceptions of honesty and message credibility suggesting 
that brands can send out a babyface in times of crisis.32 Caution is important though, because 
even a babyface will not be believed if the crisis is severe and the denial is considered 
implausible. 
 
6.4.2. The ‘Rebuttal’ Response  
 
When the crisis is severe, a “No, not I” or a “Yes, but…”strategy could backfire, even if the 
crisis was provoked by a rumor and is unjustified. When consumers believe that they 
personally are at risk (e.g., from previously unannounced side effects of prescription drugs), 
then brands need to come up with a point-by-point rebuttal of the accusation. Ignoring the 
attack, even if it is not valid, could sink the brand. Witness the Swift Boat campaign against 
John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election. A group called the “Swift Boat Veterans for 
Truth” that was allegedly financed by people close to competitor George W. Bush accused 
Kerry of lying about his action in the Vietnam War. The Kerry campaign did not immediately 
respond, and many believe that this lack of response was the key event that lost the election 
for Kerry. 
The rebuttal response even works for crises that are not very severe, but are in danger of 
being perceived as severe by less-committed customers as the crisis unfolds. Committed 
consumers spontaneously question the validity of an attack and can generate their own 
counterarguments. They are less likely to need help to counterargue when the crisis is not 
severe.33 If the incident that caused the crisis is very severe, however, then those highly 
committed to the brand or company have been shown to react just as negatively as those not 
committed. The bottom line is that severe crises require fast response with complete 
                                                 
32 Gorn, G. J., Jang, Y. & Johar, G. V. (2007). Babyfaces, Trait Inferences, and Company Evaluations in a PR 
Crisis. Columbia Business School Working Paper. 
33 Ahluwalia, R. (2000). Examination of Psychological Processes Underlying Resistance to Persuasion. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 27 (2), September, 217-32; Ahluwalia, R., Burnkrant, R. E. & Unnava, H. R. (2000). 
Consumer Response to Negative Publicity: The Moderating Role of Commitment. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 37 (May), 203–14. 
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information to help customers rebut the accusation if it is invalid.34 One tactic that could 
work to help consumers integrate the counterarguments is to frame them in a way that is 
similar to the framing of the attack.35 In this case, correction of false beliefs brought about by 
the false accusation may be automatic and not require much effort. And effort is something 
that consumers are unlikely to spend on a brand especially if they are not very committed to 
it. Consumers who are not motivated and able to hold accurate brand beliefs may not 
integrate the brand’s response to crisis.36 Framing the message to match the attack is a good 
tactic for these consumers. 
 
6.4.3. The ‘Inoculation’ Response37 
 
This is the only strategy that requires anticipating a crisis and preparing consumers for it by 
giving them counterarguments. This strategy is particularly effective if the crisis is severe and 
likely to receive a lot of media coverage. If you believe that even committed consumers will 
begin to question your brand when the news hits, then it is time to adopt an aggressive full-
frontal strategy. Anticipate the criticism and prepare consumers with counterarguments prior 
to the attack. The inoculation message acts like a vaccine and prevents the “crisis virus” from 
attacking the brand. Consumers are fortified by the message and ready to counterargue when 
the crisis hits. Inoculation can be used with caution if the crisis-provoking event is true—in 
this case, the role of the message is to make consumers believe that the crisis is not as severe 
as it will be made out to be in the media. Counterarguments, whether used as rebuttal or as 
inoculation, can point out that the attack is not valid, or not important, or not indicative of the 
true nature of the brand. 
 
                                                 
34 Einwiller, S., Fedorikhin, A., Johnson, A., & Kamins, M. (2006). Enough Is Enough! When Identification No 
Longer Prevents Negative Corporate Associations. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34 (2), 185-
94. 
35 Johar, G. V. & Roggeveen, A. (forthcoming). Changing False Beliefs from Repeated Advertising: The Role 
of Claim-Refutation Alignment. Journal of Consumer Psychology. 
36 Johar, G. V. & Simmons, C. The Use of Concurrent Disclosures to Correct Invalid Inferences. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 26 (4), 307-22. 
37 Einwiller, S. & Johar, G.V. (2007). Preventing Damage From Accusations – The Case of WalMart. European 
Marketing Conference, Reykjavik. 
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6.4.4. The ‘Attack the Accuser’ Response38 
 
This strategy should be used in small doses because it could backfire if it is viewed as being 
unfair or defensive. However, it may be necessary to attack the accuser especially if the 
accusation is severe. In less severe cases, attacking the accuser is unnecessary with highly 
committed customers, but should be used with less-committed customers. The idea here is to 
decrease the credibility of the claim by discrediting the accuser. If the unjustified attack 
originated from a competitor and then took off, the brand could bring this to light and show 
that vested interests are the origin of the attack.  
 
6.5. Summary 
 
As you can see, the goal of communication during a crisis is to diffuse the crisis by helping 
consumers understand why it happened and why the brand should not be viewed more 
negatively as a result of the crisis. Manage consumers’ attributions of blame as well as their 
thoughts about the future of the brand by providing them with a clear and cohesive narrative 
that answers their questions about the crisis in a compelling way. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the communication tools that are most useful in different circumstances. By 
choosing wisely from the communication arsenal, you can avert backlash from consumers 
and perhaps even strengthen your brand when a crisis hits.   
 
 
                                                 
38 Einwiller, S. & Johar, G.V. (2007). Preventing Damage From Accusations – The Case of WalMart. European 
Marketing Conference, Reykjavik. 
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6.6. Exhibit 1: The Role of Customer Commitment  
 
High customer commitment is one of the best insurances against the possibly devastating 
effects a crisis can have for an organization. Committed customers feel emotionally attached 
to a certain brand.39 They wish to maintain their relationship with the brand or the company 
and believe that that the relationship is worth working for.40 Usually commitment arises when 
customers are highly involved with a certain product of the company.41 Building brand 
commitment requires heavy investment of marketers’ resources42 but in the case of a 
marketing crisis it certainly pays off: because of their attachment to the brand, committed 
customers start questioning by themselves, whether reports about a crisis are true or not.43 
Hence, with theses customers it may be enough to simply provide them with information 
supporting that the accusation is not true. And even when an accusation is true, committed 
customers tend to perceive the event as less important than uncommitted customers.44 
Uncommitted customers instead will devote less attention to carefully examine whether the 
information is true. Further they are more likely to think that the problem may also affect 
other parts of the brand or the company.45 So for uncommitted customers it is necessary that 
companies actually provide counterarguments, as they are unlikely to engage in counter-
arguing themselves. 
                                                 
39 Fournier, S. (1998). Consumers and Their Brands: Developing Relationship Theory in Consumer Research. 
Journal of ConsumerResearch, 24 (March), 343–73; Lastovicka, J.L. &.Gardner, D.M. (1978). Components of 
Involvement. In: Attitude Research Plays for High Stakes, eds. John L. Maloney and Bernard Silverman, 
Chicago: American Marketing Association, 53–73. 
40 Morgan, R. & Hunt, D.S. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing. Journal of 
Marketing, 58(3), 20-38. 
41 Beatty, S.E., Kahle, L.R. & Homer, P. (1988). The Involvement-Commitment Model: Theory and 
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Figure 6-1: Comprehensive Crisis Communication Framework  
 
6.7. Brand Crises Examples 
 
6.7.1. Example 1: Cremalita 
 
Company 
CremaLita, a family-owned low calorie ice cream chain, opened its first store in New York in 
August 2001. Owner Jeffrey Britz stated in National Restaurant News that the chain targets 
audiences in “busy metropolitan areas” and planned to “ramp up expansion through 
franchising.”46 Within two years of its launch, the company included 10 Manhattan 
                                                 
46 National Restaurant News (8/4/03), CremaLita Grabs Scoop of Burgeoning Low-Fat Dessert Niche. 
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franchises and had made numerous deals with contract feeders and corporate cafeterias.47  
When CremaLita was introduced to the Los Angeles market in late 2003, Variety announced, 
“CremaLita ice cream has reached near-cult status in New York…and now Angelenos can 
get their paws on the coveted cone, too.”48 
 
Crisis: False Statement of Calories 
On October 2, 2002, The New York Times featured CremaLita in its “Dining In, Dining Out” 
column with headline reading: “Fewer Calories than Ice Cream, But More than You Think.”  
After conducting lab tests that found substantially higher fat and calorie values than 
Cremalita advertised, the Times accused CremaLita of deceptive advertising. In response to 
the Times expose, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) 
commissioned the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to test samples of the frozen 
dessert.  On December 30, 2003 DCA announced the findings of these tests in a press release 
widely quoted by New York area media: “New Yorkers think they’re getting a sweet deal, 
but in reality they are being fed false claims and three times the calories…What you think is 
60 calories is really closer to 300 calories.”49  The DCA hit CremaLita with 61 counts of 
deceptive and misleading trade practices and the company faced $30,500 in fines.50  On May 
4, 2004, ABC News included CremaLita in their story headlined, “Are Some Low-Cal Food 
Claims Big Fat Lies?”51 On May 26, 2004, the DCA and CremaLita jointly announced they 
had come to an agreement stating, “certain charges in the initial notice of violation were 
based, in good faith, on erroneous FDA analyses of the product, and that CremaLita admits 
no wrong doing.”52  The new findings suggested that “CremaLita is not low-calorie (by 
Federal definition), but it’s not as fattening as the city Department of Consumer Affairs 
charged.”53 
 
Communication Strategy: 
On the day the DCA announced its charges, chain owner Allison Britz maintained her stores 
sold a “good-for-you product.” “I just think their tests are incorrect,” she told the New York 
Sun. “We don’t think we’re wrong. I’ve tested this stuff…There is no reason for the labs to 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Variety (11/3/03). 
49 New York Sun (12/31/03), ‘Guilt Free’ Ice Cream Guilty?. 
50 New York Sun (12/31/03), ‘Guilt Free’ Ice Cream Guilty? 
51 http://www.abcnews.com (5/4/04), Are Some Lo-Cal Food Claims Big Fat Lies? 
52 http://www.nyc.gov (5/26/04) New Yorkers Get the Real Skinny. 
53 New York Daily News (5/27/04), CremaLita Lo-Cal Tiff Lands in the Middle. 
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give us bad tests.”54 Britz did admit to larger than advertised serving sizes, but she attributed 
this to repeated customer demands. When asked to respond to accusations about deceptive 
advertising by ABC News in early May 2004, Britz replied in an e-mail statement, “There 
were serious errors in the FDA methodology leading to a substantial overstatement of 
CremaLita’s calorie count, fat content and other nutritional information.”55 When CremaLita 
reached a compromise with the city on May 26, Ms. Britz stated in her joint press release 
with the DCA:  “We are pleased to reach this agreement with the Department of Consumer 
Affairs, and believe that the end result will be a win for all consumers…We also hope that 
our new voluntary level of disclosure and independent testing will become the industry 
standard…As an industry leader, our goal is to give our customers the highest quality fat-and 
cholesterol-free ice cream, accompanied by the kind of information needed to make an 
informed and satisfying choice.”56 
 
Result: 
According to Cremalita sales at stores dropped by 30% following DCA accusations, 
contributing to the closings of 6 of the 10 Manhattan stores in 2004.57 Traces of the 
Times/DCA allegations continue to haunt the brand.  When CremaLita opened its first café in 
Phoenix in early 2007, the first blogger to add a review on the City Guide wrote:  “NY Times 
did an expose on CremaLita revealing that the calorie content of their ‘small’ is 3x what they 
advertised.”58 The DCA’s initial indictment of Cremalita kept many customers away from the 
stores, according to Cremalita.59  Some customers - as revealed in personal blogs and local 
media interviews - felt “betrayed” to hear how fattening a supposedly low-cal snack might 
be.60  One consumer, Stephen Brandt, did attempt to bring a class action suit against the 
company in 2004 claiming that “as a result of CremaLita’s alleged false advertising…he and 
countless ‘other members of the class’ were put at risk of severe health problems,”61 but a 
Manhattan judge dismissed the suit in May 2006. 
 
                                                 
54 New York Sun  (12/31/03), “Guilt Free” Ice Cream Guilty? 
55 http://www.abcnews.com (5/4/04), Are Some Low-Cal Food Claims Big Fat Lies? 
56 http://www.nyc.gov (5/26/04), New Yorkers Get the Real Skinny. 
57 New York Times (4/17/05), As Calories Add Up, the Costs Can, Too. 
58 http://search.cityguide.aol.com/phoenix (1/19/07), CremaLita: Ratings and User Reviews. 
59 New York Times (4/17/05), As Calories Add Up, the Cost Can, Too. 
60 New York Sun (12/31/03), ‘Guilt Free’ Ice Cream Guity? 
61 http://www.overlawyered.com (5/30/06). 
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6.7.2. Example 2: Dell 
 
Company 
In 2005 Dell was the world’s largest computer manufacturer (currently the number three in 
the market) with an 18.2% market share62, generating $55,908 million in global revenues. 
Dell was founded in 1984 and is based in Texas.63 Dell pioneered the direct-sales model for 
computers by eliminating the middleman.64  According to the American Customer 
Satisfaction index, Dell scored 79 in August 2004, comfortably above the industry average.65   
 
Crisis: Customer Support Problems – “Dell Hell” 
On June 21, 2005, Jeff Jarvis, creator of BuzzMachine, a popular weblog tracking new 
developments in media, headlined his entry “Dell lies. Dell sucks”,66 coining the phrase “Dell 
Hell.”  Throughout the summer of 2005, Jarvis chronicled his efforts to get Dell to fix his 
broken computer, a quest he claims included “an infuriating string of unanswered or 
improperly handled e-mails and phone calls.”67  The complain was that Dell’s customer 
service was poor, long wait times on the phone, unresolved technical problems and hard-to-
understand customer service representatives working in India.68 Soon mainstream media like 
Business Week, Fast Company, ZDNet, PC World and the Houston Chronicle gave the claim 
a wider audience. 69  In October 2005, Business Week headlined an article, “Hanging Up On 
Dell?” referencing Jarvis’ blog and stating that “plenty of people are going public with 
complaints” about Dell, giving birth to websites like www.ihatedell.net. An industry observer 
noted “What began as a personal account by Jarvis of his problems with Dell on his 
BuzzMachine blog has turned into a public perception nightmare.”70 
 
Communication Strategy: 
Initially Dell ignored the blogger uprising and the subsequent media coverage. In August 
2005, Dell CEO Rollins refuted news of a recent slip in Dell’s American Customer 
                                                 
62http://www.netadvantage.standardpoor.com 
63 Hoovers, Dell Inc., Information and Related Industry Information. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Austin American Statesmen (8/16/05), Study Finds Fewer Dell Customers Satisfied, Company Disputes 
Finding of Increased Complaints. 
66 http://www.buzzmachine.com (6/21/05), Dell Lies. Dell Sucks. 
67 http://directmag.com (10/1/05), Dell Takes One Hell of a Blogging. 
68 Investor’s Business Daily (4/10/07), HP Advances, Dell Stumbles in Buyer Poll. 
69 B to B/Crain Communications (9/12/05), How One Man’s Weblog Became Dell’s Nightmare. 
70 B to B/ Crain Communications (9/12/05), How One Man’s Weblog Became Dell’s Nightmare. 
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Satisfaction Index rating stating that “findings from another organization and its own internal 
check showed that service is still strong and improving.”71 In October 2005, John Hamlin, 
senior VP of Dell’s U.S. consumer business, told Business Week that Dell was “hiring a few 
thousand additional reps this year and striving to reduce call transfers.” For over a year, Dell 
endured eroding market share and increasing slippage in customer satisfaction ratings, yet 
took no direct action in response to the Dell Hell attacks. Then, in November 2006, CEO 
Rollins announced the company would spend $150 million to fix customer service problems 
that left U.S. buyers in what the company acknowledged was “Dell Hell.”  On January 9, 
2007, a Houston Chronicle “Tech Blog” reported that newly Dell re-appointed CEO Michael 
Dell said he was “very aware of blog guru Jeff Jarvis’ crusade against his computer company 
over poor customer service…and now concedes that the way it was handled at the time was a 
mistake.”72  In February 2007, CEO Dell launched wwww.dellideastorm.com, a website “to 
gauge which ideas are most important and most relevant to the public” with a page which 
demonstrates how Dell is acting upon suggestions. 73   
 
Result: 
The customer responses to Jarvis’ blog were unprecedented; he appeared to unite millions of 
consumers furious about Dell’s poor service.74 Mainstream media backed up the bloggers’ 
complaints with their own interviews of disgruntled Dell customers.  Business Week, in a 
story prompted by the Dell Hell fury, reported on the saga of several Dell consumers—
including one that spent nearly three hours on the phone talking to half a dozen reps to solve 
a simple keyboard problem. “I certainly won’t buy another product from Dell,” she told 
Business Week.  “I will make sure that any other prospective Dell customer I meet knows 
what kind of treatment they’ll get.”75 In August 2005, a study issued by the University of 
Michigan found Dell’s American Customer Satisfaction Index dropped 6% to 74 points from 
79 in August 2004.76  In November 2006 Dell’s stock had fallen nearly 4% over one year 
ago, while Hewlett Packer quadrupled its profits in the same period.77  By July 2007, Dell 
                                                 
71 Austin American-Statesman (8/16/05), Study finds fewer Dell customers satisfied, Company disputes finding 
of increased complaints. 
72 http://blogs.chron.com (1/9/07), Dell on Dell Hell:  We were mostly to blame. 
73 Wikipedia, “Dell IdeaStorm”. 
74 The Guardian, (8/29/05) My Dell Hell. 
75 Business Week (10/10/05), Hanging up on Dell? 
76 Austin American-Statesman (8/16/05), Study finds fewer Dell customers satisfied. 
77 The Guardian (11/17/06), Financial:  Dell results delay deepen woes as HP quadruples profits. 
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slipped from its number one spot in worldwide PC sales to commanding the number three 
spot with a 17.1% market share.78 
 
While Dell’s perceived customer service problem was gaining momentum before Jarvis 
blogged his views, industry experts agree that BuzzMachine propelled the issue to crisis 
status.  In August 2006, Ad Age observed that Dell’s “brand image has been damaged by 
rampant online customer –service complaints—driven by BuzzMachine blogger Jeff Jarvis’ 
rants.”79  By February 2007, when Hewlett-Packer had overtaken Dell as the market leader, 
the Daily Telegraph observed, “the computer makers reputation could scarcely be lower…the 
internet is littered with websites detailing customers’ frustrations of wading through ‘Dell 
Hell.”80 
 
6.7.3. Example 3: Jetblue Airways 
 
Company  
JetBlue is a low-cost low-fare passenger airline, based in New York, that began operation in 
2000. It offers approximately 500 daily flights from 50 destinations, and has a market 
capitalization of around $2.4billion81. In a February 2007 survey by the Consumer Reports 
National Research Center, just days before the Valentine’s Day crisis it was ranked as No. 1 
in customer satisfaction with a score of 87 out of a possible 100.82 
 
Crisis: Valentine’s Day delay with passengers stuck in planes, Feb. 14th, 2007 
On Valentine’s Day in 2007 a series of storms in the eastern U.S. halted air traffic. Although 
many other carriers had already cancelled dozen of flights in preparation of the storm, due to 
its policy to ensure a flight is completed, JetBlue’s management opted to wait it out and 
boarded the planes, which were subsequently waiting on the runway for the weather 
conditions to improve. But instead of improving, freezing rain and sleet continued and planes 
and equipment were slowly freezing to the tarmac. Customers were stuck in the airplanes and 
                                                 
78 http://www.netadvantage.standardpoor.com,, Dell Inc. 
79 Ad Age (8/21/06), Dell Still No. 1, But Blogger, Battery Recall Dent Image. 
80 Daily Telegraph (2/2/07), Michael Dell is Planning to Change his Firm’s Course Completely to Recover Lost 
Ground. 
81 Bartholomew, D. & Duwall, M. (2007). What Really Happened at JetBlue. Baseline Magazine. 
http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,1540,2111617,00.asp 
82 USAToday (2007). What Meltdown? JetBlue Named Top U.S. Airline. 
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2007-06-05-jetblue-survey_N.htm 
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not allowed to leave for up to eleven hours83 with little to eat, problematic air and bathroom 
conditions84. After it became clear the planes would not be able to take off, due to the heavy 
snow and ice storms, passengers had to be taken back to the terminal by bus. Customers were 
claiming their experience to be “the worst” and “horrific”85. 
 
In addition JetBlue was accused of having heavily underinvested in its information system. 
JetBlue was unable to handle the resulting calls from passengers that were trying to reserve 
other flights due to an outdated information system not prepared for dealing with such a 
situation. As a result many passengers were unable to get through to the reservation system or 
had to wait more than an hour on the line. Also, JetBlue did not have a computerized system 
in place for recording and tracking lost bags, which meant that the returning bags from the 
planes piled up and passengers had to wait for up to three days to reclaim their baggage86.  
 
Communication Strategy: 
In a first step JetBlue apologized by personally calling affected customers and providing 
information by explaining passengers individually the reasons for the failures.87 The 
company’s CEO further publicly apologized by saying he was “sorry and embarrassed” 88 
acknowledging that the situation was totally “unacceptable”89. In an effort to come clean 
JetBlue offered immediate refunds and travel vouchers for customers stuck on planes for 
longer than three hours. In addition, the company’s CEO announced a new “customers’ bill 
of rights” and created a “service guarantee”, that includes certain guaranteed vouchers 
relative to the length of the delay. Also, JetBlue’s CEO vouched for new investments in 
weather related operations, thereby bolstering the company’s reputation of customer-
friendliness90. 
 
Result:   
As a response to the JetBlue crisis, Consumer Reports conducted a small follow-up survey in 
April and found that JetBlue's Valentine's Day problems had little effect on the airline's 
                                                 
83 Factiva (02/15/07). DJ Update: Airlines Scramble to Recover After US Winter Storm  
84 Factiva (02/16/07). NYC Fliers Stranded on Planes for Hours.   
85 Factiva (02/16/07). NYC Fliers Stranded on Planes for Hours.   
86 Bartholomew, D. & Duwall, M. (2007). What Really Happened at JetBlue. Baseline Magazine. 
http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,1540,2111617,00.asp 
87 Business Week (03/62/2007), Readers Report. JetBlue Customers stand by their Carrier.  
88 Business Week (03/12/2007). Is JetBlue the Next People Express?  
89 Factiva (02/16/07). NYC Fiers Stranded on Planes for Hours.   
90 Business Week (03/05/2007). An Extraordinary Stumble at JetBlue. 
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overall levels of satisfaction, with the carrier remaining among the top-rated airlines in the 
survey. 91 In a Business Week Readers Report passengers involved in the Valentine’s Day 
crisis applauded the communication strategy employed by JetBlue in response to the crisis. 
One passenger: “Many companies, when faced with such a consumer crisis, first deny the 
problem, then promise to study the issue, then resolve it with some personnel changes. In 
stark contrast, JetBlue moved swiftly to own up to its failures, honestly explain why they 
happened […], and worked to both fix the problem and mend fences with customers who 
were harmed.”92 However, the former CEO Neeleman had to step down in response to the 
Valentine crisis93 a couple of months later and similar problems have been reported with 
passengers delayed in planes for 25hours in June 2007.94 
 
6.7.4. Example 4: Pepsi 
 
Company 
Pepsi was founded in 1965, and is one of the largest food and beverage companies in the 
world. Headquartered in Purchase, New York, the company has operations in 200 countries. 
Pepsi recorded revenues of $35 billion in 2006 with a net profit of $6 million.95 Pepsi Cola 
International first entered the Indian market in 1988 through a joint venture with a 
government-owned company. In 1994, Pepsi-Co bought out its Indian partner.96  From 1989-
2004, Pepsi-Co invested $700 million in the Indian growth market; annual sales for Pepsi 
India in 2004 neared $1 billion.97 
Crisis: Pesticides in Pepsi drinks 
On August 5, 2003, the Center for Science and Environment (CSE) Director Sunita Narain 
announced that her group had conducted a study that revealed “shocking quantities of 
pesticides” in many Pepsi and Coca-Cola beverages produced in India.98 Narain, a well-
known activist, emphasized the “extremely toxic” nature of the pesticides that, with 
prolonged exposure, cause “cancer, damage to the nervous and reproductive systems, birth 
                                                 
91 USAToday (2007). What meltdown? JetBlue Named Top U.S. Airline. 
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2007-06-05-jetblue-survey_N.htm 
92 Business Week (03/62/2007), Readers Report. JetBlue Customers stand by their Carrier.  
93 The Star (06/01/2007). Ex-JetBlue CEO Sells 2.5M Shares.  
94  New York Post (06/29/2007). Get a Clue Blue! 25-hr. Ordeal of JFK-Bound Fliers. 
 
95 http://www.datamonitor.com (6/24/07), Company Profiles: Pepsi-Co. 
96 Ibid. 
97 http://www.domain-b.com (10/26/04), Pepsi-Co India Sales to Hit $1-Billion Mark Soon. 
98 http://www.tribuneindia.com (8/05/03), Pesticides Found in Coke, Pepsi. 
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defects and severe disruption of the immune system.”99Narain said that the study found the 
pesticides in Pepsi-Co brands to be, on average, 36 times higher than the European Economic 
Commission (EEC) standards; no such standards had yet been established by the Indian 
government for beverages. Moreover, the CSE found vastly lower incidences of pesticides in 
sodas sold and manufactured in the US, prompting Narain to accuse these “global players 
who fake social responsibility” of producing products abroad “they wouldn’t dare sell at 
home.”100 The Indian press was outraged at news of this report, the Times of India wrote of 
the “deadly cocktail of pesticide residues”101 in major cold drink brands; the Tribune called 
the report “a startling revelation.”102 
 
Communication Strategy:  
Hours after the CSE accusations became public, Pepsi denied all claims of tainted products; 
Pepsi India Chief Executive Rajeev Bakshi suggested the CSE report was “baseless” and  
“should be disregarded.”103  The company quickly placed ads in the largest circulation 
newspapers seeking to counter the accusations—but these same papers ran editorials accusing 
Pepsi of utilizing double standards.104 Bakshi publicly criticized the inflammatory campaign 
being waged by the Indian media declaring, “this is a trial by media,” and considered 
bringing the CSE to court for publishing what Pepsi considered to be bogus findings.105  
Pepsi executives resolutely discredited the CSE findings, suggesting that the method used 
was for testing water and that it would lead to the wrong conclusion for soft drinks.106 In an 
article which focused on the dire health concerns presented in the CSE findings, Bakshi was 
unflappable:  “We expect a temporary setback for about a week or so and then we are sure the 
consumers will have the same confidence in us they have always shown.”107 
 
Result: 
Initially, Indian consumers were enraged by the CSE findings. Protestors in Mumbai and 
Kolkata defaced Pepsi and Coke ads and burned placards depicting soda bottles; several India 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 
100 Business Week (6/11/07), Pepsi: Repairing a Poisoned Reputation in India. 
101 The Times of India (6/5/03), Test Reveal Pesticides in Coke, Pepsi, Mirinda”. 
102 http://www.tribuneindia.com (8/5/03), Pesticides Found in Coke, Pepsi. 
103http:// www.abc.com (8/6/03), Coke, Pepsi in India Deny Pesticides in Soft Drinks. 
104 The Financial Times (8/8/03), Coca Cola and Pepsi May Take Legal Action Over ‘Pesticide’ Claim. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Indian Business Insight (8/16/03), Pepsi India Chief Slams CSE Test Method. 
107 Inter Press Service (8/6/03), Health:  Indian Coke and Pepsi Laced with Pesticides, says NGO. 
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states temporarily restricted or banned soda sales.108 A popular Indian guru, Baba Ramdeu, 
began telling his cable-television viewers that Pepsi and Coke should be used as “toilet 
cleaners.”109 Moreover, the CSE continued a campaign of e-mail alerts and accusatory press 
releases inviting comments from journalists and bloggers worldwide. 
 
Several weeks after the CSE report was released, Pepsi officials reported daily sales figures 
had dropped by 30%.110 According to Business Week, linking Pepsi with pesticides was 
enough to scare off even sophisticated consumers. Advertising executive Manish Sinha, a 
former cola loyalist, admits he would rather be safe than drink Pepsi. “I no longer trust the 
cola companies,” he said.111 Fallout from the 2003 crisis also took the form of management 
shakeouts:  three executive VP’s, one unit head and an executive director of Pepsi India 
resigned in December 2003 due to “low morale and discontent in the company after the 
pesticide controversy.112 Nonetheless, despite short-term losses and lingering consumer 
concerns, Pepsi appeared to be financially recovering from its pesticide crisis. By September 
20, Bakshi reported that Pepsi’s sales were returning to the pre-controversy level.113 In 
October 2003, Business Standard reported that “Indian operations have contributed 
significantly to the third-quarter growth of Pepsi-Co International”- despite the sharp dip in 
sales in the “days” following the CSE report.114 By April 2004, the Economic Times of India 
headlined an article “Cola majors get fizz back” and reported Indian sales growth for Pepsi 
for first quarter 2004 to be in the high teens.115 Some analysts believed the crisis had been 
averted, if not resolved, just as “previous health scares blew over.”116 
 
Over time, however, the crisis actually smoldered. The CSE, under Narain’s direction, 
continued to pursue the pesticide problem, building a strong consumer following along the 
way. On August 2, 2006, the CSE issued a second report that declared, “three years after CSE 
released its findings…soft drinks remain unsafe and unhealthy.”117 Media analysts agreed 
that this second crisis was more serious than the first. In the days that followed the 2006 CSE 
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report, seven of India’s 28 states imposed partial or complete bans on Pepsi and other 
company sodas.  There were also reported scattered demonstrations with environmental 
groups calling out:  “Coke, Pepsi, Quit India.”118 
 
6.7.5. Example 5: Whole Foods 
 
Company 
Whole Foods was founded in 1980 in Austin, Texas, pioneering the supermarket concept in 
natural and organic foods retailing119 with 190 stores in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. and 
$5.6 billion in revenues.120 Since 1996, the company has consistently ranked as one of the 
“100 Best Companies to Work for in America” by Fortune.121  On February 21, 2007, Whole 
Foods agreed to buy arch competitor Wild Oats Market for $565 million.122 Viewing the 
merger as “anticompetitive,” the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought to block Whole 
Foods’ offer and, in June 2007, initiated an investigation.123  
 
Crisis: CEO’s anonymous Internet postings 
While investigating the company’s motives for the proposed merger, the FTC stumbled upon 
a disturbing skeleton in CEO John Mackey’s closet: since 1999, Mackey had been engaged in 
pseudonymous postings on Yahoo’s Finance Message Board. According to USA Today, 
“Rahodeb” (Mackey’s online identifier) was “unstintingly bullish on the prospects of Whole 
Foods continuing growth, and frequently critical of a rival company, Wild Oats.”124 In light 
of Whole Foods’ intended takeover of Wild Oats, the media pounced on the story, revealing 
the often-incriminating details of Mackey’s postings. Industry observers voiced surprise and 
disillusionment in both mainstream media and on specialized sites—debating the legality and 
morality of Mackey’s actions. Describing the incident as an “…embarrassing message board 
brouhaha,” the technology industry newsletter Techdirt commented, “It’s not clear that what 
he did was necessarily illegal, but his posting seems unethical and highly foolish...If nothing 
                                                 
118 Associated Press Newswires (8/27/06), Coke, Pepsi Doing Little to Confront Pesticide Allegations in India.  
119http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com.  
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else, the company’s stockholders should wonder about what the boss is doing with his 
time.”125  
 
Once the details of Mackey’s postings were made public, it appeared some investors had lost 
faith in Mackey and the future success of the brand. CTW Investment Group, a major Whole 
Foods Market shareholders group, sent a letter to the chain’s board of directors asking that 
Mackey step down as chairman. Lay bloggers and Whole Foods customers, on the other 
hand, were neither unanimously angry with Mackey nor ready to turn away from the brand, 
en masse, as a result of the incident. As one contributor to Techdirt’s site wrote: “Isn’t part of 
the CEO’s job to promote public confidence for his company? As long as he’s just 
cheerleading and not disclosing insider information, isn’t this what he is supposed to be 
doing?”126 While not overly critical of Mackey, a woman writing on www.allbusiness.com 
nonetheless expressed confusion over his actions: “Whole Foods are fantastic stores, and it’s 
a great company. But what public company CEO makes this kind of rookie mistake?”127 And, 
for some bloggers, Mackey’s only mistake was getting caught, as exemplified by this posting 
on Wired, “Forget just the CEOs. How many various high level employees…are hitting the 
financial blogs? Maybe the better question is—how many are not?”128  
 
Communication Strategy:  
One week after the FTC revealed “Rahodeb’s” Internet activities, CEO Mackey issued the 
following succinct public apology statement directed at Whole Foods investors: 
“I sincerely apologize to all Whole Foods Market stakeholders for my error in judgment in 
anonymously participating on online financial message boards. I am very sorry and I ask our 
stakeholders to please forgive me.”129 Mackey followed this formal apology by publishing an 
explanation under the “FAQ” section on the company website, using a tone more appropriate 
for Whole Foods customers than investors, writing:  
 
“I posted on Yahoo under a pseudonym because I had fun doing it. Many people 
post on bulletin boards using pseudonyms. I never intended any of those postings 
to be identified with me…The views articulated by “rahodeb” sometimes 
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represented what I actually believed and sometimes they didn’t. Sometimes I 
simply played “devil’s advocate” for the sheer fun of arguing. Anyone who knows 
me realizes that I frequently do this in person, too.”130  
 
Result:  
Ultimately, the Rahodeb incident had little long-term effect on consumers. Perhaps, as crisis 
communications consultant Eric Dezenhall suggested soon after the story broke, the incident 
represented “more of an embarrassment than an issue of profound ethical and legal 
consequence.”131 On the day following the FTC disclosures, Whole Foods Market’s share 
price dropped only slightly—about 1%—with double the average shares changing hands.132 
A few weeks later, Whole Foods reported a less-than-anticipated dip in third- quarter profits 
and a 13% increase in revenues, significantly bumping up share prices.133 One month after 
Mackey’s postings were made public, on August 17, 2007, the Federal Court overrode the 
FTC’s ruling, permitting Whole Foods to merge with Wild Oats. Commenting on the 
decision, the New York Times wrote, “In the end, the online ramblings of Rahodeb didn’t 
scuttle the plans of Whole Foods Market to buy Wild Oats.”134 A press release issued on 
November 20, 2007, by Whole Foods Market reported fourth-quarter revenues, ending 
September 30, to have increased 24.7% versus a year ago. Annual revenues, ending on the 
same date, jumped from $5.6 billion to $6.6 billion. More than six months after the FTC 
revealed Rahodeb’s identity, Mackey remained president and CEO of Whole Foods Market. 
 
6.7.6. Example 6: Mattel 
 
Company  
Mattel, based in El Segundo, California, was founded in 1945 and has since grown to become 
the largest toy manufacturer in the world with revenues of nearly $5.7 billion in 2006135 and 
an annual toy output of nearly 800 million units.136 Its product line includes Barbie dolls, 
Fisher Price toys and Hot Wheels and Matchbox cars.137 In 2006, Mattel owned and operated 
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10 factories worldwide that produced half of its toys. The remaining 50% of Mattel’s 
production was outsourced to third-party vendors in China.138  
 
Crisis: Lead paint and loose magnets on toys  
During the summer of 2007, Mattel endured three separate toy recalls, ultimately involving 
the recall of nearly 20 million toys worldwide. Of these toys, 17.4 million were recalled 
because of loose magnets and the possibility of near-fatal intestinal complications if ingested, 
while 2.2 million were recalled because of impermissible levels of lead linked to serious 
health problems in children, including brain damage.139 This prompted a U.S. Congressional 
Committee to demand information from Mattel about the numerous recalls involving lead-
tainted children’s products made in China. 
Communication Strategy: 
Mattel was quick to empathize with consumer concerns, but backed away from taking direct 
responsibility for the recalls, blaming Chinese manufacturers for ignoring Mattel’s quality 
control mandates. On the day news of lead paint on Mattel toys broke, CEO Bob Eckert 
commented to the New York Times: “This is a vendor plant with whom we’ve worked for 15 
years; this isn’t somebody that just started making toys for us. They understand our 
regulations, they understand our program, and something went wrong. That hurts.”140 On the 
day following the second recall announcement, Mattel ran an ad campaign in the Wall Street 
Journal, the New York Times, the Financial Times US and USA Today featuring a photograph 
of children playing and a letter written by CEO Eckert: “Nothing is more important than the 
safety of our children…Our long record of safety at Mattel is why we’re one of the most 
trusted names with parents, and I am confident that the actions we are taking now will 
maintain that trust.”141 Eckert added that Mattel had implemented a three-point checking 
system “to ensure that only paint from certified suppliers is used.”142 Eckert also filmed a 
video apology to parents that was distributed online pledging to “significantly increase the 
frequency of its paint inspections.”143 Making appearances on numerous TV news programs, 
including CNN and ABC News: Nightline, Eckert maintained Mattel’s commitment to 
rigorous standards, once again inferring that Chinese factories had let Mattel down: “I’m 
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disappointed, I’m upset. But I can assure your viewers that…we’ll continue to enforce the 
highest quality standards in the industry.”144  
 
Ten days after the Senate hearings, in a dramatic and unexpected about-face, Mattel 
Executive VP Thomas Debrowski traveled to Beijing to publicly apologize to the Chinese 
government and to finally assume “full responsibility” for the past summer’s recalls, noting 
Mattel’s duty to perform final quality checks on its imports. Debrowski also acknowledged, 
“The vast majority of those products that were recalled were the result of a design flaw in 
Mattel’s design [referring to the magnet issue]…lead-tainted toys accounted for only a small 
percentage of the toys recalled…We understand and appreciate deeply the issues that this has 
caused for the reputation of Chinese manufacturers.”145    
 
Result:  
Not surprisingly, U.S. consumers were losing faith in the Mattel brand and its reliance on 
Chinese production facilities as a result of the recurring recalls. As one mother whose young 
son had repeatedly “mouthed” a Mattel toy targeted by the recall expressed on ABC News: 
Nightline, “You just expect more from an American company, an American toy company, 
knowing that their products are going into the hands and the mouths of small children.”146 
Another mother of a five-year-old girl was quoted in the Newark Star Ledger: “I’m very 
worried. Today when I saw the newspaper, my daughter was playing with that Barbie doll. 
You can lose a kid over a $14.99 doll. It’s very scary.”147   
 
After the massive second recall, toy industry analyst Doug Hart predicted, “This could be the 
time that consumer perception begins to change in relation to Mattel and Barbie.”148 Crisis 
communications consultant Howard Rubenstein agreed: “Mattel has a spectacular reputation 
that they risk now…it is a mighty blow.”149 Rubenstein further suggested Mattel needed to 
take “dramatic steps” to contain the damage. One day after news of the first recall was 
released, Mattel reported that this recall alone would reduce second-quarter 2007 operating 
income by almost 50%.150 On the day the second recall was announced, Mattel stocks 
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plunged by as much as 6%.151 On October 15, in an article headlined “Mattel:  Recalls Are 
the Least of Its Problems,” CNN Money reported dramatically lower-than-projected third-
quarter profits and sales for Mattel, with U.S. sales of its flagship Barbie brand tumbling 19% 
as a result of the recalls.152 
                                                 
151 Reuters (8/14/07), Mattel Recalls Millions More Chinese-made Toys. 
152 cnnmoney.com (10/15/07), Mattel: Recalls Are the Least of Its Problems. 
 
